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THE NUCLEAR TEST BAH TREATY, I 963 :
A BIPARTISAN STEP TOWARD 
DETENTE
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION
The N uclear T es t Ban T rea ty  was th e  s u b je c t o f an add ress to  
th e  n a tio n  by P re s id e n t John F . Kennedy on J u ly  26, 1963 . He s a id  
t h a t  th e  t r e a ty  was a  "sym bol," a  "hopefu l s te p ,"  "an o p p o rtu n ity  to  
reduce te n s io n s ,"  and an opening wedge w ith  our co ld  war a n ta g o n is t ,  
th e  S o v ie t Union. The t r e a t y  was s igned  in  Moscow on August $, I 963; 
r a t i f i e d  by th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Senate  on September 24, 19Ô3j and f i n a l l y  
c e r t i f i e d  in  Moscow, London and W ashington on O ctober 10, 1963 .^
The a c tio n  by th e  U nited  S ta te s  Senate was acclaim ed by 
p o l i t i c a l  w r i te r s  as  be ing  th e  most "momentous" d e c is io n  in  th e  p o s t­
war e ra  and as  such th e  d e c is io n  was to o  im portan t to  be governed by 
p a r t i s a n  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s . The p o l i t i c a l  atm osphere was r ip e  
f o r  p a r t i s a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s . Less th a n  a  y ea r b e fo re  th e  S o v ie t Union 
had p r e c ip i ta te d  th e  m is s i le  c r i s i s  in  Cuba. D om estically  th e  c i v i l  
r ig h t s  movement clim axed on August 28 , I 963, w ith  th e  p e a c e fu l march on 
W ashington. The G o ld w a te r-fo r-P re s id en t movement was j u s t  beg inn ing  
t o  g e t in to  f u l l  swing. The Democratic a d m in is tra tio n  was being
\ r . S . ,  Department o f  S ta te  B u l le t in  (O ctober 28, I 963) , p . 658 .
accused of ex cessiv e  c re d u li ty  by Senator Barry Goldwater, Governor 
Nelson R o ck e fe lle r and Mr. R ichard Nixon. P res id en t John F. Kennedy 
in  an apparen t response  to  the  s im p lis t ic  approach of th e  r a d ic a l  r ig h t  
wing fo llow ing  of Senator Goldwater toward fo re ig n  involvem ent and en­
ta n g lin g  a l l ia n c e s ,  s ta te d  in  a speech a t  S a lt  Lake C ity , Utah, th a t  
America must guard a g a in s t  the  d i s t r u s t  o f such a l l ia n c e s ,  fo re ig n  a id  
and o th e r a sp e c ts  o f contem porary l i f e .
P ub lic  i n t e r e s t  ran  h igh  during th e  debate on th e  Test Ban 
T rea ty . P ressu re  groups such as the  Young Americans fo r  Freedom, a 
25,000 member group c o n s is tin g  o f co lleg e  s tu d e n ts , young alum ni, and 
f o r ty  members of Congress, announced through i t s  n a tio n a l chairm an, 
R obert E. Bauman, th a t  th e i r  o p p o s itio n  to  th e  t r e a ty  would be 
channeled by means o f  a n a tio n a l p e t i t io n  d r iv e , l e t t e r s  and person 
v i s i t s  to  S enato rs , and even by "mass dem o n stra tio n s."^  A r t ic u la te  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  groups can g e n e ra lly  be r e l i e d  upon to  flood  the  
m ail o f th e i r  c o n s ti tu e n t Congressmen and th a t  o f any o th e r  Congress­
man they  fe e l  they m ight in flu en ce  or coerce in to  v o tin g  fo r  or 
a g a in s t  a b i l l .  The e f f e c t s  o f such t a c t i c s  a re  d eb a tab le  and examples 
o f th i s  can be seen from th e  c o n tra s tin g  speeches o f Senator M argaret 
Chase Smith, R epublican of Maine, and Senator E veret D irksen , R epublican 
o f I l l i n o i s ,  during  th e  course o f th e i r  debate  on th e  T est Ban T reaty .
This in fo rm atio n  was in s e r te d  in to  th e  C ongressional Record 
o f August 15, 1963, p. 15167 by Senator Strom Thurmond, a t  th a t  tim e 
Democrat from South C aro lina .
S en a to r Smith s a id ;
What does th e  m a jo rity  o f th e  American people  -want? 
R a t i f ic a t io n  o r r e je c t io n  o f  th e  N uclear T est Ban Treaty?
The G allup p o l l  and th e  H a rr is  p o l l  r e p o r t  t h a t  an over­
whelming m a jo rity  o f  th e  American peop le  want th e  t r e a ty  
to  be r a t i f i e d .  But i t  i s  n o t what ny m a il shows. . . . 
and i t  i s  th e  h e a v ie s t  m a il th a t  I  have ever re c e iv e d  in  
a l l  o f  my e n t i r e  s e rv ic e  in  Congress. . . .
S en a to r Smith s a id  th a t  she would n o t l e t  th e  m a il have any s ig n i f ­
ic a n t  in f lu e n c e  on h e r  f i n a l  v o te . She would v o te  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y  
f o r  reasons o f n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty .
S en a to r E v ere t D irksen s a id :
In  my o f f ic e  a re  p robably  40,000 l e t t e r s  and on my c a p i to l  
desk a re  p e t i t io n s  co n ta in in g  10,000 names in  o p p o s itio n  
to  th e  t r e a ty .^
S en a to r D irksen went on to  say t h a t  only  on th re e  occasions had h is  
m ail been so in te n s e  and em otional. The f i r s t  occasion  was concerned 
w ith  th e  "cash and ca rry "  n e u t r a l i ty  debate  o f  1940. The second 
occasion  was a f t e r  th e  d ism is sa l o f  G eneral Douglas MacArthur. At 
th a t  tim e  he re c e iv e d  200,000 l e t t e r s .  The t h i r d  occasion  came when 
he s a t  on a  committee under S en a to r Joseph McCarthy which was t e l e ­
v is e d  and he re c e iv e d  250,000 l e t t e r s .  In  s p i te  o f t h i s .  S en a to r 
D irksen , a f t e r  quo ting  Edmund Burke, s a id :
% .S . ,  C ongressional Record, 8 8 th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  I 963,
c ix , p. 17831.
% .S . ,  C ongressional Record, 8 8 th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  I 963, 
CIX, p . 16794.
So Îîoday my s ta tem en t t h a t  I  s h a l l  support th e  t r e a t y  i s  an 
e x e rc is e  o f  my independent judgment based  upon what I  th in k  
i s  b e s t  f o r  ny co u n try .^
Not only  was t h i s  an independent judgment based upon what he though t
b e s t  f o r  th e  co u n try , b u t i t  was a  re a f f irm a tio n  o f  th e  R epublican
P a rty  P la tfo rm  of 196O;
We a re  s im ila r ly  ready to  n e g o tia te  and to  i n s t i t u t e  r e a l i s t i c  
methods and safeguards f o r  disarm am ent, and f o r  th e  suspension  
o f  n u c le a r  t e s t s .  We advocate  an e a r ly  agreem ent . . .  by a l l  
n a tio n s  to  fo rego  n u c le a r  t e s t s  in  th e  atm osphere, and th e  
suspension  o f o th e r  t e s t s  as v e r i f i c a t io n  tech n iq u es  p e rm it.^
D esp ite  th e  g re a t p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  and h e a te d  co n tro v e rsy ,
th e re  was l i t t l e  s o l id  in fo rm atio n  a v a i la b le  to  th e  p u b lic  on which
to  base a  thorough and o b je c t iv e  s tudy  o f  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e
T es t Ban T rea ty  f o r  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty .  One reaso n  t h i s  in fo rm atio n
was no t a v a i la b le  i s  th a t  i t  in v o lv es  m i l i t a r y ,  te c h n o lo g ic a l and
in te l l ig e n c e  in fo rm atio n  which i s  c l a s s i f i e d  and i s  n o t norm ally
re le a s e d  t o  th e  p u b lic  fo r  s e c u r i ty  re a so n s .
In  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  ro le  in  g iv in g  "adv ice  and
consent" th e  Senate  r e f e r r e d  th e  t r e a t y  to  th e  S enate  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s
Committee, which h e ld  h ea rin g s  from August 12, through August 2%, I 963 .
The F ore ign  R e la tio n s  Committee h eard  a  t o t a l  o f  f o r ty - th r e e  w itn e sse s .
A l l  o f  th e  h earin g s  were "o p en ," w ith  th e  excep tion  o f  th e  a fte rn o o n s
o f  August 15t h  and August 19t h ,  a t  which tim e  i t  may be assumed th a t
^ i d .
^ Ib id .
c l a s s i f i e d  in fo rm atio n  which would e f f e c t  th e  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  o f 
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  was g iven  to  th e  com m ittee.
An un u su a l a sp e c t o f  t h i s  t r e a ty  was th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  Senate 
Armed Forces Committee had  p re v io u s ly  e s ta b lis h e d  a  subcommittee to  
in v e s t ig a te  any moves o f  th e  Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n  tow ard disarmament 
or c o n tro ls  over th e  development o f  atom ic energy o r atom ic weaponry.
The Armed S e rv ices  Committee, headed by S en a to r John S te n n is , 
Democrat o f  M is s is s ip p i , had o b je c te d  e a r ly  in  th e  Kennedy adm in is­
t r a t i o n  to  th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament 
Agency under th e  S ta te  Department in  I 961 . I t  was a f t e r  th e  e s ta b l i s h ­
ment o f  th e  ACDA. t h a t  th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee e s ta b lis h e d  th e  
P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee to  keep c lo se  watch over th e  
a d m in is tra tio n  and th e  developm ents a t  Geneva o f th e  E igh teen  N ations 
Committee on Disarmament.
When th e  T est Ban T rea ty  was subm itted  to  th e  S enate  and 
r e f e r r e d  t o  com m ittee, th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee suggested  and 
asked th a t  th e  t r e a t y  should  more p ro p e rly  be co n sid e red  by th a t  
committee r a th e r  th an  th e  S enate  F o re ign  R e la tio n s  Committee.
A lth o u ^  p erm issio n  was den ied  by members o f  b o th  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  
th e  subcomm ittee con tinued  to  h o ld  h e a r in g s .
In  e f f e c t  th e  S enate  had  two committees c o n s id e rin g  th e  L im ited  
T es t Ban T re a ty . U nquestionably  th e  Subcommittee o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  
Committee had a  v e s te d  i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  t r e a t y ,  b u t i t  i s  d o u b tfu l th a t  
i t  had p reced en t on i t s  s id e  f o r  ta k in g  up an in v e s t ig a t io n  o f a  
t r e a t y  t h a t  had been made by e x ecu tiv e  i n i t i a t i v e  and was now being  
subm itted  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  S enate  fo r  i t s  ap p ro v a l o r  r e je c t io n .
The P reparedness In v e s tig a t in g  Subcommittee o f the  Senate 
Armed S erv ices  Committee was headed by Senator John S ten n is . Senator 
S ten n is  i s  considered  to  be a p a r t  o f th e  c o a l i t io n  o f co n se rv a tiv e  
Democrats from th e  South who v o te  re g u la r ly  w ith  R epublican co n se rv a tiv es  
and c o n s t i tu te  what John McGregor Burns and the  C ongressional Q uarte rly  
r e f e r  to  as  th e  "C onservative  C o a litio n "  o r the  "C ongressional P a r ty ."
The p r in c ip a l  w itn e sse s  c a l le d  b e fo re  th e  Preparedness In v e s t i ­
g a tin g  Subcommittee o f th e  Senate Armed S erv ices  Committee c o n s is te d  
g e n e ra lly  o f th e  C hiefs o f S ta f f ,  a s s o r te d  r e t i r e d  m i l i t a r y  men, the  
Chairman o f th e  Atomic Energy Commission and atom ic s c i e n t i s t s ,  Edward 
T e l le r ,  N orris  Bradbury, Harold Brown, John F o s te r , J r . ,  W illiam  C. 
F o s te r , Leland J .  Haworth, and F ran k lin  A. Long. A ll se ss io n s  o f th is  
subcommittee were "c lo sed "  se ss io n s .
The Foreign  R e la tio n s  Committee p ub lished  i t s  r e p o r t  e n t i t l e d  
The N uclear Test Ban T rea ty , on September 3 , 1963, w ith  a fav o rab le  
re p o r t  by a v o te  o f s ix te e n  to  one. Senator R u sse ll B. Long, Democrat 
o f L ou isiana , was th e  lone  d is s e n te r .  The Senate Armed S erv ices  
Committee ren d ered  an u n favo rab le  re p o r t  on September 9, 1963. The 
Senate Subsequently  approved r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f th e  t r e a ty  by a v o te  of 
e ig h ty  to  n in e te en . Senator M argaret C. Smith was among the  n in e teen  
n eg ativ e  v o te s  a g a in s t  th e  Test Ban T reaty . As a member o f th e  Armed 
S erv ices  Committee she was jo in e d  by f iv e  o th e r S enato rs fo r  a t o t a l  of 
te n  o f th a t  committee v o tin g  a g a in s t the  t r e a ty .  E ven tu a lly  Senator 
Jackson o f W ashington, Senator Young o f Ohio, Senator Inouye o f Hawaii, 
and Senator S a l to n s ta l l  o f M assachusetts voted  in  th e  a f f irm a tiv e .
Advantages o f th e Treaty
P re s id e n t Kennedy had to l d  th e  n a tio n  on th e  evening of 
Ju ly  26, 1963> th a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  advantages o f th e  t r e a ty  could 
be;
1 . . . . a  s te p  tow ard reduced te n s io n s  and b roader a re a s  o f  
agreem ent.
2 . . . . a  s te p  f re e in g  th e  w orld  from fe a r s  and dangers o f  
ra d io a c tiv e  f a l l o u t .
3 . . . .a  s te p  tow ard p rev en tin g  th e  sp read  o f  n u c lea r 
weapons to  n a tio n s  n o t now p o sse ss in g  them.
4 . . . .and  f i n a l l y ,  t h i s  t r e a ty  can l im i t  th e  n u c le a r  arms 
race  in  ways, which, on b a lan ce , w i l l  s tre n g th e n  our n a t io n ’s 
s e c u r i ty  f a r  more th an  th e  c o n tin u a tio n  o f u n r e s t r ic te d  te s t in g .
The P re s id e n t was v e iy  c a re fu l  to  p o in t o u t t h a t  th e  t r e a ty  was
"no cause f o r  complacency" and in  h is  ad d ress  to  th e  S enate  he c a l le d
a t te n t io n  to  t h i r t e e n  l im ita t io n s  :
1. The t r e a ty  p e rm itte d  con tinued  underground t e s t i n g .
2 . A s ig n a to ry  n a tio n  may w ithdraw  from th e  t r e a ty  upon th re e  
months' n o t ic e .
3 . The t r e a t y  i s  n o t an end to  th e  th r e a t  o f  n u c le a r  war.
4 . I t  ^ f i l l  n o t reduce n u c lea r s to c k p i le s .
5 . I t  ^ f i l l  n o t h a l t  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f n u c le a r  weapons.
6 . I t  id. 11 n o t r e s t r i c t  t h e i r  u se  in  tim e o f w ar.
7 . I t  r e f le c te d  no concessions to  th e  S o v ie t Union.
8 . I t  would no t re so lv e  a l l  c o n f l i c t s ,  o r cause th e  Communists 
to  fo rego  t h e i r  am b itio n s , o r  e lim in a te  th e  dangers o f w ar.
S . P re s id e n t (Kennedy), "The N uclear T es t Ban T rea ty : A S tep  
Toward P eace ,"  U. S . ,  Department o f  S ta te  B u lle t in ,  (August 12, I 963) ,  
pp . 234-240.
89. I t  would n o t reduce our need f o r  arms or a l l i e s  o r  p ro ­
grams o f a s s is ta n c e  to  o th e rs .
10. QSie Moscow ta lk s  reached  no agreement on any o th e r  s u b je c t.
11. Hie S o v ie t Union was s t i l l  u n w illin g  t o  accep t o n - s i te  
in s p e c tio n s .
12. Uo one can p re d ic t  w ith  c e r ta in ty  what fu tu re  agreem ents 
can be b u i l t  on th e  fo undations o f  t h i s  one.
13 . The fa m il ia r  c o n te s t between cho ice  and co erc io n , th e  
f a m il ia r  p la c e s  o f  danger and c o n f l ic ts  a re  s t i l l  th e r e .  However, 
t h i s  was th e  f i r s t  co n cre te  r e s u l t  o f  e ig h teen  y e a rs  o f  e f f o r t s  by 
th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  impose l im i t s  on th e  n u c le a r  arms ra c e . The 
t r e a ty  would in  e f f e c t  a c t  as  a  c a ta ly t ic  agen t to  p r e c ip i ta te  
f u r th e r  a re as  o f agreement which might le a d  tow ard g re a te r  s t a b i l i t y  
and p eace .^
P re s id e n t Kennedy c o n s ta n tly  c a l le d  th e  t r e a ty  a  "hopefu l f i r s t  
s tep "  tow ard le sse n in g  o f te n s io n s . U n fo rtu n a te ly , h is  un tim ely  death  
c u t sh o r t th e  r e a l iz a t io n  o f h is  p la n s . His c lo se  f r ie n d s .  S enato r 
A lb e rt Gore and G eneral Maxwell T ay lo r, concur th a t  th e  L im ited  T est 
Ban T rea ty  was th e  P r e s id e n t’s f i n e s t  monument tow ard le sse n in g  
o f  in te r n a t io n a l  te n s io n .
^ Ib id .
CBLAPITER I I  
I ’ORECGSr POUOY MfiKHTO
One o f th e  prim ary g o a ls  o f fo re ig n  p o lic y  i s  s e l f -p re s e rv a t io n .  
2he term  ^ se c u rity "  would perhaps be more a p p ro p r ia te  in  l i g h t  o f  th e  
th r e a t  o f  nucleeir d e v a s ta tio n  in  th e  even t o f  a  m ajor c o n fro n ta tio n  
between th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union. I t  i s  ad m itted ly  an 
a b s t r a c t  term  th a t  may be a p p lie d  in  a  m u ltitu d e  o f ways. Some would 
seek  s e c u r i ty  in  la rg e  armaments and in  th e  qu est fo r  th e  u l t im a te  
weapon o r  defense  system s. There i s  a  paradox in v o lv ed  in  seek ing  
s e c u r i ty  th rough armaments. The in s e c u r i ty  t h a t  causes n a tio n s  to  
seek s e c u r i ty  was o r ig in a l ly  caused by atom ic technology  and th e  methods 
o f  mass d e s tru c tio n  th a t  were developed by th e  s c i e n t i f i c  community 
o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union w ith  th e  f u l l  ap p ro v a l o f  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  community.
N a tio n a l s e c u r i ty  i s  a  concept t h a t  i s  ever e l a s t i c  and changing. 
When th e  U n ited  S ta te s  ended World War I I  by means o f  th e  atom ic bomb, 
s e c u r i ty ,  f o r  th e  U n ited  S ta te s ,  was t h o u ^ t  t o  have been ach iev ed .
When th e  S o v ie t Union exploded an atom ic dev ice  o f  t h e i r  own, s e c u r i ty  
f o r  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  van ished , u n t i l  weaponry i n  th e  form o f th e  
s t r a to s p h e r ic  bomber r e - e s ta b l is h e d  a  sense o f  s e c u r i ty  f o r  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s .  When th e  R ussians p laced  t h e i r  S pu tn ik  in  o r b i t  around th e  
e a r th  by means o f a  long -range  guided m is s i le ,  th e  concept o f  s e c u r i ty  
changed once a g a in .
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S e c u r ity  has been p re-em inen t in  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n s  o f 
U n ited  S ta te s  fo re ig n  p o lic y  decision-m akers a lm ost t o  th e  p o in t 
o f  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f o th e r  problem s and n a t io n a l  g o a ls .  As d e s ira b le  
as  a b so lu te  s e c u r i ty  m ight seem f o r  peace o f mind, i t  i s  in g o s s ib le  
to  a ch iev e . I t  i s ,  however, th e  ta s k  o f  th e  d ip lom at and th e  
p o l i t i c i a n  to  s t r i v e  t o  a t t a i n  i t .
F o re ig n  p û lic y  i s  concerned w ith  many a re a s  o f in te r n a t io n a l  
r e l a t io n s ,  b u t p r im a r i ly  th e  t r e a t y  i s  th e  p r in c ip le  in s tru m en t 
b in d in g  n a tio n s  to g e th e r  in  agreem ent.
The C o n s ti tu tio n  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  p ro v id es  t h a t  th e  
P re s id e n t " s h a l l  have Power, by and w ith  th e  A dvice and Consent o f 
th e  S en a te , to  make T r e a t ie s ,  p rov ided  two th i r d s  o f  th e  S en a to rs  
p re s e n t concur. . . .
H is to r ic a l ly ,  th e  P re s id e n t has i n i t i a t e d  n e g o tia tio n s  th rough  
th e  S ta te  Department o r  o th e r  a g e n ts , and th e n  subm its th e  document 
t o  th e  S enate  f o r  i t s  c o n sen t. The S en a te  has f r e q u e n tly  from tim e 
to  tim e  q u estio n ed  t h i s  in te r p r e ta t io n  and has i n s i s t e d  upon th e  r ig h t  
to  be  co n su lted  w hether n e g o tia tio n s  ought to  ta k e  p la c e  w ith  o th e r  
c o u n tr ie s  and th e  c o n d itio n s  th a t  shou ld  be  com plied w ith  b e fo re  th ey  
ta k e  p la c e . The S ena te  may by a  sim ple m a jo rity  a l t e r  t r e a t i e s  by 
means o f amendments. The e f f e c t  o f  such a c tio n s  i s  b e s t  i l l u s t r a t e d  
by th e  T rea ty  o f V e r s a i l le s ,  which was a l t e r e d  and  changed by S enate  
m o d ifica tio n s  to  such an e x ten t t h a t  P re s id e n t Woodrow W ilson cou ld  n o t' 
a ccep t th e  t r e a t y .  The a l t e r in g  o f t r e a t i e s  by amendments and
S . ,  C o n s ti tu tio n , A r t . I I ,  S e c .H , P a ra . I I .
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re s e rv a tio n s  may have one o f  two e f f e c t s :  ( l )  as in  th e  case  o f th e  
V e rs a i l le s  t r e a ty ,  th e  t r e a ty  was discarded, by th e  P re s id e n t as  no 
lo n g er in  th e  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  o r ( s )  th e  c o n tra c tin g  n a tio n s  may 
r e j e c t  th e  amendments which would e i th e r  have th e  e f f e c t  o f  k i l l i n g  
th e  t r e a ty  o r  c a l l in g  f o r  i t s  re n e g o t ia t io n .^
W hile th e  r o le  o f  Congress i s  im p o rtan t in  th e  t r e a ty  making 
p ro c e sse s , i t  i s  a  su b o rd in a te  p o s i t io n .  lEhe i n i t i a t i v e  in  fo re ig n  
p o lic y  i s  l e f t  t o  th e  P re s id e n t .^  However, th e  P re s id e n t does n o t have 
com plete freedom  o f movement i n  fo re ig n  p o lic y  making. When t r e a t i e s  
mark a  d i s t in c t iv e  movement away from  p o l i t i c a l  norms o f  th e  p a s t ,  i . e . ,  
th e  h o s t i l i t i e s  o f  th e  "co ld  w a r ," th e n  th e  P re s id e n t must co n sid e r th e  
tem per o f th e  S en a te , th e  mood o f  th e  co u n try , and p rep a re  th e  way by 
e x h o rta tio n  and ed u ca tio n , seek to  change op in ion  i f  p o s s ib le ,  and 
amend o r  add p ro v is io n s  to  th e  c lau se s  o f  th e  t r e a t y  i f  necessary.3
E xecutive  L eadersh ip
The P re s id e n t m ust, i f  he i s  to  be s u c c e s s fu l, ga in  th e  support 
o f  th e  m a jo rity  o f  h is  own p a r ty  and a  s iz e a b le  number o f th e  o p p o s itio n
"U n til 1901, th e  S enate  a l t e r e d  o r  amended e ig h ty  to  n in ty  t r e a t i e s  
p la ce d  b e fo re  it.A b o u t one4hird  o f  th e se  e i th e r  f a i l e d  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  o r 
were later abandoned by th e  P re s id e n t as u n s a t i s f a c to r y .  During th e  nex t 
q u a r te r  cen tu ry  f i f t y - e i g h t  proposed t r e a t i e s  were changed by th e  S enate ;
40 p e rc en t o f  them were abandoned o r d isca rd ed  by th e  P re s id e n t as  no 
lo n g er in  th e  n a t io n a l  in t e r e s t . " C e c i l  V. Crabb, J r . ,  American F o re ig n  
P o lic y  in  th e  W uclear Age, 2d ed.(New York: H arper and Row, I 965) , pp . 92-93 .
2
James A. Robinson, Congress m d  F o re ig n  Policy-M aking(TTnmfiwonfl; 
I l l i n o i s :  The Dorsey P re s s , I n c . ,  I 962) , C hapter T-
K e n n e th  N. $ a l t z .  F o reign  P o licy  and Democratic P o l i t i c s fP oston : 
l i t t l e ,  Brown and C o., 1967) ,  p7 98 .
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p a r ty  to  o b ta in  th e  n ecessa ry  tw o -th ird s  v o te  o f S e n a to rs . This cooper­
a t io n  between th e  d iv e rse  fa c tio n s  w ith in  p a r t i e s  and between th e  two 
m ajor p a r t i e s  has been c a l le d  " b ip a r t is a n s h ip ."
B ip a rtis a n sh ip
The term  " b ip a r t is a n "  conveys many d if f e r e n t  meanings among 
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s .  The term  came in to  prominence during  th e  Truman 
a d m in is tra tio n  and i t s  most famous advocate was S en a to r A rthu r H. 
Yandenburg,^ whose v iew point has been paraphrased  as  " p o l i t i c s  s to p s  
a t  th e  w a te r 's  edge."
Prom inent w r i te r s  such as P ro fe sso rs  C rabb,^ J e w e l l ,3 W altz ,^  
and Hoffmann^ have d i f f e r in g  p o in ts  o f  view as to  what th e  term  means 
e x a c tly , b u t a  c a r e f u l  exam ination o f  th e se  w r i te r s  in d ic a te s  th a t  a  
consensus concerning th e  concept would in c lu d e :
1 . C o n su lta tio n  between th e  ex ecu tiv e  branch and p a r ty  le a d e rs .
2 . The ex c lu s io n  o f c e r ta in  is s u e s  from p r e s id e n t i a l  campaigns.
3 . Continued support o f p o l ic ie s  a f t e r  th e  normal c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
p ro cesses  o f adv ice  and consent have been s a t i s f i e d .
^A rthur H. Vandenburg, J r . ,  The P r iv a te  Papers o f S en a to r 
Yandenburg (B oston: Houghton M if f l in , 1952), p . 55O.
2
Crabb, op. c i t .
^Malcolm E. J e w e ll, S e n a to r ia l  P o l i t i c s  y id  F oreign  P o licy  
(Kentucky: The U n iv e rs ity  o f  Kentucky P re s s , 19^2).
Sîialtz, op. c i t .
^S tan ley  Hoffmann, G u l l iv e r 's  T ro u b les , o r th e  S e tt in g  o f 
American F o re ign  P o lic y  (New York: McGraw-IK.ll Co., 196Ô).
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4 . B ip a r tis a n  v o tin g  w ithou t re g a rd  to  p a r t i s a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s .
5 . The e lim in a tio n  o f  p a r t i s a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s  in  reach ing  
agreem ent.
6 . The appointm ent o f  m in o rity  members to  re sp o n s ib le  p o lic y ­
making r o le s .
C o n su lta tio n  between th e  E xecu tive  Branch 
and P a rty  Leaders
This te rm , acco rd ing  t o  J e w e ll, means " p r io r  c o n su lta tio n "  
by th e  ex ecu tiv e  w ith  members o f  th e  m in o rity  p a r ty  le a d e rs  and 
o th e r  i n f l u e n t i a l  members o f  th e  m a jo rity  p a r ty  and m in o rity  p a r ty . 
"When th e  P re s id e n t a ttem p ts  to  o b ta in  maximum support f o r  h is  p o l ic ie s ,  
b ip a r t i s a n  c o n su lta tio n  appears to  be th e  s tro n g e s t  p r e s id e n t ia l  
weapon to  g a in  C ongressional support f o r  h is  program .^
In  th e  absence o f  d is c ip l in e d  p a r t i e s  as known in  th e  E nglish  
system  o f government, th e r e  i s  no g u aran tee  t h a t  p a r ty  members w i l l  
fo llo w  t h e i r  le a d e rs h ip  in  sup p o rtin g  a  b ip a r t i s a n  fo re ig n  p o lic y .
The P re s id e n t has no cho ice  o f  whom he s h a l l  c o n su lt ,  even w ith in  
h is  own p a r ty , because o f  th e  S e n io r i ty  system  and p a r ty  caucuses. 
Depending upon th e  p e rso n a l q u a l i t i e s  o f  th e  men chosen as  p a r ty
le a d e rs ,  th e  le a d e rs  may o r may n o t be e f f e c t iv e  in  m arshalling  support.
^ Jew e ll, op. c i t . ,  p . I 60 .
l4
The P re s id e n t m ust, i f  he i s  t o  re c e iv e  accep tance  o f  h is  
p o lic y , b u i ld  a  "b rid g e” o f  co o p era tio n  between p a r t i e s  t h a t  tran scen d s  
p a r ty  s p l i t s  and p a r t is a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s  in  th e  name o f " n a tio n a l 
i n t e r e s t ."
The P re s id e n t has an a d d i t io n a l  weapon a t  h is  d isp o sa l to  
b rin g  "m avericks" from b o th  p a r t i e s  around t o  su p p o rtin g  h is  fo re ig n  
p o lic y . The P re s id e n t may r e ly  upon th e  W hite House S t a f f ,  on 
C ongressional f r ie n d s ,  and u l t im a te ly  on h is  own p e r s o n a l i ty  in  
persuad ing  c e r ta in  i n f l u e n t i a l  S en a to rs  to  support him . The in s t r u ­
ments o f such p e rsu as io n  a re  morning b re a k fa s ts ,  te lep h o n e  c a l l s ,  and 
in fo rm al b r ie f in g s  and sh a rin g  o f  in fo rm atio n , b u t p r im a r i ly  th e  
means w i l l  be d i r e c t ,  p e rso n a l and p r iv a te .
A lthou^ i th e  P re s id e n t has g re a t  powers over h is  own p a r ty  
in  term s o f pa tronage and p o l i t i c a l  su p p o rt, he must be cau tio u s  
in  th e  u se  o f  th e s e  elem ents in  o f fe r in g  o r th re a te n in g  to  w ith o ld  
them from S en a to rs .
E xclusion  o f  C e r ta in  Is su e s  from 
P r e s id e n t ia l  Campaigns
P ro fe sso r Crabb in d ic a te s  t h a t  t h i s  concept i s  a  must f o r  
b ip a r t i s a n  fo re ig n  p o lic y . The im p lic a tio n  i s  th a t  b o th  p a r t i e s  
b e n e f i t  from a  b ip a r t is a n  fo re ig n  p o lic y  and should  one p a r ty  seek 
to  e x p lo it  a  t r e a ty  o r agreem ent, t h a t  p a r ty  in  e f f e c t  d estro y s  
c r e d i t a b i l i t y  in  i t s  own m otives.
15
F or purposes o f  t h i s  s tu d y , th e  above mentioned, concept was 
ren d ered  mute by th e  death  o f  P re s id e n t Kennedy in  1963. However, 
during  th e  debate  on th e  L im ited  T es t Ban T r e a ty ,th e re  was th e  
d i s t i n c t  p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  th e  R epublican c an d id a te  f o r  P re s id e n t 
in ten d ed  t o  u se  th e  t r e a t y  as a  campaign i s s u e .^
C ontinued Support o f  P o l ic ie s  A f te r  th e  Normal 
C o n s ti tu t io n a l  P ro cesses  o f A dvice and Consent
A gain th e  death  o f P re s id e n t Kennedy muted t h i s  concep t. 
However, -fdien one examines th e  fo re ig n  p o lic y  o f  P re s id e n t lyndon 
Johnson and th e  su c c e ss fu l conclusions o f  id e a s  i n i t i a t e d  in  th e  
Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n , i . e . ,  th e  C onsular T rea ty  and th e  Non- 
P r o l i f e r a t io n  T rea ty , one may conclude t h a t  th e r e  was con tinued  
support o f p o l ic ie s  a f t e r  th e  co n c lusion  o f th e  L im ited  T es t Ban 
T rea ty .
B ip a r tis a n  V oting W ithout R egard to  
P a r t i s a n  C on sid e ra tio n s
When S en a to r Vandenberg was once p a rap h rased  as in d ic a t in g  
t h a t  " p o l i t i c s  s to p s  a t  th e  w a te r 's  ed g e ,"  t h i s  o f  course  im p lied  
u n i ty ,  b u t i t  d id  n o t mean th a t  c r i t i c i s m  o f th e  E x e c u tiv e 's  h an d lin g  
o f  fo re ig n  p o lic y  should  c ea se . C r it ic is m  in  a l l  cases should  be
^ e e  C hapters Y, VI, and V II o f t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  and  th e  
p e rso n a l in te rv ie w  w ith  form er S en a to r and V ice P re s id e n t H. H. 
Humphrey in  Appendix "B. "
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c o n s tru c tiv e , p a r t i c u la r ly  i f  th e re  has been wide support f o r  a
t r e a t y  by b o th  p a r t i e s .  However, i t  i s  a ls o  c e r ta in  th a t  one
can no t decide  when c r i t i c i s m  changes from c o n s tru c tiv e  t o  d e s t r u c t iv e .
P ro fe sso r  Crabb in d ic a te s  t h a t  th e  "appearance" o f  b ip a r t i s a n  
u n i ty  may be o f  immense v a lu e  d ip lo m a tic a lly . I t  may convey a  
u n i f ie d  governm ental p u b lic  su p p o rt; i t  may make p o l ic ie s  more 
p u b licd y  a c c e p ta b le ; i t  may communicate th e  g ra v ity  o f an incumbent 
P r e s id e n t’s views o f  th e  o u ts id e  w orld; i t  may i n s t i l l  a  f e e l in g  o f  
confidence  in  th e  governm ent’s p o l ic ie s ,  i . e . .  P re s id e n t E isenhow er’s 
sup p o rt o f  P re s id e n t Kennedy fo llo w in g  th e  d is a s tro u s  "Bay o f P ig s"  
in v a s io n  o f  Cuba.
E lim in a tio n  o f  P a r t i s a n  C on sid era tio n s  in  
Reaching Agreement
T his te rm  perhaps a p p lie s  more a p t ly  to  dom estic is s u e s  o r  
" th e  h o rse  tra d in g "  o r  " t i t  f o r  t a t "  t h a t  sometimes goes on in  th e  
g iv e  and ta k e  o f  v o tin g  in  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  S e n a te . I t  i s  a  concept 
a lm ost im p o ssib le  to  re s e a rc h .
Appointment o f  M in o rity  Members to  R esponsib le  
P o lic y  Making R oles
F o re ign  p o lic y  t h a t  i s  made by members in  good s tan d in g  and 
re p u ta tio n  from one’s own p a r ty  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  re p u d ia te .
This concept would cover a  f a r  g r e a te r  range th an  th e  o c ca s io n a l 
in c lu s io n  o f members o f  th e  o p p o s itio n  p a r ty  in  t r e a ty  s ig n in g  cerem onies.
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I t  means, in  essen ce , b ip a r t i s a n  nom ination o f  members o f  th e  
m in o r ity  p a r ty  t o  h ig h  l e v e l  p o lic y  maMng p o s ts  in  th e  m a jo rity  
P r e s id e n t’s a d m in is tra tio n . However, once more, in  th e  absence 
o f d is c ip l in e d  p a r t i e s  in  th e  U n ited  S ta te s ,  "m averick" Congress­
men w i l l  r e j e c t  t h e i r  p a r ty  le a d e rsh ip  and v o te  acco rd ing  to  a  
m u ltitu d e  o f  reaso n s th ey  might choose to  g iv e , be i t  th e  w ishes 
o f  t h e i r  c o n s ti tu e n c y , p u b lic  o p in io n , o r  t h e i r  own in d iv id u a l  
co n sc ien ces .
P u b lic  Supports
The P re s id e n t i s  s a id  to  be th e  P re s id e n t o f  a l l  th e  peop le  
and th e  U n ited  S ta te s  i s  h is  c o n s titu e n c y . When th e  P re s id e n t speaks 
he commands th e  a t t e n t io n  o f th e  whole n a t io n . Through th e  u se  o f  
b ro a d c a s ts , t e l e c a s t s ,  news co n fe ren ces, speeches, su p p o rtin g  groups 
o f  o rg an ized  c i t i z e n s ,  and messages to  Congress, th e  P re s id e n t may 
in f lu e n c e  Congress by p re s su re  from h is  co n stitu en c y , which i s  n a tio n ­
wide r a th e r  th a n  th e  l im ite d  c o n s titu en c y  o f  in d iv id u a l  Congressmen.
F u r th e r , th e  E xecu tive  has th e  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  th e  S ta te  Departmeiit 
and h is  W hite House S ta f f  f o r  g a th e r in g  p u b lic  op in ion  s a u r ie s . The 
Congress does n o t have c e n t ia l iz e d  f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  g a th e r in g  and 
an a ly z in g  d a ta  concern ing  p u b lic  o p in io n . S ubsequently , each Congress­
man must r e ly  on h is  own re so u rc e s .
The Congressm an's m a il i s  one source o f  in fo rm atio n  t h a t  he 
can r e ly  upon. However, th e  w ise Congressman must ta k e  in to  account 
"p re ssu re  groups" and t h e i r  in f lu e n c e . P re s su re  groups a re  n o to rio u s  
fo r  o rg an ized  m a ilin g  to  t h e i r  Congressmen and any o th e r  Congressmen
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though t to  he w avering o r  l i a b l e  to  in f lu e n c e . In  th e  case  o f th e  
lim ited . T es t Ban T rea ty  o f I 963,  S en a to rs  re p o r te d  t h a t  t h e i r  m ail 
was d iv id ed . S en a to r Smith o f Maine in d ic a te d  th a t  h e r  m a il was 
running h e a v ily  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty  w h ile  th e  p o l l s  in d ic a te d  g re a t 
p u b lic  su p p o rt. S en a to r A iken re p o r te d  th a t  h i s  m a il in d ic a te d  th e  
same th in g ,  b u t when broken down to  h is  own c o n s titu e n c y , th e  in d ic a t io n  
was spontaneous, overwhelming su p p o rt.
S en a to r A lb e rt Gore and V ice P re s id e n t H ubert Hum phry, who 
was s t i l l  a  S en a to r in  I 963,  b o th  in d ic a te d  t o  t h i s  w r i te r  th a t  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  r i ^ t  wing " s t i r r e d  up a  tem pest"  around th e  L im ited  T est 
Ban T rea ty , an obv iously  w e ll-o rg a n iz ed  tem p est. Both men p laced  
more f a i t h  in  th e  H a rr is  and G allup p o l l s  th a n  th e  amount and ty p e  
o f  m ail th ey  re c e iv e d  during  t h i s  p e r io d . The im pressions o f p u b lic  
opin ion  t h a t  th e  S en a to rs  re c e iv e d  from o rgan ized  p o l i t i c a l  groups 
were d i f f e r e n t  from th o se  conveyed in  o th e r  sources o f  p o l i t i c a l  
communication.
Newspapers from th e  Congressman’s c o n s titu en c y  a re  a  v a l id  
source o f  in fo rm atio n  f o r  th e  Congressman concerning th e  tre n d s  in  
what would be im portan t to  them reg a rd in g  s ig n i f ic a n t  p u b lic  o p in io n .
I t  may be th a t  o th e r  even ts overshadow th e  concern o f re g io n a l news­
papers and m a tte rs  in v o lv in g  fo re ig n  p o lic y  may be hidden  by m a tte rs  
o f  more immediate concern to  th e  Congressman’s c o n s titu e n c y .
The E xecu tive i s  th e  c e n t r a l  f ig u re  in  American p o l i t i c s  
around whom a l l  fo re ig n  p o lic y  i s  made. I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  even ts may 
c re a te  fo re ig n  p o lic y  on a  c r i s i s  b a s i s ,  b u t lo n g -ran g e  fo re ig n  p o lic y  
i s  th e  p roduct o f  th e  E xecu tive  and h is  a d v is e rs .
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The id e a  o f  a  t e s t  "ban t r e a ty  o r a  t r e a ty  l im it in g  t e s t in g  
in  c e r ta in  elem ents was n o t new in  fo re ig n  p o lic y . The a d m in is tra tio n  
o f P re s id e n t Eisenhower and th e  p la tfo rm  o f th e  R epublican P a r ty  were 
d ed ica ted  to  th e  id e a  from 1958. P re s id e n t Kennedy a c t iv e ly  pursued  
th e  id e a  w ith  th e  estab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms C ontro l and Disarmament 
Agency. By I 961 th e  q u estio n  reg ard in g  atom ic te s t in g  was n o t "td iat" 
i s  to  be done b u t "’tdien?" There was no q u estio n  reg ard in g  th é  d e s i r ­
a b i l i t y  o f a  l im i ta t io n  on atom ic t e s t in g  by th e  m a jo rity  o f  bo th  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
E a rly  in  196I  P re s id e n t Kennedy proposed  f iv e  s tag e s  o f 
disarmament th a t  he and h is  a d m in is tra tio n  would work fo r :
1 . A E u c lear t e s t  ban agreem ent.
2 . C essa tio n  o f  p ro d u c tio n  o f  n u c le a r  m a te r ia ls  f o r  w ar.
3 . P ro h ib it io n  upon th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  n u c le a r  weapons to  
c o u n tr ie s  n o t p re s e n tly  p o sse ss in g  them.
4 . An East-W est agreem ent to  ban n u c le a r  weapons in  o u te r
space .
5 . The d e s tru c tio n  o f e x is t in g  s to c k p ile s  o f  n u c le a r  weapons 
and conversion  o f f is s io n a b le  m a te r ia ls  f o r  p e a c e fu l u s e s .^
In  each o f  th e se  p o s i t io n s  "consensus" between th e  o f f ic e  o f  
th e  P re s id e n t and Congress would be h i ^ l y  d e s ir a b le .  The i n i t i a t i v e  
in  g a in in g  t h i s  consensus i s  up to  th e  P re s id e n t .
^ e  New York TimesCSeptember 26, I 961) quoted in  Crabb, 
op. c i t . ,  p . 434.
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Once consensus has become r e a l i t y  th e  problem  o f  implemen­
t a t io n  becomes a  problem . ÜJhe to o l  n e ce ssa ry  to  o b ta in  consensus i s  
" c o n s u lta tio n . " I n  some in s ta n c e s  c o n s u lta t io n  may mean " in fo rm atio n - 
g iv in g "  o r  " sh a r in g ."  A t o th e r  tim es b r ie f in g s  o f C ongressional 
committees s u f f ic e  as  " c o n s u lta t io n ."  P ro fe sso rs  Crabb, D ahl, J e w e ll, 
W altz and Hoffmann a l l  in d ic a te  t h a t  o f  a l l  th e  co n cep ts , " p r io r -  
c o n su lta tio n "  i s  th e  most im portan t f a c to r  in  o b ta in in g  s u c c e ss fu l 
co o p era tio n  from th e  S enate  in  g a in in g  t h e i r  co n sen t.
E x e c u tiv e -L e g is la tiv e  R e la tio n s
In  o rd e r fo r  th e  P re s id e n t to  f u l f i l l  h is  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d u tie s ,  
he must be inform ed on a  m yriad o f  su b je c ts  and a  m u ltitu d e  o f d e ta i le d  
su b je c t m a tte r .
I n te l l ig e n c e  g a th e r in g  o r  communications betw een th e  P re s id e n t 
and Congress i s  a  v e iy  d e ta i le d  and in  some in s ta n c e s  s e c r e t iv e  p ro c e ss .
F o re ig n  p o lic y  making in  th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  has been 
c h a ra c te r iz e d  by th e  need fo r  te c h n ic a l  in fo rm atio n  in  a  v ery  s h o r t  
tim e .
The 1963 Cuban m is s i le  c r i s i s  and th e  need to  u se  p u b lic  
communications between th e  R ussian  Prem ier and th e  P re s id e n t o f  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  b e s t  i l l u s t r a t e  th e  needs o f  in s ta n t  com m unications.
The E xecu tive branch o f  government has a  n e a r  monopoly on in fo rm atio n  
g a th e rin g  and Congress must r e ly  on d a ta  su p p lie d  by th e  P re s id e n t and 
h is  a d v is e rs .  A lthough p r i o r  c o n su lta tio n  w ith  members o f  th e  S enate  
may be d e s ira b le  i t  i s  n o t always p o s s ib le  due to  th e  r a p id i ty  o f  even ts .
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In  such even ts Congress* r o le  i s  m ereiy t o  l e g i t im i t i z e  r a th e r  th an  
i n i t i a t e . ^
Congress has long r e a l iz e d  t h a t  th e  C hief E xecu tive  and h is  
a d v ise rs  shou ld  have wide d is c r e t io n a ry  powers to  g a th e r  in fo rm atio n  
and keep i t  c o n f id e n t ia l .  OSie S ta te  Department was c re a te d  to  a id  
th e  P re s id e n t i n  fo re ig n  p o lic y  fo rmu la t io n .  However, s in c e  th e  end 
o f World War H  and th e  in s e c u r i ty  th a t  th e  postw ar p e r io d  b ro u g h t. 
Congress has been asked  to  c r e a te  s p e c ia l  ag encies  to  cover th e  needs 
o f  th e  n a t io n ’s fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  Thus Congress c re a te d  th e  C en tra l 
In te l l ig e n c e  Agency, th e  N a tio n a l S e c u r ity  C ouncil and th e  Arms C o n tro l 
and Disarmament Agency.
The Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency was e s ta b lis h e d  t o  meet 
th e  needs o f  co o rd in a tin g  re se a rc h  on atom ic energy , weaponry, and th e  
problem s o f  n e g o tia tin g  arms c o n tro l  and disarm am ent. The Agency 
stan d s midway between m i l i t a r y  p o lic y  and fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  As such 
i t  became th e  o b je c t o f  d i s t r u s t  by th e  o th e r ag en c ies  w ith in  th e  
S ta te  D epartm ent, th e  S enate  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee, th e  J o in t  
Committee on Atomic Energy and th e  re sea rc h  la b o ra to r ie s  a t  Los Alamos 
and Liverm ore.
P re s id e n t Kennedy by E xecu tive  O rder s ta t e d  t h a t  th e  D ire c to r  
o f th e  Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency shou ld  be re sp o n s ib le  fo r  
th e  p re p a ra t io n  and management o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  
in te r n a t io n a l  n e g o tia tio n s  in  th e  a rm s .c o n tro l and disarmament f i e l d .  
Furtherm ore, th e  D ire c to r  sh o u ld  see  th a t  d if f e re n c e s  o f  o p in io n  con­
cern in g  arms c o n tro l  and disarmament p o lic y  and r e l a t e d  m a tte rs  be
R o b in so n , op. c i t . .  C hapter J,
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re so lv ed  e x p e d itio u s ly  and produce common o r harmonious a c t io n  among 
a l l  concerned a g e n c ie s .^
As sweeping a s  t h i s  power m ight seem to  h e , th e  a c t u a l i t i e s  
in v o lv ed  in  fo rm u la tin g  and im plem enting fo re ig n  p o lic y  p ro p o sa ls  
were f a r  more com plicated .
P ro fe s so r  Robinson in d ic a te s  t h a t  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n  in v i te s  a  
c o n te s t  n o t on ly  between th e  P re s id e n t and Congress f o r  th e  making 
o f  fo re ig n  p o lic y , b u t a ls o  a _ s tru g g le  o f Congress a g a in s t  Congress 
w ith  re s p e c t  to  i t s  r o le  in  th e  making o f policy.^
C ongressional In v e s t ig a t io n s
L e g is la t iv e  in v e s t ig a t io n s  have made some v ery  in p o r ta n t 
c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  American fo re ig n  p o lic y . A f te r  World War H  
Congress made in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  v i r t u a l l y  every phase o f American 
fo re ig n  policy.3 G3ae in v e s t ig a t iv e  model o f th e  American S enate  has 
produced much needed in fo rm atio n  f o r  Congress to  inform  i t s e l f  on 
m a tte rs  o f  n a t io n a l  im p o rtan te . However, as  in  th e  in s ta n c e  o f th e  
C ongressional in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  th e  f i r i n g  o f  G eneral M acArthur, some 
l e g i s l a t i v e  in v e s t ig a t io n s  in  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  have been in s tru m en ts  
f o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  m isc h ie f . In  t h i s  in s ta n c e  W illiam  S . W hite c a l le d
S . ,  Congress, F oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee J o in t  Committee 
P r in t ,  L e g is la tio n  o f  F o re ig n  R e la t io n s . 90th  Cong., 1 s t  S e ss .,1 9 6 T ,p . 324.
2
Robinson, op. c i t . ,  p .  I 3I .
^Crabb, op. c i t . ,  p . l0 4 .
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th e  c o n g re ss io n a l in v e s t ig a t io n  th e  "g rav es t and most em otional 
C o n s ti tu tio n a l c r i s i s  t h a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  has ever knovm."^
Upon examining th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to r y  o f  th e  S enate , one 
fin d s  t h a t  th e  F o re ign  R e la tio n s  Committee i s  th e  most pow erful 
o f a l l  com m ittees. With few excep tions th e  recommendations o f th e  
F oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee become th e  S e n a te 's  d e c is io n .^
Because ap p roval o f  co n g ress io n a l committees i s  e s s e n t ia l ,  
governm ental o f f i c i a l s  must submit them selves to  co n g ress io n a l 
q u estio n in g . S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  John F o s te r  D ulles in d ic a te d  th a t  
he had met more th a n  100 tim es w ith  b ip a r t is a n  co n g ress io n a l g ro u p s .3 
In  a d d itio n  to  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te ,  D epu ties , A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta r ie s ,  
a s s o r te d  e x p e r ts , and in te r e s te d  p a r t i e s  may appear b e fo re  th e  
v a rio u s  committees o f Congress.
The U n ited  S ta te s  Senate  has been d iv id ed  in to  id e o lo g ic a l  
l i b e r a l  and co n se rv a tiv e  v o tin g  b lo c s  th a t  c ro ss  p a r ty  l in e s  on 
dom estic and in te r n a t io n a l  i s s u e s .  Hie American government has been 
d esc rib ed  as  be ing  t r a d i t io n a l ly  "deadlocked" between "C ongressional" 
and "Executive" wings o f bo th  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
Dr. Jew e ll in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  two p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a re  d iv id ed  
along  in te r n a t io n a l  p o l ic ie s  and dom estic i s o l a t i o n i s t  p o l ic ie s .
^quoted in  Crabb, op. c i t . ,  P . 106.
R o b in so n , op. c i t . ,  p . 95*
% a l t z ,  op. c i t . ,  p .  101.
h
James MacGregor B um s, The Deadlock o f Democracy (New York; 
P re n tic e -H a ll ,  1963) .
2k
Among b o th  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  Democratic and R epublican , th e  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l i s t s  rank h ig h e s t in  th e  W ortheastern  s e c tio n  o f  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s ,  fo llow ed  by th e  West Coast and th e  Midwest. Ranking low est 
on h is  s c a le  o f su p p orting  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  commitments o f  th e  
P re s id e n t were th e  Southern  and th e  P la in s  s t a t e s ,  which h i s t o r i c a l l y  
have se n t " f i s c a l"  co n se rv a tiv e s  to  C ongress.^
Both c a te g o r ie s  correspond  roughly  to  th e  term  "co n se rv a tiv e - 
c o a l i t io n "  u sed  by th e  C ongressional Q u arte rly  t o  in d ic a te  th e  
v o tin g  b loc  o f co n se rv a tiv e  Democrats and R epublicans who re g u la r ly  
v o te  to g e th e r  t o  b lo c  in te r n a t io n a l  p o l ic ie s  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
P re s id e n t and th e  "E xecutive" p a r ty  o f Congress.
Furtherm ore, th e  committee system  in  th e  S enate  has been 
c o n tro l le d  by S en a to rs  from th e  "co n g ress io n a l wing" o r  th e  "con­
s e rv a tiv e -  c o a l i t io n ."  The u n d is c ip lin e d  n a tu re  o f American p a r t i e s  
ten d s  to  perm it th e  M idwestern R epublican and Southern  Democratic 
c o a l i t io n  to  b lock  in te r n a t io n a l  agreem ents made a t  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f 
th e  P re s id e n t and th e  E xecu tive Departm ent.
The committees o f th e  S enate  guard t h e i r  a re a s  o f  concern w ith  
g re a t  je a lo u sy . F req u en tly  th e re  a re  s i tu a t io n s  ■vdiere th e  j u r i s ­
d ic t io n  o r  concern overlap s  o th e r  com m ittees, and -when i t  does 
co n s id e rab le  s tro n g  fe e lin g s  a re  expressed  a long w ith  eq u a lly  s tro n g
^Jew e ll, op. c i t .
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p a rlia m e n ta iy  a c t io n s .  The S en a te  com m ittee most concerned -with 
" n a t io n a l s e c u r i ly "  i s  th e  S ena te  Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee. The 
committee most concerned wLth t r e a t y  maMng and fo re ig n  p o lic y  i s  
th e  S enate  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee. The L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  
o f  1963 b rough t th e s e  two com m ittees in to  d i r e c t  c o n fro n ta tio n .
A case  s tudy  o f th e  d i s t in c t io n s  made between th e  two com m ittees 
would be ve ry  i n te r e s t in g ,  b u t in  th e  complex s i tu a t io n  in v o lv in g  a  
new agency n e g o tia t in g  fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  th e  Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament 
Agency, a t t i t u d e s  o r  " s ta te s  o f  minds" become e q u a lly  in te r e s t in g  and 
im p o rtan t f o r  th e  in f lu e n c e  th e y  p la y  on fo re ig n  p o lic y  making
The M ili ta ry  Frame o f  Mlnd^
The P re s id e n t a s  Commander-in-Chief f u l f i l l s  th e  "founding 
f a th e r s ’ " w ishes t h a t  th e  m i l i t a r y  be under th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  c iv i l i a n s .  
P rim aiy  in  th e  tho u g h t o f James Madison was th a t  a  s tan d in g  army was 
"one o f  th e  g r e a te s t  m isch ie fs  t h a t  can p o s s ib ly  happen.
U n t i l  th e  end o f  World War I I ,  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had  l i t t l e  to  
worry about an o v e rt tak eo v er o f  th e  government by th e  m i l i t a r y .  How­
e v e r , one can n o t escape th e  f a c t  t h a t  a  n a tio n  th a t  has been armed
^Pwo c la s s ic  tre a tm e n ts  o f  c iv i l i a n - m i l i t a r y  r e la t io n s  a re  Samuel P. 
H untington , The S o ld ie r  and th e  S ta t e  ( C am bridge,I% ss.:H arvard U n iv e rs ity  
P re s s , 195?) and Jerome G. Kerwin, e d . ,  C iv il-M L lita iy  R a ^ t io n s h lp s  in  
American L ife  (Chicago;. .U n iversity  o f  Chicago P te s s ,  1 9 ^ ) .
^Quoted in  Crabb, op. c i t . ,  p . 6 5 .
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alm ost t h i r t y  y e a rs  and expends a  m ajor p o r tio n  o f i t s  income on 
th e  m i l i t a r y  would have some changes in  i t s  b a s ic  a t t i t u d e s .  These 
a t t i t u d e s ,  no m a tte r  how s u b tle  o r  o v e r t,  shou ld  be tak en  in to  account 
f o r  t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  on fo re ig n  p o lic y .
P ro fe s so r  Crabb in d ic a te d  th e  r e a l  danger comes from w ith ­
in  th e  c iv i l i a n  s e c to r  o f  government. S en a to rs  w ith  a  p a r t i c u la r ly  
s tro n g  m i l i t a r y  background o r mUio have c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  w ith  la rg e  
m i l i t a iy  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a re  a p t t o  be more th a n  fa v o ra b le  to  th e  
m i l i t a iy  and m i l i t a r y  spending f o r  weaponry. A ll  o f  t h i s  in d ic a te s  
a  c e r ta in  framework o f  th in k in g  on th e  p a r t  o f  Congressmen. P o l i t i c a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  have dubbed t h i s  th e  " m il i ta ry  m ind."
The " m il i ta ry  mind" as  d e fin ed  by P ro fe sso r  Crabb in d ic a te s  
th a t  th o se  in d iv id u a ls  g e n e ra lly  d isp la y :
. . . a  re lu c ta n c e  to  change outmoded weapons system s and 
t a c t i c s ;  an a d d ic t io n  to  e s s e n t ia l ly  m i l i t a r y  so lu tio n s  to  
c r i s e s  in  e x te rn a l  a f f a i r s ,  accompanied by an i n a b i l i t y  to  
reco g n ize  th e  l im i ta t io n s  i33herent in  such an approach; a  
p re d ic ta b le  re a d in ess  to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  n a t io n ’s m i l i t a r y  
defenses a re  in ad eq u a te , i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  th e  c u rre n t l e v e l  o f 
defense  spending; and m a n ife s ta tio n s  o f  a  s u p e r - p a t r io t ic , 
u l t r a n a t i o n a l i s t i c  approach to  r e la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .
« . .an d  a  tem p ta tio n  to  reduce  complex d ip lom atic  is s u e s  in to  
c o n te s ts  o f power and fo rc e . . .an d  to  g lo ss  over p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic, c u l tu r a l  and id e o lo g ic a l  dimensions o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y . '
There may be fundam ental d if fe re n c e s  between o f f i c i a l s  and
ag en c ies  concerned w ith  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty .  Whether th o se  S en a to rs
Tdio d isp la y  a  " m ili ta ry  mind" a re  m erely  engaging in  p a r t i s a n  m isch ie f
o r  pushing  a  d e e p - fe l t  concern f o r  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty ,  t h e i r  u se  o f
m i l i t a r y  men to  back up p re v iso u ly  s ta t e d  p o s i t io n s  o r  p reconce ived
^ b i d . , p . 76 .
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id e as  abou t " n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty "  s e r io u s ly  erodes th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
dictum  o f  c i v i l i a n  c o n tro l .^
The S c ie n t i f i c  Community
The s c i e n t i f i c  community o f  atom ic s c i e n t i s t s  i s  th e  l a t e s t  
s e c to r  o f  government t o  p lay  a  v e ry  im portan t p a r t  i n  fo re ig n  p o lic y  
making. S c i e n t i f i c a l l y ,  i t  -was t h e i r  genius t h a t  enab led  man to  
produce methods o f  mass d e s tru c tio n  and b rin g  about -fche in s e c u r i ty  
of-file c o ld  -war. P o l i t i c a l l y ,  i t  was th e  s c i e n t i s t  a c t in g  as  a  
n e g o tia to r  a t  Geneva th a t  s e r io u s ly  hampered r e a l  p ro g ress  tow ard 
any r e a l  disarmament by demanding " o n -s i te "  in s p e c tio n s .^
The s c i e n t i f i c  communi-ty i s  i t s e l f  di-vided on th e  r o l e  i t  
shou ld  p la y  in  fo re ig n  p o lic y  making. W hile p h y sics  may be a  "pure" 
sc ie n c e , th e  s c i e n t i s t  o u ts id e  h i s  la b o ra to iy  i s  s t i l l  a  man w ith  
p o l i t i c a l  p re fe re n c e s  and may f a i l  t o  a p p re c ia te  how h is  own p o l i t i c a l  
d is p o s i t io n s  a f f e c t  h is  ad-vlce on te c h n ic a l  m a tte rs . I t  i s  e n t i r e ly  
p o s s ib le  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  may co n sc io u sly  have t h e i r  own s p e c ia l  
i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  th e y  -wish to  f u r th e r  -vdien t h e i r  ad-vlce i s  c a l le d  up­
on by e i th e r  th e  E xecu tive  o r L e g is la t iv e  branch o f  governm ent.
S in ce  1955 th e  s c i e n t i f i c  community has been di-vided in to  two 
m ajor schoo ls  o f  though t over atom ic development and c o n tro l .  The
l l b i d . , p . 77.
2R obert G ilp in , American S c ie n t i s t s  and E u c lear Weapons P o lic y  
(P r in c e to n ; P r in c e to n  U niversi-by P re s s ,  19^2).
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F in i te  School holds th a t  c o n tro l i s  p o ss ib le  through p o l i t i c a l  
means of consensus and accommodation. This group i s  g e n e ra lly  
a s so c ia te d  w ith  the  Los Alamos L aboratory  and the  s c i e n t i s t s  were 
th e  p r in c ip a l s c i e n t i f i c  a d v ise rs  in  th e  Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n .^
The I n f in i te  School i s  o f the  mind th a t  co n tro l i s  not 
p o ss ib le  in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere o f th e  co ld  war. The L iv er­
more L aboratory  i s  the  fo ca l p o in t o f th e  I n f in i t e  School s c i e n t i s t s ,
2
le d  by Dr. Edxvard T e lle r .
Statem ent o f  T hesis
I t  i s  the  purpose o f th i s  study to  examine the  L im ited Test 
Ban T reaty  o f 1963 as a " b ip a r t is a n "  s tep  toward le ssen in g  th e  
te n s io n s  w ith  the  Soviet Union.
The study examines a p e rio d  o f tim e when the  United S ta te s ' 
in te g r i ty  was a t  s tak e  reg a rd in g  the  ta lk s  on disarmament. The 
U nited S ta te s  had been involved  in  n e g o tia tio n s  a t  Geneva s in ce  1958 
and on p u b lic  reco rd  we were in  favor o f l im it in g  atom ic te s t in g  and 
even disarmament. The reco rd  of accomplishment was zero .
The U nited S ta te s  had a young P res id en t of " l ib e r a l"  p e rsu as io n  
who came under severe  p a r t is a n  a t ta c k  from th e  "co n se rv a tiv e"  elem ents 
o f th e  Democratic and R epublican p a r t ie s  fo r  th e  a b o rtiv e  "Bay of P igs" 
in v asio n  of Cuba. A fte r h is  su ccess fu l handling  o f th e  "M iss ile  C r is is  
o f 1962," he was ag a in  under a t ta c k  from th e  same q u a r te rs  fo r  u s in g
^ Ib id . , Chapter 4. 
Z ibid .
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th e  c r i s i s  as a means o f ga in ing  Democratic m a jo r i t ie s .  When the 
P res id en t announced a l i t t l e  more than  seven months a f t e r  th e  con­
f r o n ta t io n  w ith  the  S ov ie t Union in  Cuba th a t  the  two n a tio n s  were 
e n te r in g  in to  ta lk s  aimed a t  the  l im i ta t io n  o f n u c lea r t e s t in g ,  he 
was ag a in  a tta ck e d  by the co n se rv a tiv e s  o f h is  own p a r ty  and th e  
le a d e rsh ip  o f th e  R epublican P a rty . However, the  American p u b lic  
re a c te d  q u ite  d i f f e r e n t ly .  P ub lic  opin ion  p o l ls  tak en  a f t e r  th e  
October m is s i le  c r i s i s  in d ic a te d  th a t  74 p e rcen t o f th e  American 
people were s a t i s f i e d  w ith  h is  perform ance as c o n tra s te d  to  a low 
o f 64 p e rcen t b e fo re  th e  October c r i s i s . ^  The e f f e c t  o f an i n t e r ­
n a tio n a l c r i s i s  i s  to  in c rease  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  popular s tand ing .
The in v e s t ig a t io n ,  d e sc r ip tio n , and a n a ly s is  o f any p a r t ic u la r  
h i s to r i c a l  event c o n s t i tu te s  a case  study. The m a te r ia ls  p resen ted  
h e re in  r e la t in g  to  th e  development and approval o f th e  Test Ban 
T reaty  of 1963 c o n s t i tu te  by d e f in i t io n  such a s tudy . The q u estio n  
which a r is e s  r e la te s  to  the  degree of re lev an ce  and va lue  th a t  a 
p a r t i c u la r  case  h is to ry  can have fo r  th e  study o f fo re ig n  p o lic y  making.
Viewed as an is o la te d  ev en t, or as a d e s c r ip t iv e  n a r ra t io n  of 
c a u s a li ty  or a c c id e n ta l ly  r e la te d  h i s to r i c a l  occu rren ces, a case 
study i s  o f l im ite d  s ig n if ic a n c e . Ordered by theory  or hypo thesis  
th e se  same even ts assume a m eaningful t o t a l i t y .  Theory i s  both  th e  
end product and th e  s ta r t in g  p o in t o f s c i e n t i f i c  re s e a rc h . However, 
the  study of cases i s  an e s s e n t ia l  a sp e c t o f any sc ie n c e , p o l i t i c a l  
sc ien ce  or "pure" sc ie n c e , and a case study i s  th e  p re lim in a ry  s tep  
toward fo rm u la tion  o f types and g e n e ra liz a tio n s . In  the  long ru n  i t
^W altz, op. c i t . , p. 275.
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i s  ap p aren t t h a t  in d iv id u a l  s tu d ie s  can accum ulate in  v a lue  t h r o u ^  
o ffe r in g  sou rces fo r  g e n e ra l iz a t io n . The more immediate v a lu e  o f 
th e  case  s tudy  would seem to  be in  th e  realm  o f p r a c t i c a l  p o l i t i c s  
and th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  th e  f u tu r e .
A c e n tr a l  theme o f  t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  i s  t h a t  P re s id e n t John F . 
Kennedy, having  been e le c te d  by l e s s  th a n  h a l f  o f  th e  v o te r s ,  developed 
b ip a r t is a n  p ra c t ic e s  to  a  h i ^  p o in t in  th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  
o f  1963 . The L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  f u r th e r  opened p o l i t i c a l  
doors w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union, u l t im a te ly  le ad in g  to  th e  le s s e n in g  o f 
te n s io n s  between th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t U nion.
I t  i s  th e  in te n t io n  o f t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  t o  show t h a t  " b i-  
p a i t is a n s h ip "  -was dem onstrated  by th e  P re s id e n t by:
1 . P r io r  c o n su lta tio n  between th e  ex ecu tiv e  branch  and 
p a r ty  le a d e r s .
2 . C ooperation w ith  p a r ty  le a d e rs  in  Congress.
3 . B ip a r tis a n  v o tin g  w ith o u t re g a rd  to  p a r t i s a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s .
h. P r iv a te  appeals to  in d iv id u a l  congressmen.
5 . Appeals to  p u b lic  op in ion  c a lc u la te d  to  g e n e ra te  con­
g re s s io n a l  su p p o rt.
6 . Appointment o f m in o rity  members to  re sp o n s ib le  p o lic y  
making r o le s .
This p e r io d  was f u r th e r  un ique f o r  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  ro le  in  
re q u e s tin g  and o b ta in in g  th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms C o n tro l and 
M saimament Agency, which p ro found ly  changed th e  n e g o tia t in g  r o le  
o f  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  and th e  S ta te  Department in  m a tte rs  con­
cern in g  arms c o n tro l  and disarm am ent.
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i s  ap p aren t t h a t  in d iv id u a l  s tu d ie s  can accum ulate in  v a lu e  th rough  
o f fe r in g  sou rces f o r  g e n e ra l iz a t io n . The more immediate v a lu e  o f 
th e  case  s tudy  would seem to  he  in  th e  realm  o f p r a c t i c a l  p o l i t i c s  
and th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  th e  fu tu r e .
A c e n tr a l  theme o f t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  i s  t h a t  P re s id e n t John F-. 
Kennedy, having  been e le c te d  by l e s s  th a n  h a l f  o f  th e  v o te r s ,  developed 
b ip a r t i s a n  p ra c t ic e s  to  a  h ig h  p o in t in  th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  
o f  1963. The L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  f u r th e r  opened p o l i t i c a l  
doors w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union, u l t im a te ly  le ad in g  to  th e  le s se n in g  o f 
te n s io n s  between th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union.
I t  i s  th e  in te n t io n  o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t io n  t o  show th a t  " b i­
p a r t is a n s h ip "  was dem onstrated  by th e  P re s id e n t by:
1 . P r io r  c o n su lta tio n  betw een th e  ex ecu tiv e  branch and 
p a r ty  le a d e r s .
2 . C ooperation  w ith  p a r ty  le a d e rs  in  C ongress.
3 . B ip a r tis a n  v o tin g  w ith o u t re g a rd  to  p a r t i s a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s .
4 . P r iv a te  appeals to  in d iv id u a l  congressmen.
5 . Appeals to  p u b lic  o p in io n  c a lc u la te d  to  g e n e ra te  con­
g re s s io n a l  su p p o rt.
6 . Appointment o f m in o rity  members to  re sp o n s ib le  p o lic y  
making r o le s .
This p e r io d  was f u r th e r  unique f o r  th e  P r e s id e n t’s ro le  in  
re q u e s tin g  and o b ta in in g  th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms C o n tro l and 
Disarmament Agency, which p ro found ly  changed th e  n e g o tia t in g  ro le  
o f  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  and th e  S ta te  Department in  m a tte rs  con­
ce rn in g  arms c o n tro l  and disarm am ent.
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A secondary' thème of th is  d i s s e r ta t io n  i s  to  show th a t  the  
U nited S ta te s  S e n a te 's  Armed S erv ices Committee, under th e  ideo­
lo g ic a l  le a d e rsh ip  o f  Senator B arry Goldwater and a "co n se rv a tiv e - 
c o a l i t io n "  o f W estern and Southern Democrats and R epublicans, 
a ttem p ted  to  b lock  th e  passage of th e  L im ited T est Ban T reaty  on 
th e  b a s is  o f testim ony  g iven by r e t i r e d  members o f th e  Armed S erv ices 
and members o f th e  s c i e n t i f i c  community known fo r  th e i r  views 
fav o rin g  u n lim ited  t e s t in g  and development o f n u c lea r energy. In  
th i s  in s ta n c e  " b ip a r t is a n  o p p o sitio n "  was d isp lay ed  on th e  b a s is  
of v o tin g  p a t te r n s .  In  1963, Senator Goldwater jo in e d  b is  p a r ty  in  
sup p o rtin g  t h e i r  fo re ig n  p o lic y  p o s it io n s  only  36 p e rcen t o f th e  time 
as compared w ith  65 p e rcen t fo r  th e  average R epublican S en a to r.^
Resources
A few words must be s a id  concerning th e  evidence ga th ered  
fo r  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f th i s  s tudy . The m ajor p o r tio n  o f th e  m a te r ia l 
was drawn from government documents, co n g ress io n a l h earin g s  and r e p o r ts ,  
ex ecu tiv e  agency s tu d ie s ,  news r e le a s e s  and p r e s id e n t ia l  news con ferences.
Much o f th e  in fo rm atio n  of t h i s  d i s s e r ta t io n  i s  from testim ony 
of persons having a d i r e c t  p e rso n a l i n t e r e s t  in  su b je c ts  under consid ­
e ra t io n ,  th e re fo re , an  e f f o r t  has been made to  co rro b o ra te  im portan t 
p o in ts  through p ro fe s s io n a l w rit in g s  and through the  use o f personal 
in te rv ie w s . In  th i s  fa sh io n  th e  r e l i a b i l i t y  and v a l id i t y  o f much of 
th e  m a te r ia l co n ta in ed  has been v e r i f ie d .
^Warren Weaver, "Goldwater S p l i t s  His V o tes,"  The New York Times 
(Ju ly  17, 1964).
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A p o in t o f cau tio n  should  be n o ted . A g re a t d e a l o f  th e
in fo rm atio n  r e la t in g  to  th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  invo lves
te c h n ic a l  and m i l i t a r y  in fo rm atio n . This p o in t  i s  p a r t i c u la r ly
p e r t in e n t  to  th e  Defense Department ' s p ro je c t  VELA,. P ro je c t VELA
i s  th e  name a ss ig n ed  by th e  S e c re ta ry  o f Defense f o r  th e  va rio u s
p ro je c ts  devoted t o  th e  problems o f h igh  a l t i t u d e  d e te c tio n  (Panofsky
P anel) and th e  Berkner P anel ■which had examined th e  problems of 
1
seism ic  d e te c tio n .
Although u n o f f ic ia l  European sources in d ic a te  t h a t  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  has p e r fe c te d  i t s  s a t e l l i t e  and se ism o lo g ica l l i s t e n in g  de­
v ic e s  to  such an e x ten t th a t  " o n -s ite "  in sp e c tio n s  a re  no lo n g er 
n ecessa ry , th e  U nited  S ta te s  s t i l l  o f f i c i a l l y  c l a s s i f i e s  th e  p ro je c t  
as "top  s e c r e t ."
Two o f th e  most im portan t in d iv id u a ls  concerned w ith  th i s  
t r e a ty  a re  dead. The Kennedy papers a re  locked  fo r  a  p e r io d  o f 
tw e n ty -fiv e  y e a r s . The papers o f S en a to r D irksen a re  n o t a 'v a ilab le  
fo r  re se a rc h  and th e r e  i s  no in d ic a t io n  when th e  papers  w i l l  be  a v a i l ­
a b le . The in fo rm atio n  concerning b o th  in d i'v id u a ls  came through  
in d iv id u a l in te rv ie w s  w ith  S en a to r A lb e rt Gore o f  Tennessee, G eneral 
Maxwell T ay lo r and Vice P re s id e n t Hubert Humphrey.
In  a d d itio n  to  t h i s  ch ap te r , th e  fo llow ing  ch ap te rs  a re  
designed as  a  case  study  to  examine th e  a c tio n s  o f  th e  P re s id e n t and 
Congress in  th e  framework o f  " b ip a r t is a n s h ip ."  Chapter I I I  d eals  w ith  
th e  c h ro n o lo g ic a l s u r v ^  o f our e f f o r t s  to  ach iev e  a  t r e a ty  l im it in g
% . S . ,  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency, Documents on 
Disarmament, 1962,P u b lic a tio n  No. 19(W ashington: Government P r in t in g  
O ffice , 1953; ,  V ols. I ,  n .
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n u c lea r t e s t i n g .  H is to r ic a l ly ,  A dlai Stevenson vas th e  f i r s t  person  
o f  p u b lic  re c o g n itio n  to  c a l l  f o r  a  ban on t e s t in g ,  during  th e  
p r e s id e n t i a l  campaign o f  1955»
C hapter IV in  many vays i s  th e  h e a r t  o f th e  d i s s e r ta t io n  
because i t  examines th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f  P re s id e n t John F . Kennedy’s 
e f f o r t s  t o  o b ta in  a  b ip a r t i s a n  execu tive  s t a f f ;  change th e  s t r u c tu r e  
o f  th e  S ta te  Department and th e  manner o f  n e g o tia tin g  t r e a t i e s  con­
cerned w ith  atom ic energy and development by th e  e s tab lish m en t o f 
th e  Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency; h is  e f f o r t s  to  keep th e  
p ro p e r c o n g re ss io n a l committees inform ed and seeking t h e i r  adv ice  
reg a rd in g  th e  t r e a t y  and f i n a l ly  th e  e f f o r t s  to  n e g o tia te  th e  
t r e a ty  w ith  an eye on th e  S en a te .
The committee a c t io n  was d iv id ed  in to  two c h a p te rs . C hapter V 
i s  devoted e n t i r e ly  to  th e  Subcommittee o f  th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee 
on Disarmament. The c h ap te r  i s  re sea rch ed  f o r  evidence o f  a  " m il i ta ry  
frame o f mind" and th e  d if fe re n c e s  o f  op in ion  w ith in  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  
commu n ity  o f  atom ic s c i e n t i s t s .  Chapter VI i s  devoted to  th e  S enate 
F ore ign  Relations Committee and evidence o f  p r io r  approva l o f  th e  
t r e a ty  by th e  committee due to  p r io r  c o n su lta tio n .
C hapter V II d iv id e s  th e  Senate  debate  on th e  t r e a ty  in to  th re e  
se c tio n s  covering  th e  proponents o f  th e  t r e a ty ,  th e  opponents o f  th e  
t r e a ty  and th e  group o f R epublicans vho were le d  by t h e i r  le a d e r ,
B veret D irksen , to  support th e  t r e a t y .  Once ag a in  evidence o f  p r io r  
c o n su lta tio n , co o p era tio n  w ith  S enate le a d e rs  and b ip a r t is a n  v o tin g  i s  
s o u ^ t .  C hapter V H I i s  an a ttem p t to  analyze th e  v o tin g  o f  th e  S enate  
and th e  r o le  th e  P re s id e n t p layed  in  a f f e c t in g  th e  v o te .
CHAPTER I I I  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The f i r s t  atom ic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in  
August, 1945, were a t  f i r s t  considered  as a means to  an end, th e  end 
of World War I I .  Atomic te s t in g  d id  no t become a m a tte r  o f p o l i t i c a l  
im portance u n t i l  a f t e r  the  U nited S ta te s  de tonated  a f i f t e e n  megaton 
therm onuclear device in  the  B ik in i A to ll on March 1, 1954. The dangers 
o f f a l lo u t  became apparen t when i t  came to  l ig h t  th a t  sev e ra l M arshallese  
and Japanese fisherm en had been endangered when they  in a d v e r te n tly  came 
in to  th e  pa th  o f the  f a l lo u t  d e b r is . World p re ssu re  a g a in s t th e  t e s t in g  
of n u c lea r weapons in c reased .
The is su e  of d isco n tin u in g  n u c lea r t e s t in g  was an im portan t 
is su e  in  th e  P r e s id e n tia l  Campaign of 1956 when Dem ocratic Nominee 
A dlai E. S tevenson suggested th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  should s top  te s t in g  
u n i l a t e r a l ly  as  a f i r s t  s tep  toward o b ta in in g  some agreement on te s t in g  
w ith  the  S ov ie t Union.
The D em ocratic-con tro lled" Congress o f  1957 e s ta b lis h e d  a Sub­
committee on Disarmament under th e  Foreign  R e la tio n s  Committee w ith  
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as i t s  chairm an. The f i r s t  re p o r t  o f th is
subcommittee was to  c a l l  fo r  a m oratorium  on te s t in g  w ith  United
1
N ations su p erv is io n .
On March 31, 1958, the  S ov ie t Union announced th a t  i t  would 
cease t e s t in g  u n i la te r a l ly  and would no t con tinue  u n le ss  o th e r n a tio n s
U .S ., C ongress,Senate,Com m ittee on Foreign R e la tio n s ,S u b ­
committee on Disarmament, C ontrol and R eduction o f Armaments, 88th  Cong., 
2d S e s s . , 1958.
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te s te d .  This move was h a rd ly  more than  a propaganda p loy designed to  
em barrass the  U nited S ta te s .  The United S ta te s  had long planned to  
conduct a s e r ie s  o f e la b o ra te  t e s t s .  The R ussians had a lre ad y  com­
p le te d  th e i r  t e s t in g  and th e re fo re  had n o th in g  to  loose  in  th e i r  
announcement and e v e ry th in g  to  g a in  on th e  propaganda f r o n t .
The U nited S ta te s ' response  was to  re q u e s t a m eeting o f 
te c h n ic a l e x p e r ts  from th e  East and West to  examine th e  q u estio n  
o f th e  p r a c t i c a l i t y  o f banning n u c lea r t e s t in g .
The U nited S ta te s  d id  no t perm it t h i s  o f f e r  to  d e te r  th e i r  
conducting  th e  t e s t  th a t  had a lre a d y  been scheduled . On August 22,
1958, th e  U nited S ta te s  and G reat B r i ta in  announced th a t  they  would 
suspend t e s t in g  fo r  one year commencing October 31, 1958. The o f fe r  
was to  be renew able fo r  one year p e r io d s , p rov ided  th e  S ov ie t Union 
would a ls o  d e s is t  from te s t in g  and would ag ree  to  jo in  th e  U nited 
S ta te s  and G reat B r i ta in  in  n e g o tia tio n s  fo r  th e  suspension  of 
n u c lea r t e s t s  and th e  e stab lish m en t of an in te r n a t io n a l  c o n tro l 
system.
The Geneva Conference o f Experts met from Ju ly  1 s t to  August 
21, 1958. The co n c lu sio n  of th i s  conference was th a t  i t  was " te c h n ic a l ly  
f e a s ib le  to  s e t  up, w ith  c e r ta in  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and l im i ta t io n s ,  a 
w orkable and e f f e c t iv e  c o n tro l system  fo r  th e  c e s s a tio n  o f n u c lea r 
weapons t e s t s . D e t e c t i o n  of n u c lea r t e s t in g  could be accom plished 
by a system  in v o lv in g  lan d -b ased  c o n tro l p o s ts  and sh ip s  s ta t io n e d  
a t  sea . The im portance of " o n - s i te "  in sp e c tio n s  was due to  th e  f a c t
^U .S ., Department o f S ta te ,  Documents on D isarm am ent,1945-59, 
P u b lic a tio n  No. 7008 (W ashington: Government P r in t in g  O ffice , 1960).
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t h a t  underground n u c lea r exp losions cou ld  be d e tec te d  by th e  c o l le c t io n  
o f  r a d io a c tiv e  d e b ris  a t  th e  s i t e .  The London conference d id  n o t go 
in to  any le n g th  on th e  problems o f  h ig h  a l t i t u d e  and o u te r  space 
e x p lo ra t io n s .
P re s id e n t Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed th a t  th e  n u c le a r  
powers e n te r  in to  n e g o tia tio n s  on a  t e s t  ban agreem ent and o f fe re d  
to  suspend t e s t in g  f o r  a  p e r io d  o f one y e a r from  th e  beg inn ing  o f  
th e  n e g o t ia t io n s .  Thus began a  m oratorium  which e v e n tu a lly  r e s ù i te d  
in  th e  T e s t Ban T rea ty  o f I 963 .
The U nited  S ta te s  proposed during  th e se  n e g o tia tio n s  th a t  th e  
problem  o f  p ro h ib i t in g  n u c le a r  t e s t i n g  should  be se p a ra te d  from th e  
b ro ad e r disarmament p ro p o sa ls . E u ss ia  re fu se d  to  accep t any m eaningful 
in s p e c tio n  system  and th e  West was j u s t  as  adamant re g a rd in g  s a fe ­
guard s . On A p r i l  13; 1959^ th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and G reat B r i ta in  p ro ­
posed th a t ;  as a  f i r s t  s te p  tow ards a  com prehensive t e s t  ban t r e a ty ;  
an agreem ent should  be concluded which would av o id  th e  is s u e  o f  "on­
s i t e "  in sp e c tio n s  to  d e te c t  underground and space t e s t s .  The S o v ie t 
Union r e je c te d  t h i s  p ro p o sa l. On F ebruary  11; I 96O; th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
proposed an u n in sp ec ted  p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban; id iich  would in c lu d e  a l l  
n u c le a r  t e s t in g  in  th e  atm osphere; undeirwater; in  space and under­
ground. There was an ex cep tio n  made i n  th e  p ro p o sa l exempting 
"sm all e x p lo s io n s ."  The S o v ie t Union vetoed  t h i s  p ro p o sa l.
The 1959 p ro p o sa l had a ls o  co n ta in ed  th e  ex p ress io n  o f  w i l l in g ­
ness on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  e n te r  in to  a  j o in t  re se a rc h  
program w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union and G reat B r i ta in  t o  improve c o n tro l 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  There seemed to  be some p ro g ress  tow ard a  s o lu tio n
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u n t i l  th e  d ip lom atic  r e la t io n s  between th e  S o v ie t Union and th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  were sev e re ly  s t r a in e d  by th e  U-2 spy p lan e  in c id e n t .  
Prem ier N ik ita  Khrushchev announced th a t  he would have no more 
d ea lin g s  w ith  th e  Eisenhower a d m in is tra tio n  and would w a it u n t i l  
th e  fo llow ing  y e a r t o  d e a l w ith  th e  new a d m in is tra tio n . A lth o u ^  
th e  Geneva Conference con tinued  in  se s s io n  u n t i l  January  29, I 962 , 
th e re  was no s ig n i f ic a n t  p ro g re s s .
The in a u g u ra tio n  o f P re s id e n t John E.Kennedy marked a  more 
fo r c e fu l  e ra  o f d ip lom atic  moves tow ard some form o f a  h a l f  in  th e  
arms race  in  atom ic weaponry. P r io r  to  P re s id e n t Kennedy’s in au g u ra tio n , 
th e  U nited  S ta te s  had  never ta b le d  an e n t i r e  d r a f t  t r e a ty  f o r  a  
n u c le a r  t e s t  ban a t  Geneva. The Eisenhower a d m in is tra tio n  had 
d ra f te d  one, b u t had n o t been a b le  to  o b ta in  a  "consensus" among 
th e  in te r e s te d  agenc ies o f th e  U nited  S ta te s  Congress and E xecutive 
Departm ents. P re s id e n t Eisenhower, p a r t ic u la r ] y  during th e  f i r s t  
p a r t  o f  h is  a d m in is tra tio n , was n o t o f th e  op in ion  th a t  a  t e s t  ban 
t r e a ty  would be in  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s .  This doubt 
was shared  by th e  Atomic Energy Commission and th e  Department o f  
D efense. The only  agency in  fav o r was th e  P r e s id e n t 's  Science 
A dvisory Committee and h is  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  John F o s te r  D u lle s .^
^ r a b b ,  op. c i t . , p . I I 9 .P re s id e n t Eisenhower had appo in ted  
James R. K i l l ia n  J r . ,  P re s id e n t o f  th e  M assachusetts I n s t i t u t e  o f  
Technology, as h is  S p e c ia l A s s is ta n t  f o r  Science and Technology. 
Robert G ilp in  in d ic a te s  in  h is  book, American S c ie n t i s t s  and N uclear 
Weapons th a t  t h i s  was a  b reak through  fo r  th e  " f i n i t e  containm ent 
sch o o l."
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P re s id e n t Eisenhower r e l i e d  upon "consensus b u ild in g "  and th e  one 
m ajor d e c is io n  in  1957- I 958 t h a t  d id  n o t come from consensus was 
th e  p ro p o sa l f o r  th e  Conference o f E xperts in  19^8. This d ec is io n  
has been c r i t i c i z e d  because th e  U nited  S ta te s  s e n t a  d e leg a tio n  
dominated by s c i e n t i s t s  to  London and Geneva. The Eisenhower admin­
i s t r a t i o n  looked upon th e  conference as s t r i c t l y  a  m a tte r  between 
s c i e n t i s t s .  John F o s te r  D ulles re p o rte d  t h a t  "we have g iven them 
com plete a u th o r i ty  to  work on th i s .m a t te r  as a  p u re ly  s c i e n t i f i c  
te c h n ic a l  m a tte r . . . .1  do no t a n t ic ip a te  th a t  th e re  w i l l  be any 
need f o r  p o l i t i c a l  g u id an ce ."^
At th e  Conference o f  E xperts th e  U n ited  S ta te s  committed 
i t s e l f  to  a  course o f a c tio n  reg ard in g  in sp e c tio n s  t h a t  would have 
fa r - re a c h in g  p o l i t i c a l  consequences w ithou t f u l l y  ex p lo ring  th e  
f u l l  fm p lic a tio n s •
To th e  Eisenhower a d m in is tra t io n ’s c re d îjt, i t  should  be 
p o in te d  out th a t  i t  was under h is  a d m in is tra tio n  th a t  th e  appointm ent 
o f Dr. James R. K i l l ia n ,  J r .  le d  to  th e  e s tab lish m en t o f a  b roader 
spectrum  o f  thought concerning atom ic energy developm ent. U n ti l  
1957; th e  s c i e n t i s t s  invo lved  in  p o lic y  decision-m aking were th o se  who 
had been d i r e c t ly  connected w ith  th e  Atomic Energy Commission and th e  
Department o f  D efense. Under Dr. K i l l i a n ’s guidance Dr. George B. 
K istiakow sky, Dr. Is a d o r  I .  E ab i, Dr. Jerome B. W iesner, Dr. H erbert 
York, D r. Lloyd V. Berkner and Dr. Hans A. B ethe, a l l  i d e n t i f i e d  w ith
S . ,  Department o f  S ta te  B u lle tin  (June 30, I 958) ,  p . IO85 .
39
th e  " f i n i t e  containm ent school" were brought in to  th e  d e c is io n ­
making p ro c e ss .
Dr. K i l l ia n  s e t  up a  p a n e l to  study  some of th e  is su e s  
in v o lv in g  th e  banning o f n u c le a r  weapon t e s t s .  The panels which 
has come to  be known as th e  Bethe P an e l, c o n s is te d  o f  Dr. Hans 
Bethe, Dr. H arold Browi, Dr. H erb ert York and an asso rtm en t o f  
c iv i l i a n  and m il i t a r y  o f f ic e r s  o f  th e  Eisenhower a d m in is tra tio n .
The f in d in g s  o f  th e  Bethe P an e l have never been made p u b lic , 
bu t V ice P re s id e n t Humphrey in d ic a te d  to  t h i s  w r i te r  t h a t  i t  was 
h e re  t h a t  a  s ig n i f ic a n t  b reak th rough  in  seism ic  d e te c t io n  was made 
by th e  Bethe p a n e l, p a r t i c u la r ly  by Dr. B erkner, -vdio was an in d e ­
pendent re s e a rc h e r  on th e  p r o je c t .  Prom testim ony  b e fo re  th e  Humphrey 
subcom m ittee, i t  t r a n s p ir e d  th a t  th e  p an e l had concluded th a t  
con tinued  te s t in g  would u l t im a te iy  r e s u l t  in  th e  narrow ing o f  th e  
le a d  in  th e  development o f more s o p h is t ic a te d  weapons th a n  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  h ad .^
On September 1 , 19^2, th e  m oratorium  was a b ru p tly  ended by 
th e  S o v ie t Union w ith  a  s e r ie s  o f t e s t s  th a t  were conducted as  a  
r e s u l t  o f ex ten s iv e  p re p a ra t io n s . The U nited  S ta te s  and B r i ta in  
were com pelled to  conduct t e s t s  o f  t h e i r  own. One p o s i t iv e  a sp e c t 
o f  th e  t e s t in g  and th e  m oratorium  was th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  f in d in g s  
o f  th e  Bethe P an e l were a c c u ra te  to  th e  degree th a t  th e  ta s k  o f 
d e te c tin g  underground t e s t s  was co n sid e rab ly  e a s ie r  th an  f i r s t  
thought during  th e  London C onference.
^ e e  Humphrey in te rv ie w . Appendix "B."
H a r o ld  K. Jacobson, "The T es t Ban N e g o tia tio n s :Im p lic a tio n s  
f o r  th e  F u t u r e , The A nnals, CCCLIlJanuary, 1964}, p . 96 .
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In  s p i te  o f t h e i r  d isappo in tm en ts, th e  U nited  S ta te s  p e r ­
s i s t e d  in  i t s  p u r s u i t  o f  a  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .  During th e  m iddle o f 
th e  second post-m oratorium  S o v ie t t e s t  s e r ie s ,  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
eind B r i ta in  p re sen te d  two im p o rtan t t r e a t i e s ;  one proposed a  ban 
on a l l  n u c lea r t e s t i n g ,  safeguarded  by a  system  o f in te r n a t io n a l ly  
su p erv ised  c o n tro l p o s ts  and " o n -s i te "  in s p e c tio n s , w h ile  th e  o th e r  
c a l le d  fo r  th e  u n in sp ec ted  p ro h ib i t io n  o f t e s t in g  i n  a l l  environm ents 
excep t underground. lEhe S o v ie t Union r e je c te d  b o th  p ro p o sa ls .
O ctober, 1$62, saw th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union 
" e y e b a ll- to -e y e b a ll"  w ith  th e  t h r e a t  o f  a  f u l l  s c a le  atom ic war 
over th e  is s u e  o f  m is s i le s  in  Cuba. The c o n fro n ta tio n  made a p ro ­
found im pression  on P rem ier Khrushchev about th e  American w illin g n e ss  
to  u se  fo rc e  and th e  firm ness o f  th e  P re s id e n t o f th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  
John P . Kennedy. During th e  c r i s i s  a  s e r ie s  o f l e t t e r s  were ex­
changed between th e  two le a d e rs  and a re  s t i l l  c l a s s i f i e d  documents.
On December 19, 1962, P rem ier Khrushchev in d ic a te d  in  a  l e t t e r  to  
P re s id e n t Kennedy th a t  th e  S o v ie t Union would be ag reeab le  to  a  
t e s t  ban t r e a t y  on th e  b a s is  o f  two o r  th re e  in sp e c tio n s  a  y ea r on 
S o v ie t t e r r i t o r y ,  in  a d d itio n  to  a  few unmanned se ism ic  s ta t io n s .  
While th e  U nited  S ta te s  r e je c te d  t h i s  p ro p o sa l, th e  l e t t e r  d id  have 
th e  e f f e c t  o f keeping  a l iv e  th e  t e s t  ban ta lk s  because i t  seemed to  
in d ic a te  a  w illin g n e s s  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  S o v ie t Union to  accep t th e  
p r in c ip le  o f " o n -s ite "  in s p e c tio n s .
Edw ard  D. W ilson, The M iss ile  C r is i s :  1962, U npublished M aste r ' s 
T hesis (Uorman, Oklahoma: U n iv e rs ity  o f  Oklahoma, I 963) . P e rso n a l con­
v e rs a t io n  w ith  S en a to r A lb e rt Gore, Democrat o f  Tennessee, confirm ed th e  
fin d in g s  o f  th e  th e s i s .
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On January  21, 1963, S en a to r H ubert H. Humphrey announced to  
th e  Senate  th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union were resuming 
n e g o tia tio n s  in  New York a f t e r  a  s e r ie s  o f  l e t t e r s  between P re s id e n t 
Kennedy and Prem ier Khrushchev were made p u b lic  and p r in te d  in  th e  
W ashington P o s t o f  January  21 , 1963 . Mr. W illiam  C. F o s te r  o f th e  
Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency headed up th e  U nited  S ta te s  
d e le g a tio n  w h ile  P rem ier Khrushchev app o in ted  N. T. Fedorenko, U .S .S .R . 
permanent r e p re s e n ta t iv e  to  th e  U n ited  N ations and S . K. Œ sarapkin, 
U .S .S .R . permanent r e p re s e n ta t iv e  to  th e  E igh teen  N ation  Disarmament 
Committee o f  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s . The U n ited  Kingdom was t o  be re p re ­
sen ted  by S i r  David Ormsby G ore.^
The p re lim in a ry  n e g o tia tio n s  were prong)tly deadlocked over 
th e  " o n -s i te "  in sp e c tio n  is s u e  once a g a in . In  an a ttem p t to  overcome 
t h i s  i s s u e .  P re s id e n t Kennedy o rd ered  a  suspension  o f underground 
t e s t i n g .  In  resp o n se , th e  S o v ie t Union proposed th a t  th e  th re e  power 
ta lk s  be te rm in a te d  and th a t  th e  E igh teen  N ation Disarmament Committee 
be g iven  th e  ta s k  o f  working ou t an agreem ent. On F ebruary  I 8 , I 963 , 
Dean Rusk announced t h a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would can ce l i t s  suspension  
o f  underground t e s t i n g .
A m isunderstand ing  between th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t 
Union on th e  exac t number o f " o n -s i te "  in s p e c tio n s  caused th e  E igh teen  
N ation t a lk s  t o  a r r iv e  a t  an im passe. The S o v ie t Union had ag reed  to
S . ,  C ongressional Record, 88t h  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  I 963,  CIX,
pp . 692-697 .
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two o r  p o ss ib ly  th re e  " o n - s i te ” in sp e c tio n s , b u t th e  U nited  S ta te s  
in s i s t e d  t h a t  i t  had never o ffe re d  to  low er i t s  demands below seven .^  
On F ebruary  19t h ,  a  rumor was w idely  c i r c u la te d  in  th e  Congress 
th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  m ight ag a in  lower th e  number o f  in sp e c tio n s
p
i t  had been demanding a t  Geneva. S en a to r Ihomas J .  Dodd, Democrat
o f  C onnecticu t, made a  speech on th e  f lo o r  o f  th e  S enate  which
i l l u s t r a t e d  th e  concern o f th e  Senate  and h is  own p e rso n a l hopes;
The tim e has come th e re fo re  fo r  a  fran k  n o n p a rtisan  a p p ra is a l  
of our n u c le a r  p o s tu re  and o f our s ta tu s  in  th e  t e s t  ban 
n e g o t ia t io n s .
Œhe re c o rd  of th e  U nited  S ta te s  and o f th e  U n ited  Kingdom a t  
Geneva s in ce  th e  in c e p tio n  o f th e  t e s t  ban n e g o tia t io n s , r e ­
v e a ls  a  c o n s is te n t  and con tinu ing  r e t r e a t  from  th e  b a s ic  
p r in c ip le  o f in s p e c tio n .
The c e n t r a l  q u estions a t  is s u e  in  th e  m a tte r o f a  t e s t  ban 
a re ,  f i r s t ,  th e  q u estio n  o f Tdiether o r  no t we can t r u s t  th e  
S o v ie ts . These a re  e s s e n t ia l ly  p o l i t i c a l  q u estio n s  o f which 
s c i e n t i f i c  competence by i t s e l f ,  does n o t q u a lify  a  man to  
a d v ise .
. . . i t  i s  my hope th a t  t h i s  concession  o f o n s i te  in sp ec tio n s  
w i l l  enab le  my co lleag u es  and th e  p u b lic  a t  la rg e  to  b e t t e r  
u n d ers tan d  how f a r  we have r e t r e a te d  from our i n i t i a l  p o s i t io n .3
The th r u s t  o f  S en a to r Dodd's speech was th a t  we should  re tu rn
to  our o r ig in a l  p o s i t io n  o f " o n -s ite "  in sp e c tio n s  as Voiced a t  Geneva
in  1958 . To do o therw ise  would c o n s t i tu te  a  th r e a t  to  our n a t io n a l
James A. McBride, The N uclear T est Ban T rea ty  and U nited  S ta te s  
N a tio n a l S e c u r ity , U npublished D is s e r ta t io n  No. 2896(W ashington,D .0 . :  
Georgetown U n iv e rs ity , I 966) .
^ Ib id .
% «8 . ,  C ongressional Record(F ebruary  21 , I 963) , p . 2802.
43
s e c u r i ty  and he could  no t support such a  t r e a ty  i f  a  t r e a ty  d id  
r e s u l t .  S ix  days l a t e r  S enato r Dodd rev e rsed  h is  p o s i t io n  and 
jo in e d  w ith  S ena to r Humphrey and th ir ty - tw o  o th e r  S ena to rs  in  
sponsoring  a  r e s o lu tio n  u rg in g  a  l im ite d  t e s t  han t r e a ty  w ithou t 
" o n - s i te ” in sp e c tio n s , "b earin g  in  mind th a t  such t e s t s  can a lre ad y  
be m onitored by th e  U nited  S ta te s  w ithou t o n s ite  in sp e c tio n  on 
S o v ie t T e r r i to ry .
I f  th e  S o v ie t Union should  r e j e c t  t h i s  o f f e r  o f  a  l im ite d  
o r p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban in  fa v o r o f a  t o t a l  ban w ith o u t in sp e c tio n s , 
th en  th e  U nited  S ta te s  shou ld  p e r s i s t  in  i t s  e f f o r t s  to  n e g o tia te .  
Meanwhile, th e  U n ited  S ta te s  should  no t conduct any f u r th e r  t e s t s  in  
th e  atm osphere o r underw ater so long as th e  S o v ie t Union a b s ta in e d . 
However, b earin g  in  mind th e  reco rd  o f th e  S o v ie t Union tendency n o t 
to  keep i t s  word, th e  U n ited  S ta te s  should  keep i t s  t e s t in g  f a c i l i t i e s
pa t  a  s t a t e  o f re a d in e s s .
This p o s i t io n  expressed  to  th e  Senate was n o t new n o r d id  
i t  re p re se n t "arm tw is tin g "  o f  S ena to r Dodd by th e  "White House. The 
p o s i t io n  had been announced and c le a r ly  expounded by W illiam  0 . F o s te r  
o f  th e  Bendix C orporation  A5rms C on tro l Symposium a t  Ann A rbor, M ichigan, 
on December 15, I 962 . Dr. F o s te r  s ta te d  a t  t h a t  tim e th a t  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  had spen t in  excess o f  100 m illio n  d o lla rs  so f a r  in  re sea rc h  
on d e te c tio n  dev ices and as  a  consequence th e  U nited  S ta te s  was a b le  
a t  th a t  tim e to  m onitor t e s t s  w ith in  th e  S o v ie t Union w ith o u t " o n -s ite "  
in s p e c tio n s . Underground t e s t s  con tinued  to  be an a re a  o f am biguity ,
^ Ib id . , p . 91+8 3 .
^ Ib id .
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b u t th e  U n ited  S ta te s  was working on p e r fe c t in g  d e te c tio n  dev ices 
which should  e lim in a te  even t h i s  a re a . The U nited  S ta te s ,  " in  an 
e f f o r t  to  b reak  th rough th e  c i r c u la r  debate  t h a t  has been ta k in g  
p la c e ," was p rep a red  to  co n sid e r fo u r  a l te r n a t iv e s  in  th e  p o s s ib le  
banning o f n u c le a r  weapons:
1 . We w i l l  co n sid er a  com prehensive t r e a ty  w ith o u t on­
s i t e  in s p e c tio n  i f  ,the S o v ie t Union can dem onstrate why 
o n - s i te  in sp e c tio n s  a re  unn ecessa ry .
2 . I f  th ey  cannot do so , we a re  p repared  t o  co n sid e r a  
com prehensive t r e a ty  w ith  l im ite d  requ ir ements fo r  o n - s i te  
in s p e c tio n .
3 . I f  n e i th e r  o f  th e  fo reg o in g  approaches i s  a cc e p tab le  t o  
th e  S o v ie t Union," we a re  p rep a red  t o  e n te r  in to  a  p a r t i a l  
t r e a ty ,  w ith  an in te r im  agreem ent banning underground t e s t s  
and p ro v id in g  adequate  c o n tro ls  w h ile  n e g o tia tio n s  f o r  a  
l a s t in g  arrangem ent co n tin u e .
if. I f  th e  S o v ie t Union does n o t w ish to  accep t adequate 
c o n tro ls  even on an in te r im  b a s is ,  we a re  p rep ared  to  accep t 
a  p a r t i a l  t r e a ty  which would ban t e s t s  in  th e  atm osphere, in  
o u te r  space and underw ater. Underground t e s t s  would co n tinue  
w h ile  we sought agreement f o r  t h a t  environm ent.^
American U n iv e rs ity  Commencement
P re s id e n t Kennedy had been in v i te d  to  address th e  g rad u a tin g  
c la s s  a t  American U n iv e rs ity  on June 10, 1963 . H is b io g ra p h e r,
Theodore Sorenson, s a id  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t came away from th e  1962 
m is s i le  c r i s i s  bad ly  shaken over th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  n u c le a r  d e s tru c t io n  
to  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  wot-ld. Try as th e  P re s id e n t m i ^ t ,  he  had 
u n t i l  t h i s  tim e been unab le  to  convince th e  S o v ie t Prem ier o f  h is  good 
in te n t io n s .  A lthough th e  U n ited  S ta te s  p re s s  was a le r te d  to  th e  
f a c t  th a t  th e  P r e s id e n t’s ad d ress  would be a  m ajor one, l i t t l e  n o tic e
^W illiam  C. F o s te r , "Risk and S e c u r ity  in  th e  Age o f  IR iclear 
W eapons," U .S ., Department o f  S ta te  B u l l e t i n , (January , 1963)•
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•was g iven  to  i t  in  th e  d a i ly  new spapers.
The speech i t s e l f  r e f l e c te d  th e  Kennedy a d m in is tr a t io n ’s 
a t t i t u d e  to'ward an agreem ent on n u c le a r  energy , b u t a ls o  th e  f e a rs  
th a t  dom estic o p p o s itio n  i n  th e  Senate  m ight f u r th e r  hamper any 
su c c e ss .
Some say th a t  i t  i s  u s e le s s  to  speak o f  w orld peace o r 
w orld law o r w orld disarm am ent. . . and th a t  i t  would be 
u s e le s s  u n t i l  th e  le a d e rs  o f  th e  S o v ie t Union adopt a  more 
en lig h te n ed  a t t i t u d e .  . .B ut I  a ls o  b e l ie v e  t h a t  we must r e ­
examine our own a t t i t u d e s .  . . . f o r  our a t t i t u d e  i s  as 
e s s e n t ia l  as t h e i r s .
The P re s id e n t a ls o  to o k  t h i s  occasion  to  announce th a t  he , 
in  co n ce rt w ith  B r i t i s h  Prim e M in is te r  MacMillan and Prem ier Khrushchev 
had ag reed  to  h ig h  l e v e l  d isc u ss io n s  in  Moscow ’’lo o k in g  forw ard t o ­
ward e a r ly  agreem ent on a  com prehensive t e s t  ban t r e a t y . ”^ I n  
a d d it io n  he announced t h a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  -would r e f r a in  from atm os­
p h e ric  t e s t in g  so long  as  o th e r  n a tio n s  d id  n o t t e s t .
B r i t i s h  Labour P a r ty  le a d e r  H arold  W ilson co n fe rre d  in  
Moscow on th e  same day w ith  P rem ier Khrushchev f o r  more th a n  th re e  
h o u rs . He s a id  a t  th e  co n c lu sio n  o f t h e i r  t a lk s  t h a t  th e  hopes were 
n o t b r ig h t  f o r  a  f u l l  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  b u t t h a t  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a  
t e s t  ban -which would l im i t  atm ospheric  t e s t s ,  space and underw ater 
t e s t s  was more h o p e fu l.^
S . P re s id e n t Kennedy, ”To-ward a  S tra te g y  o f P e a c e ,” U. S . ,  
Department o f  S ta te  B u l le t in  ( J u ly  1 , I 963) .
^ Ib id .
^The Hew York Times (June 11, I 963) .
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P rem ier Khrushchev commented on th e  co n ten t o f  th e  commence­
ment ad d ress  a t  American U n iv e rs ity  and in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e  speech 
had made a  fa v o ra b le  im pression  on him;
We a re  ready  to  s ig n  an agreem ent on th e  d is c o n tin u a tio n  o f 
a l l  n u c le a r  t e s t s  even to d a y . We ag reed  to  a  m eeting between 
th e  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  th e  th re e  powers in  Moscow to  t r y  once 
ag a in  t o  reach  an agreem ent on t h i s  q u e s tio n .
On J u ly  2nd, in  an ad d ress  to  a  r a l l y  i n  B e r lin , Prem ier
Khrushchev announced th a t  th e  S o v ie t Union would be w i l l in g  to  s ig n
a  t r e a ty  banning n u c le a r  weapons i n  th e  atm osphere, underw ater and
p
in  space . The n ex t day b o th  W ashington and London re le a s e d  announce­
ments to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  th e y  would be w i l l in g  to  accep t a  p a r t i a l  
t e s t  ban t r e a ty ,  and th e  s ta g e  seemed s e t  f o r  agreem ent.
The th re e  power t a lk s  opened in  Moscow on Monday, J u ly  I 5, 
1963 . The American d e le g a tio n  was headed by A v e re ll  Harrim an, Under­
s e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  f o r  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s .  The B r i t i s h  d e le g a tio n  was 
headed by V iscount H ailsham , M in is te r  o f S c ien ce . The S o v ie t d e le ­
g a tio n  was headed by P rem ier Khrushchev a t  th e  f i r s t  m eeting and 
subsequen tly  by F o re ig n  M in is te r  A ndryei Gromyko. By th e  fo llow ing  
S atu rday  th e  Conference was in  t e n ta t iv e  agreem ent on a  t r e a ty  which 
would ban n u c lea r t e s t in g  i n  th e  atm osphere, in  space and underw ater.
The d r a f t  o f th e  t r e a t y  was i n i t i a l e d  by th e  c h ie f  d e leg a te s  
o f  each o f th e  th re e  powers on th e  evening o f  J u ly  25, I 963 . On
^ i d . ,  (June I 5, I 963) . 
^ I b i d . , ( J u ly  3 , I 963) .
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August 5^ 1963, th e  t r e a ty  was fo rm ally  signed  in  Moscow by S e c re ta ry  
o f S ta te  Dean Rusk, who was accompanied by s ix  U nited  S ta te s  S en a to rs ; 
P u lb r ig h t ,  Sparkman, A iken, and Humphrey o f th e  Senate F oreign  R e la tio n s  
Committee, S a l to n s ta l l  of th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee, and P a s to re  
o f th e  J o in t  Committee on Atomic Energy. S ign ing  f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  was 
S e c re ta ry  fo r  F o re ign  A f fa i r s ,  Lord Home. S o v ie t F o re ign  M in is te r  
Gronyko signed  f o r  th e  S o v ie t Union.
P re s id e n t Kennedy tra n s m itte d  th e  t r e a ty  to  th e  Senate on 
August 8 , 1963, where i t  was r e f e r r e d  to  th e  F oreign  R e la tio n s  
Committee as "Executive M., 88t h  Congress, 1 s t  S e s s io n ."  The Foreign  
R e la tio n s  Committee conducted h ea rin g s  on th e  t r e a ty  from August 12th , 
th rough  th e  27th  and re p o r te d  i t  ou t o f  committee on September 3 rd  
w ith  a  p o s i t iv e  v o te  o f  s ix te e n  to  one. S ena to r R u sse ll  B. Long 
was th e  only  d is s e n te r .
The Armed S e rv ices  Committee h e ld  c lo sed  h ea rin g s  on th e  
m il i t a r y  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  t r e a ty  from August 1 s t  to  th e  27th  and de­
l iv e re d  an un fav o rab le  re p o r t  on September 9 , I 963 .
The S enate  i n i t i a t e d  debate  on th e  t r e a ty  th e  same day and 
con tinued  u n t i l  September 2 4 th , when th e  S ena te  approved r a t i f i c a t i o n  
by a  v o te  o f e ig h ty  to  n in e te e n . On th e  same day th e  A frican  Republic 
o f N iger signed  th e  t r e a ty ,  being  th e  102nd n a tio n  to  do so . The 
t r e a t y  was signed  by P re s id e n t Kennedy on O ctober 7 th  and on O ctober 10th 
th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  was c e r t i f i e d  in  Moscow, London and W ashington, th u s  
e n te r in g  in to  fo rc e  th e  T est Ban T rea ty  o f I 963 .
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Hie Treaty
’’P roclaim ing as t h e i r  p r in c ip a l  aim th e  sp e e d ie s t p o s s ib le  
achievem ent o f an agreem ent on g e n e ra l and com plete disarmament under 
s t r i c t  in te r n a t io n a l  c o n tro l  in  accordance v i th  th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f 
th e  U nited  N ations -which -would p u t an end to  th e  armaments race  and 
e lim in a te  th e  in c e n tiv e  to  -the p ro d u c tio n  and t e s t in g  o f a ll ,  k inds 
o f  weapons” th e  governments o f th e  U nited  S ta te s  o f  America, th e  
U n ited  Kingdom o f G reat B r i ta in  and N orthern  I r e la n d , and th e  Union 
o f S o v ie t S o c ia l i s t  R epub lics, seek ing  ”to  achieve th e  d iscon tinuance  
o f  a l l  t e s t  exploâÉLons o f n u c le a r  weapons f o r  a l l  t im e , ” agreed to  
f iv e  a r t i c l e s . 1
Under A r t ic le  I  a l l  n a tio n s  s ig n in g  -the t r e a t y  -would r e f r a in ,  
p rev en t o r  n o t c a r iy  ou t a l l  n u c lea r ex p lo sio n s, o r n u c le a r  weapons 
any p la ce  under i t s  ju r i s d ic t io n  o r c o n tro l  in  th e  atm osphere, o u te r  
space o r under w ater in c lu d in g  t e r r i t o r i a l  -waters o r  th e  h igh  sea s . 
Underground t e s t in g  was to  be a llow ed pro-viding th e  ex p lo sio n  d id  n o t 
cause ra d io a c tiv e  d e b ris  to  t r a v e l  beyond th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  l im i t s  o f 
th e  s t a t e  where th e  exp losion  to o k  p la c e . F u r th e r , th e  p a r t i e s  agreed  
to  r e f r a in  from cau sin g , encouraging, o r  in  any way p a r t ic ip a t in g  in ,  
th e  c a r  ly in g  ou t o f any n u c lea r weapon t e s t  ex p lo sio n  anywhere in  th e  
p ro h ib i te d  en-vironments.
"kche f u l l  t e x t  o f  th e  t r e a ty  i s  to  be found in  Appendix ”Ai’ 
o f  t h i s  d is s e r ta t io n .
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A r t ic le  I I  p rov ided  fo r  fu tu re  amendments to  th e  t r e a ty .
Any p a r ty  may propose amendments by sub m ittin g  th e  t e x t  o f th e  
amendments to  th e  d ep o sito ry  governments who th e n  would d i s t r ib u te  
th e  amendments to  th e  o th e r  s ig n a to ry  n a tio n s . Mien o n e - th ird  o r 
more o f th e  p a r t i e s  ag reed , th e  d e p o sito ry  governments would convene 
a  conference to  co n sid e r th e  amendment. R a t i f ic a t io n  o f th e  amendment 
must be by a  m a jo rity  o f  a l l  th e  v o te s  o f th e  p a r t ie s  t o  t h e t t r e a ty ,  
in c lu d in g  a l l  th e  d e p o sito ry  p a r t i e s . The f a i lu r e  o f  any one o f  th e  
th re e  d ep o sito ry  p a r t i e s  to  s ig n  th e  amendment would have th e  e f f e c t  
of a  v e to .
A r t ic le  i n  p ro v ides fo r  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  p rocedures to  be 
fo llow ed . I t  a ls o  p ro v ides t h a t  th e  t r e a ty  should  be open to  a l l  
s t a t e s  fo r  s ig n a tu re . At th e  tim e th e  U nited  S ta te s  fo rm ally  r a t i f i e d  
th e  t r e a t y  over 102 n a tio n s  had become s ig n a to r ie s .
A r t ic le  17 d ec la red  th a t  th e  t r e a ty  would be o f  "u n lim ited  
d u ra tio n ."  I n  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f n a t io n a l  so v e re ig n ty  each n a tio n  s h a l l  
have th e  r i ^ t  t o  w ithdraw  from th e  t r e a ty  when i t  decides th a t  i t s  
n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  has been th re a te n e d  by "e x tra o rd in a ry  ev en ts , r e ­
la te d  to  th e  s u b je c t m a tte r  o f t h i s  t r e a ty . " ^  N otice  o f  th re e  months 
should  be g iven to  th e  o th e r  p a r t i e s  to  th e  t r e a ty .
I^bid.
GEATTER IV  
EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP
"The h e a r t  o f  b ip a r t i s a n  p ro d ed u res, must l i e  in  th e  
E xecu tive  b ranch , -with t h e i r  purpose be ing  to  b r in g  Congressmen 
around.
Much has been w r i t te n  by p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  concern ing  th e  
power o f th e  L e g is la t iv e  b ranch  o f  government v is - a - v i s  th e  E xecutive 
b ranch . I t  would seem th a t  a  consensus o f  o p in io n  reg ard s  as  "weak" 
th o se  P re s id e n ts  who a llow  th e  L e g is la t iv e  b ranch  to  dominate o r 
" lead "  and as " s tro n g "  th o se  P re s id e n ts  who ta k e  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  
and le a d  th e  L e g is la t iv e  b ranch .
B efore th e  advent o f atom ic weaponry and advances in  commun­
ic a t io n s ,  a  "weak" P re s id e n t m ight have been p ro b ab le  w ith o u t l a s t i n g  
consequences. Given th e  c ircum stances o f  th e  "co ld  war" and th e  might 
o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t U nion, a  weak P re s id e n t cou ld  
s e r io u s ly  je o p a rd iz e  th e  s e c u r i ty  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and i t s  ro le  
as  le a d e r  o f  th e  W estern n a tio n s .
The Eisenhower a d m in is tra tio n  r e l i e d  upon consensus b u ild in g  
in  th e  decision-m aking  p ro cesses  o f  dom estic and fo re ig n  p o l i t i c s .  
Because o f th e  slow ness o f  a c t io n  v e rsu s  th e  momentum g en era ted  by 
tech n o lo g y , th e  U n ited  S ta te s  found i t s e l f  a t  a  s e r io u s  d isadvan tage  
i n  th e  arms l im i ta t io n  t a lk s  a t  Geneva in  1958. The cause o f th e
^ a l t z ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 121.
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d isadvan tage  was due to  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  went to  th e  
ta lk s  w ithou t a  s in g u la r  purpose or p re v io u s ly  ag reed  g o a l. P re s id e n t 
Eisenhower had se n t s c i e n t i s t s  t o  n e g o tia te  p o l i t i c a l  m a tte rs  and in  
th e  minds o f  many t h i s  was a  prim ary  e r r o r .^  The e r r o r  was due in  
p a r t  to  P re s id e n t E isenhow er's in s is te n c e  on o b ta in in g  a  "consensus" 
w ith in  h is  a d m in is tra tio n . P ro fe s so r  J e w e ll c r i t i c i z e d  th e  P re s id e n t, 
th e re fo re ,  f o r  a  la ck  o f le a d e rs h ip  in  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s . ^  J e w e ll 
in d ic a te s  th a t  i n i t i a t i v e  i s  n ecessa ry  and p o s s ib le  to  o b ta in  w ith in  
a  P r e s id e n t 's  own p a r ty .  I n  t h i s  in s ta n c e  P re s id e n t Eisenhower found 
h is  g r e a te s t  s tre n g th  in  th e  Democratic le a d e rsh ip  o f  lyndon Johnson, 
Make M ansfie ld , John Kennedy and E u beit Humphrey.^
S en ato rs  o f b o th  p a r t i e s  a re  g e n e ra lly  r e lu c ta n t  to  dem onstrate 
se r io u s  d is u n ity  t o  our a l l i e s  and opponents o r to  undermine any 
in te r n a t io n a l  commitment a lre ad y  made by th e  P re s id e n t .^
P ro fe sso rs  J e w e ll, Crabb, and W altz ag ree  t h a t  Congress has 
vo iced  o p p o s itio n  and some r e s is ta n c e  to  p r e s id e n t i a l  i n i t i a t i v e  in  
fo re ig n  a f f a i r s .  In  th e  l i g h t  o f  modern d ip lom atic  h is to r y  t h e i r  
o p p o s itio n  cou ld  be c a l le d  academ ic. N ev e rth e le ss , a  P re s id e n t 
cannot ig n o re  th e  id io s y n c ra s ie s  o f in d iv id u a l  Congressmen b u t must
^G ilp in , op. c i t .
2Je w e ll, op. c i t .
3I b i d . , p . IÀ7 .
I^bid.
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a ttem p t to  p lace  them f o r  t h e i r  support o f h is  p o l i c i e s .
Ih e  reasons a  P re s id e n t must seek  b ip a r t is a n  support a re ;
(1 )he  may have only  a  sm all m a jo rity  o r none a t  a l l  in  Congress;
(2 )p a r ty  u n ity  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  i s  n o t dependable; and (3) some 
p o l ic ie s  re q u ire  e x tra o rd in a ry  m a jo r i t ie s  t o  maximize t h e i r  im pact 
ab ro ad .^
P re s id e n t Kennedy was e le c te d  by le s s  th an  o n e -h a lf  o f t ie  
American e le c to ra te  in  an e le c t io n  th a t  was marked by r e l ig io u s  
and r a c i a l  o v e rto n es . He re p re se n te d  th e  "E astern"  e s ta b lish m e n t.
He was young, r ic h ,  urbane and Roman C a th o lic . While h is  c a re e r  in  
th e  Senate  was n o t s p e c ta c u la r^  he had served  on th e  Senate F oreign  
R e la tio n s  Committee and had le a rn ed  th e  in n e r workings o f th e  
S en a te . He was w e ll v e rsed  on fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  and through  h is  
c lo se  a s s o c ia tio n s  w ith  S ena to rs  Gore and Humphrey he was p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y  w e ll-v e rsed  on th e  problems o f disarm am ent.
I t  was ev id en t from h is  in a u g u ra l add ress  t h a t  P re s id e n t 
Kennedy was concerned w ith  disarm am ent. In  th e  minds o f  most 
Americans th e  term  disarmament had meant th e  s in k in g  o f b a t t l e s h ip s ,  
th e  d e s tru c tio n  of weapons and a  la p se  in to  a b so lu te  p a c if ic ism .
I t  appeared th a t  th e  P re s id e n t was a sk in g  th e  American people  to  
p la ce  t h e i r  th in k in g  on th e  te rm  "c o n tro l"  r a th e r  th a n  "disarm am ent."
^ u p r a .  C hapter I I .
^Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New YorkzHarper and Row,
1965).
53
The P re s id e n t a ttem pted  to  make h im se lf  more o f an ex p ert 
on th e  su b je c ts  concerning disarmament and arms c o n tro l .  He 
surrounded h im se lf  w ith  ex p erts  who v e re  n o t burdened w ith  "co ld  war" 
lo g ic  and v o c a b u la r ie s . By doing th e se  th in g s , th e  E xecutive was 
a b le  to  g ive th e  government a  g re a te r  sense o f d ir e c t io n  and an 
aw areness o f purpqse th a n  was known in  th e  p rev ious a d m in is tra tio n .^
On September 26, 1961, P re s id e n t Kennedy s e t  ou t f iv e  s tag e s  
o f disarmament th a t  he and h is  a d m in is tra tio n  would work fo r ;
1 . A n u c le a r  t e s t  ban agreem ent.
2 . C essa tio n  o f p ro d uction  o f n u c lea r m a te r ia ls  fo r  w ar.
3 . P ro h ib it io n  upon th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  n u c le a r  weapons to  
co u n tr ie s  n o t p re s e n tly  p o ssess io n  them.
k.  An East-W est agreement t o  ban n u c le a r  weapons in  o u te r
sp ace .
5 . The d e s tru c tio n  o f e x is t in g  s to c k p ile s  o f n u c lea r weapons
o
and conversion  of f is s io n a b le  m a te r ia ls  f o r  p e a c e fu l u se s .
I t  was w ith in  t h i s  framework th a t  P re s id e n t Kennedy s e t  ou t 
h is  hopes fo r  a  le ss e n in g  o f te n s io n s  w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union, a  " re ­
exam ination o f a t t i tu d e s "  c a lle d  f o r  in  h is  June l$ th  address a t  
American U n iv e rs ity . The peace he sought would n o t be a  "pax Americana" 
no r "m erely peace fo r  Americans, b u t peace fo r  a l l  men. . .n o t m erely 
peace in  our tim e b u t peace fo r  a l l  t im e ."3
^Jerome B. W eisn e r,. Where Science  and P o l i t i c s  Meet (New York: 
McGraw H i l l ,  I 965) ,  p . 11.
%?he New York Times (September 26, I 961) . 
^Sorenson, op. c i t . ,  p . 731*
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E xecutive  Appointments o f  
M inority  P a rty  Members
P re s id e n t Kennedy, from th e  very  o u ts e t  o f  h is  a d m in is tra tio n , 
r e a l iz e d  th e  im portance o f having  re sp ec ted  members o f th e  m in o rity  
p a r ty  in  h is  a d m in is tra tio n  in  o rd er t h a t  he cou ld  govern e f f e c t iv e ly  
and le a d  Congress. T h e re fo re , th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f P re s id e n t Kennedy 
was marked by a  thorough mixing o f Republicans and Democrats chosen 
f o r  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  as  w e ll as t h e i r  power to  in f lu e n c e  Congress.
P re s id e n t Kennedy im m ediately appo in ted  John J .  McCloy, banker. 
R epublican, A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  o f War from 19^1 to  194$, P re s id e n t 
o f  th e  World Bank and U. S . H i ^  Commissioner in  Europe, as  h is  
a d v ise r  on disarm am ent.
The P re s id e n t changed th e  n e g o tia tio n  team  a t  Geneva by 
ap p o in tin g  A rthur Dean, a  R epublican.
The most im portan t and h ig h ly  c o n tro v e rs ia l  appointm ent was 
t h a t  o f  Robert S . McWamara, former P re s id e n t o f Ford Motor Company 
and a  r e g is te r e d  R epublican as h is  S ecre ta ry ' o f  D efense.
John A. McCone, businessm an. R epublican and form er Chairman 
o f  th e  Abomic Energy Commission became D ire c to r o f  th e  C e n tra l 
In te l l ig e n c e  Agency.
Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg was appo in ted  Chairman o f  th e  Atomic 
Energy Commission and Dr. Jerome B. W iesner was named S p a c ia l A s s is ta n t  
t o  th e  P re s id e n t f o r  Science and Technology. Dr. W iesner had p re v io u s ly  
expressed  h is  concern about th e  dangers o f th e  arms race  and l ik e  
P re s id e n t Kennedy had been c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  Eisenhower a d m in is tra tio n  
as be ing  "su sp ic io u s  o f  S o v ie t p ro p o sa ls  and u l tr a c o n s e rv a tiv e  in
55
th e  In sp e c tio n  re q u ire m e n ts ."^
Agents and A gencies o f F o re ign  R e la tio n s
H is to r ic a l ly ,  th e  m ajor p o r tio n  o f fo re ig n  p o lic y  i s  f a s h ­
ioned  hy th e  S ta te  Department w ith  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  be ing  
th e  p rim ary  agen t and re sp o n s ib le  only to  th e  P re s id e n t f o r  h is  
a c t io n s .
!Ehe q u e s tio n  o f  n e g o tia tin g  a  t r e a ty  c o n tro l l in g  th e  
t e s t in g  o f  atom ic dev ices p re sen te d  a  f a r  more d i f f e r e n t  p ic tu r e  
th a n  had been cu sto m arily  encountered  by th e  S ta te  D epartm ent. In  
1958 P re s id e n t  Eisenhower had faced  th e  q u estio n  o f  n e g o tia tin g  
arms q u estio n s  by sending  s c i e n t i s t s .  Ho one can q u estio n  th e  
u se  o f s c i e n t i s t s  as  a d v is e rs  t o  d ip lo m atic  n e g o tia t io n s , b u t some 
have c r i t i c i z e d  th e  sending o f  s c i e n t i s t s  as p r in c ip a l  n e g o tia to rs  
because , " la ck in g  o f s u f f i c i e n t  p o l i t i c a l  g u id an ce ," th ey  f e l l  in to  
a  number o f r e g re ta b le  e r r o r s .^
The v e ry  n a tu re  o f  th e  system  o f fo rm u la tin g  s e c u r i ty  pojLicy 
and atom ic re se a rc h  w ith in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  p re sen te d  P re s id e n t 
Kennedy w ith  a  v ery  fundam ental problem  a t  th e  beg inn ing  o f h is  
a d m in is tra tio n . P re s id e n t Eisenhower had f i r s t  fa ced  t h i s  problem  
o f  drawing to g e th e r  complex s c i e n t i f i c  is s u e s  in v o lved  in  th e  t e s t  
ban w ith  th e  m achinery a v a ila b le  t o  h is  a d m in is tra tio n . But by t h i s  
tim e P re s id e n t Kennedy took o f f ic e ,  tim e had allow ed a  c e r ta in  amount
^Jerome B. W iesner, "Comprehensive Arms L im ita tio n  System s," 
Daedalus ( F a l l ,  I 960) ,  p . 917 .
% i l p in ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 219 .
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o f e x p e r tis e  to  have been b u i l t  up in  th e  d ip lom atic  s e rv ic e s  and 
o th e r  governm ental o f f ic e s  to  be o f  g re a t  value to  P re s id e n t Kennedy.
!Ebe U n ited  S ta te s  obv iously  needed an agency to  co o rd in a te  
t h i s  v a s t ly  complex problem  of b rin g in g  to g e th e r  th e  s c i e n t i f i c ,  
m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  s e c to rs  o f government in  o rder th a t  th e  fo re ig n  
p o lic y  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  have some d ir e c t io n  and meaning.
Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency
During th e  debate  le ad in g  up to  th e  I 960 e le c t io n ,  c an d id a te  
John P . Kennedy p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th e re  were le s s  th a n  100 persons in  
th e  Eisenhower a d m in is tra tio n  working f o r  p e a c e fu l o b je c t iv e s  in  
fo rè ig n  p o lic y . P re s id e n t Eisenhower re a c te d  by e s ta b l is h in g  a  
disarmament a d m in is tra tio n , headed by H arold  S ta s se n , w ith in  th e  
S ta te  D epartm ent.
S h o rtly  a f t e r  S en a to r Kennedy was e le c te d  P re s id e n t ,  he  made 
some very  fundam ental and im portan t d ec is io n s  reg a rd in g  th e  heads 
o f  d ep artm en ts . These were c a rry -o v e rs  from th e  Eisenhower admin­
i s t r a t i o n ,  such as M ie n  ¥ . D u lle s , who serv ed  as D ire c to r  o f  th e  
C e n tra l In te l l ig e n c e  Agency u n t i l  September 27, I 96I ,  when he was 
re p la ce d  by John U. McCone.
Perhaps th e  most im portan t Kennedy appointm ent f o r  purposes 
o f  t h i s  s tudy  was th a t  o f  John J .  McCloy as  S p e c ia l A dv iser on D is­
armament. At th e  u rg in g  o f  Mr. McCloy, P re s id e n t Kennedy req u ested  
Congress t o  c re a te e th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament 
Agency.
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ŒStie c re a tio n  o f th e  ACM meant th a t  t h r o n g  c o -o rd in a tio n  
o f re se a rc h  th e  fo re ig n  p o lic y  p o s it io n s  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
could  be exp lored  more th o r o u ^ ly  b e fo re  being  advocated , and 
a n a ly s is  would be done w ith  th e  view o f t ry in g  to  ach ieve  agreem ents 
among competing agenc ies o f government.
I n  th e  beg inn ing  a  q u estio n  a ro se  reg ard in g  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  
o f th e  agency. Should disarmament be a  se p a ra te  agency which would 
c re a te  ex cessiv e  bu reaucracy  and weaken th e  n e g o tia tin g  p ro cesses  
o f  th e  S ta te  Department o r should  i t  be co -o rd in a te d  w ith  th e  S ta te  
Department?
C o n su lta tio n s  took  p la c e  w ith  a  number o f p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls , 
in c lu d in g  P ro fe sso r  R ichard E. E eu s tad t o f  Columbia U n iv e rs ity , Mr.
Robert A. L o v e tt, Mr. James A. P erk in s  o f th e  C arnegie C orpora tion , 
and Mr. Don K. P r ic e  o f th e  Ford Foundation . W ithin  th e  Kennedy 
a d m in is tra tio n  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te ,  th e  S e c re ta iy  o f  Defense, 
th e  Chairman o f  th e  Atomic Energy Commission, th e  D ire c to r  o f  th e  
Budget, and th e  P re s id e n t were a l l  invo lved  in  th e  ev en tu a l d ec is io n  
to  e s ta b l is h  an agency " a t  an a u th o r i ta t iv e  le v e l  in  th e  government 
w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n a lly  broad  competence, fu n c tio n s  and re so u rces  r e ­
q u ired  to  work on th e  problem s o f  arms c o n tro l and disarm am ent, i n ­
c lud ing  th e  conduct o f th e  re s e a rc h  so e s s e n t ia l  t o  p ro g ress  in  t h i s  f i e l d .
S . ,  Department o f S ta te  B u lle t in , (November 6 , I 961) ,
p .  7 6 9 .
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The d ec iè io n  was made t h a t  th o se  conducting re sea rc h  should 
be in  th e  same o rg a n iz a tio n  as th o se  conducting n e g o tia tio n s  in  t h i s  
f i e l d .  T herefo re , th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  should  be s u b je c t to  th e  d ir e c t io n  
o f th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te .  The D ire c to r  o f th e  agency should  a ls o  
have d i r e c t  access to  th e  P re s id e n t as h is  p r in c ip a l  a d v ise r  in  
th e  f i e l d  o f  disarmam ent, w ith  p roper n o t i f i c a t io n  o f  th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f  S ta te .^
On June 23, 1961, John J .  McCloy w rote a  l e t t e r  to  th e  P r e s i ­
den t o u tl in in g  th e  p r in c ip a l  p ro v is io n s  o f th e  b i l l  t h a t  would 
c re a te  th e  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency. O r ig in a lly  th e  
agency was to  be c a l l  th e  Disarmament Act fo r  World Peace and S e c u r ity . 
Congress ev en tu a lly  would n o t "buy" t h i s  te rm  as b e in g  to o  g rand iose  
and a l l  encompassing. Mr. McCloy' s  l e t t e r  p o in te d  out th e  im portance, 
n o t only o f  th e  agency, b u t th e  n e c e s s i ty  to  do away w ith  some o f 
th e  c o n f l ic ts  w ith in  p a s t  a d m in is tra tio n s .
The agency was to  be under th e  P re s id e n t ahd th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f S ta te  because:
This arrangem ent reco gn izes t h a t  disarmament co n s id e ra tio n s  
a re  so a l l -p e rv a s iv e  i n  scope and im portance th a t  th e  P re s id e n t 
must concern h im se lf  w ith  th e se  m a tte rs  on a  co n tin u in g  b a s i s .
I t  a lso  recogn izes th e  f a c t  t h a t  disarmament p o l ic ie s ,  n e g o tia tio n s  
and programs must be v e iy  c lo se ly  co o rd in a ted  w ith  S ta te  D epart­
ment a c t i v i t i e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 2
^ Ib id .
^ Ib id . ,  (Ju ly  IT, I 961) ,  p . 100.
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Under th e  b i l l ,  P u b lic  Law 89-297, th e  D ire c to r  o f th e  
agency would have th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  conducting n e g o tia tio n s  
based on approved p o lic y , under th e  d ire c t io n  o f  th e  S e c re ta ry  of 
S ta te .  Mr. McCloy suggested  th a t  such n e g o tia tio n s  should  "take  
th e  form o f form al conferences o r  in fo rm al communications through  
re g u la r  d ip lom atic  m iss io n s ."^  The D ire c to r  was to  be appo in ted  
by th e  P re s id e n t w ith  th e  adv ice  and consent o f th e  S en a te . He 
would a ls o  se rv e  as p r in c ip a l  a d v ise r  to  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te .
The fu n c tio n s  o f th e  D ire c to r and th e  agency covered r e ­
sea rch , development and o th e r  s tu d ie s  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  arms c o n tro l
p
and disarmament by th e  U nited  S ta te s .
P o licy  was to  be made by th e  P re s id e n t, th e  S e c re ta ry  of 
S ta te  and o th e r such agenc ies as th e  P re s id e n t must determ ine con­
cern in g  U nited  S ta te s  c o n tro l  and disarmament p o lic y ;
. . .p ro v id ed , however, th a t  no a c tio n  s h a l l  be tak en  under 
t h i s  o r any o th e r law  th a t  w i l l  o b lig a te ih e  U nited  S ta te s  
to  d isarm  or t o  reduce o r l im i t  th e  Armed F orces o r armaments 
of th e  U n ited  S ta te s ,  excep t p u rsuan t to  th e  t r e a ty  making 
power o f  th e  P re s id e n t . . .o r  u n le ss  a u th o riz e d  by f u r th e r  
a f f irm a tiv e  l e g i s l a t i o n  by th e  Congress o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s .^
Under th e  S e c re ta iy  o f S t a t e 's  d ir e c t io n  th e  "D ire c to r  may co n su lt and
communicate w ith  o r d i r e c t  th e  c o n su lta tio n  and communication w ith
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f o th e r  n a tio n s  o r o f  in te r n a t io n a l  o rg a n iz a tio n s .
^ • S . ,  S ta tu te s  a t  largeQ Tth Gong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  I 961 . See S e c tio n  
XXXIII-XXXIV.
^ Ib id . , S ec tio n  XXXI. 
^ Ib id .
4 b i d .
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In  o rd e r th a t  th e  v a s t  sp raw l o f  in fo rm atio n  be d ire c te d  to  
i t s  p ro p e r sou rce , th e  P re s id e n t was a u th o riz e d  to  e s ta b l i s h  p ro ­
cedures to :
1 . . . .a s su re  c o o p e ra tio n ,c o n s u lta tio n  and co n tin u in g  ex­
change o f  in fo rm atio n  betw een th e  Agency and th e  Department 
o f D efense, th e  Atomic Energy Commission, th e  N a tio n a l Aero­
n a u tic s  and Space A d m in is tra tio n  and o th e r  a f fe c te d  government 
a g e n c i e s . . . .
2 . . . .r e s o lv e  d if fe re n c e s  o f  o p in io n  between th e  D ire c to r  
and o th e r such ag encies  which cannot be re so lv ed  th rough  
c o n s u l ta t io n . ^
P re s id e n t Kennedy, a c tin g  w ith  th e  a u th o r i ty  g ran ted  to  him, is su e d  
E xecu tive  Order No. 11044 on August 12, 19.61, s p e ll in g  out in  d e t a i l  
th e  p rocedures on co o p era tio n  between governm ental agencies invo lved  
w ith  arms c o n tro l  and re s e a rc h . The P re s id e n t s p e c i f ic a l ly  s ta t e d  
th a t  th e  D ire c to r  shou ld  be re sp o n s ib le  f o r  th e  "p re p a ra tio n  and 
management o f  U n ited  S ta te s  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  in te r n a t io n a l  n e g o tia tio n s  
in  th e  arms c o n tro l  and disarmam ent f i e l d .  . . .and  s h a l l  e x e rc ise  
le a d e rsh ip  in  a ssu rin g  t h a t  d if f e re n c e s  o f op in ion  concern ing  arms 
c o n tro l and disarmament p o lic y  and r e la te d  m a tte rs  a re  re so lv ed  exped i­
t io u s ly  and s h a l l  ta k e  such s te p s  as may be a p p ro p r ia te  i n  o rd e r to  
produce common o r harmonious a c t io n  among th e  ag enc ies concerned ."^
The d r a f t  o f  th e  b i l l  t o  c re a te  th e  agency was f i n a l ly  p rep ared  
by th e  N h ite  House S ta f f  and tra n s m itte d  to  th e  Vice P re s id e n t and 
th e  Speaker o f th e  House. S en a to r H ubert Humphrey in tio d u c e d  th e  b i l l
^ i d .
^ " L e g is la tio n  on F o re ig n  A f f a i r s ,"  op. c i t . ,  p . 324.
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as  S. 2180 . In  th e  House, th e  b i l l  was o r ig in a l ly  in tro d u ced  by 
John S . Morgan, ranking  Democrat on th e  House F o re ig n  A ffa irs  
Committee from P enn sy lv an ia . H earings were h e ld  b e fo re  th e  Senate  
F o re ign  R e la tio n s  Committee and th e  House Committee on F o re ig n  A f fa ir s ,  
Both com m ittees recommended passage by unanimous v o te .^
The S enate  v e rs io n  o f  th e  b i l l  was passed  on September 8 ,
1961, by a  v o te  o f  s e v e n ty -th re e  to  fo u r te e n . S en a to r Goldwater 
in tro d u ced  an amendment t o  c r ip p le  th e  ag en cy 's  re s e a rc h  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
b u t t l e  p ro p o sa l was d e fe a te d  by a  v o te  o f f o r ty - s ix  to  f o r ty - th r e e .  
S en a to r G oldw ater' s amendment would have d e le te d  from  th e  b i l l  th e  
r ig h t  o f  th e  agency to ;
. . . conduct re s e a rc h , development and o th e r  s tu d ie s  in  
th e  f i e l d  o f  disarm am ent. . . t o  make arrangem ents in c lu d in g  
c o n tra c ts ,  agreem ents and g ra n ts  f o r  th e  conduct o f r e ­
sea rc h , development and o th e r s tu d ie s  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  d i s ­
armament. . .and c o o rd in a te  th e  re s e a rc h , development and 
o th e r  s tu d ie s  conducted in  th e  f i e l d  of disarmament by o r 
f o r  o th e r Government a g en c ie s .
In  th e  p re lim in a iy  d eb a te . S en a to rs  Goldwater and R u sse ll 
o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee s ta t e d  t h a t  th e y  tho u g h t th e  b i l l  
shou ld  have been committed to  t h e i r  committee r a th e r  th a n  th e  F o re ig n  
R e la tio n s  Committee f o r  h e a r in g s .^
% . S . ,  Department o f  S ta te  B u l le t in , (November 6 , I 961) ,
p . 769-
^ Ib id .
3
U. S . ,  C ongressional Record, 8 l s t  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  I 961, 
CVII, p . 18686.
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The b i l l  had  been re p o rte d  ou t o f committee and was on th e  
f lo o r  o f  th e  S en a te . To have acceded to  th e  S e n a to rs ' w ishes would 
have meant th a t  th e  b i l l  would have to  be recom m itted. Both S enato rs  
had a lre a d y  been on re c o rd  as be ing  opposed to  any id e a  o f  disarm ­
ament. S en a to r Goldwater saw th e  agency as m erely a  d u p lic a tio n  o f 
e x is t in g  e f f o r t s  by v a rio u s  a g en c ie s . He s a id  th a t  fee knew o f  no 
o th e r co u n try  which had an agency f o r  disarm am ent. Furtherm ore, 
such an agency would c re a te  je a lo u s ie s  and co m p lica tio n s, p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  m is s i le  developm ent, "where we now have a  
c o n f l i c t .
S en a to r McCarthy of M innesota asked S en a to r Goldwater i f  
i t  wasnot a  q u estio n  o f  "whether th e  a u th o r i ty  s h a l l  be con tinued  to  
be e x e rc ise d  by th o se  who now possess  i t ,  o r , i f  i t  i s  n o t now 
a ss ig n ed  to  an agency, th e  P re s id e n t could a s s ig n  th a t  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ?  
S en a to r Goldwater acknowledged th a t  i t  could b e , b u t he b e lie v e d  th e  
s i tu a t io n  a s  i t  th e n  e x is te d  would be b e s t .
He f u r th e r  though t th a t  th e  c o n tro l over agencies would be 
b e s t  l e f t  t o  th e  a p p ro p ria tio n s  p ro cesses  o f  th e  House and th e  S en a te . 
During th e  p r e s id e n t i a l  campaign o f  l$ 6k. S en a to r Goldwater c l a s s i f i e d  
h is  amendment to  c o n tro l  by agency by means o f a p p ro p ria tio n s  as 
"harm less, a l l  i t  would do would be to  k i l l  th e  agency."^ S enato r 
G oldw ater, a f t e r  th e  d e fe a t o f h is  amendment, con tinued  t o  a t ta c k  th e
^ I b id . ,  pp . 18718- 18720.
^ i d .
^ Ib id .
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th e  agency as  a  " w e ll- in te n tio n e d  dream ," a  "m other-love type  
agency ."^
S en a to r Thurmond o f th e  same Armed S e rv ice s  Committee
a tta c k e d  th e  agency:
. . . th e  Communists a t  t h i s  tim e a re  app ly ing  to  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  alm ost every p re s su re  p o s s ib le .  We a re  faced  w ith  a  
c r i s i s  in  B e r lin , w ith  a  co n tro v e rsy  over our n av a l base  in  
Cuba and ever in c re a s in g  a ttem p ts  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  Communists 
to  fo rc e  us to  recogn ize  d ip lo m a tic a lly  O uter M ongolia and 
Red China. . . . I t  would be a  s la p  in  th e  face  o f  our a l l i e s  
f o r  th e  S enate to  g ive  fa v o ra b le  c o n s id e ra tio n  of th e  im­
pending b i l l . 2
The House o f R ep resen ta tiv es  p assed  i t s  v e rs io n  o f th e  b i l l  
by a  v o te  o f  290 to  $4. A conference committee re p o r t  was adopted 
by th e  House on September 23, I 96I ,  by a  v o te  o f 2^0 t o  $0. The 
S enate  adopted th e  re p o r t  by unanimous co n sen t. The b i l l  became
P u b lic  Law 87- 297*
Mr. W illiam  C. F o s te r  was nom inated to  be th e  f i r s t  D ire c to r  
o f  th e  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency on September 27, I 961, as 
an in te r im  appointm ent. Congress approved h is  appointm ent on O ctober 9,
1961 . P o s te r ,  a  R epublican, was b u t one o f  th e  members o f  th a t  p a r ty  
chosen by P re s id e n t Kennedy to  f i l l  im portan t p o s ts  in  th e  new ad ­
m in is tr a t io n .  W illiam  F o s te r  was born  a t  W es tfie ld , Hew Je rs e y ,
A p r i l  27, 1887 . He rece iv ed  h is  educa tion  a t  M .I.T . A f te r  serv in g  
in  th e  A ir Force as a  p i l o t ,  he h e ld  th e  p o s i t io n  o f  U nd ersec re ta ry
^ Ib id . , p . 18720. 
^ Ib id . , p . 18738.
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o f  Commerce from 1$46 to  19^8 under A v e re ll Harrim an. From th e  
years  1948 th rough  1951 he served  on th e  Economic Cooperation 
A d m in is tra tio n . During th e  y ea rs  1951 to  1953, Mr. F o s te r  served  
as Deputy S e c re ta ry  o f D efense.^
Mr. A drian F is h e r , a  la u y e r , had served  as counse lo r to  th e  
S ta te  Department and th e  Atomic Energy Commission. He was a ls o  a  
P ro fe sso r  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  Law a t  Georgetown U n iv e rs ity . A fte r  
be ing  Deputy to  John J .  McCloy, he was appo in ted  Deputy D ire c to r  
o f th e  U nited  S ta te s  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency. These 
two gentlem ent were re sp o n s ib le  f o r  th e  n e g o tia tio n s  and t r e a ty
p
fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  L im ited T est Ban T rea ty  in  Moscow.
I n te r n a l  S tru c tu re
The Disarmament Agency m ain ta in s a  sm all p ro fe s s io n a l s t a f f  
numbering roughly  one hundred and tw e n ty -s ix  peop le . The agency 
a id s  in  th e  fo rm ula tion  o f p o lic y  and th e  conduct o f fo re ig n  p o lic y , 
working in  c lo se  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  an ad v iso ry  committee o f s c h o la rs , 
d ip lom ats , businessm en and m il i t a r y  men.
The G enera l A dvisory Committee in  I 963 c o n s is te d  o f  John J .  
McCloy o f  Hew York, form er a d v ise r  on disarmament to  P re s id e n t Kennedy;
"4rhe Hew York Times, (August 27, I 961) .
2
U .S ., Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency,Documents on 
Disarmament, 1963, P u b lic a tio n  Ho. 20 (W ashington: Government P r in t in g  
O ffic e , 1964).
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Eoger M, Blough, Chairman o f  th e  Board o f D ire c to rs  o f U nited  
S ta te s  S te e l ;  th e  Reverend Edward A. Conway o f  Omaha, N ebraska, 
a  P ro fe s so r  o f P o l i t i c a l  Science a t  C reighton  U n iv e rs ity ; John 
Cowles, p u b lis h e r , !The M inneapolis S ta r  and T ribune Company;
T revor Gardner o f  Pasadena, C a l ifo rn ia , Chairman and P re s id e n t 
o f  Hycon M anufacturing Company and form er A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  o f 
th e  A ir  F orce; George B. K istiakow sky, P ro fe s so r  o f  Chem istry a t  
H arvard U n iv e rs ity  and form er A s s is ta n t  to  th e  P re s id e n t f o r  
Science  and Technology; Robert A. L ovett o f Long I s la n d , New York, 
law yer and form er U n d ersec re ta ry  o f  S ta te  and form er S e c re ta ry  o f 
Defense; Dean Anderson McGee o f Oklahoma C ity , Oklahoma, P re s id e n t 
o f  Kerr-McGee O il In d u s t r ie s ;  Ralph E. M cG ill, e d i to r  o f  th e  A tla n ta  
C o n s ti tu tio n ; George Meany o f  B ethesda, M aryland, P re s id e n t o f  th e  
AFL-CIO; James A. P e rk in s , P re s id e n t o f C o rn e ll U n iv e rs ity ;  Herman 
P h le g e r, law yer and form er le g a l  a d v ise r  in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent; 
I s id o r  Isa a c  R abi, P ro fe sso r  o f Physics a t  Columbia, form er Chairman 
o f th e  S c ie n t i f i c  A dviser Committee, O ffice  o f Defense M o b iliz a tio n , 
and form er Chairman o f  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  S cience  A dvisory Committee; 
G eneral Thomas D resser W hite, form er A ir F orce  C h ief o f  S t a f f ,  H erb ert 
F rank York, C hancello r o f  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f C a l ifo rn ia , form er C hief 
S c ie n t i s t  f o r  th e  Advanced R esearch P ro je c t  Agency, Department o f 
D efense, form er member o f  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  S cience  A dvisory Committee 
and D ire c to r  o f D efense, R esearch and E n g in ee rin g .^
I^bid.
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The Committee o f P r in c ip le s
E ie  Committee o f  P r in c ip le s  was e s ta b lis h e d  in  1958 by 
P re s id e n t Eisenhower and in  1963 was composed o f th e  S e c re ta r ie s  
o f  S ta te  and D efense, th e  Chairman o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f ,  
th e  D ire c to r  o f  th e  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency, th e  C hair­
man o f th e  Atomic Energy Commission, th e  D ire c to r  o f th e  C en tra l 
I n te l l ig e n c e  Agency, th e  S p e c ia l A ss is ta n ts  to  th e  P re s id e n t fo r  
N a tio n a l S e c u r ity  A f fa ir s  and f o r  Science and Technology, th e  Admin­
i s t r a t o r  o f  th e  N a tio n a l A eronau tics  and Space A d m in is tra tio n  and 
th e  D ire c to r  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  In fo rm ation  Agency.
The Committee o f P r in c ip le s  i s  co n su lted  on every  m ajor p ro ­
p o sa l which th e  U nited  S ta te s  makes o r advances a t  conference  ta b le s  
in  in te r n a t io n a l  n e g o t ia t io n s .  The f i n a l  s te p  in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y ­
making i s  a  rev iew  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t .
The Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency i s  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  
th e  development o f  th e  id e as  and recommendations from th e  beginn ing  
u n t i l  th e  f i n a l  rev iew  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t. This p ro cess  may s t a r t  a t  
any le v e l  in s id e  o r o u ts id e  o f  th e  ACDA. by re se a rc h  t h a t  has been 
c o n tra c te d  f o r  by th e  agency.
At th e  study  group s ta g e , th e  D ire c to r may a ls o  c a l l  upon 
o u ts id e  ex p e rts  from th e  r e la te d  f i e ld s  concerning th e  s u b je c t m a tte r 
a t  hand. The r e s u l t s  o f  th e se  study  groups, p a r t i c u la r ly  th o se  o f 
m ajor im portance, a re  b rought b e fo re  th e  G eneral A dvisory Committee.
The G enera l A dvisory Committee was c a l le d  upon th re e  tim es 
during  th e  y e a r  I 963 . A comprehensive t e s t  ban was co n sid ered  e a r ly
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in  1963 . A p ro p o sa l f o r  th e  " h o t- l in e "  was s tu d ie d  in  A p ril  and th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban t r e â ty  was co n sid ered  in  J u ly .  I t  
i s  im portan t to  n o te  t h a t  th e  members o f  th e  S enate  F o reign  R e la tio n s  
Committee were b rought in  and c o n su lted  along w ith  th e  G eneral Ad­
v is o ry  Committee concerning th e  p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban t r e a t y .^
During t h i s  tim e  c o n s id e ra tio n  was given to  a l l  r e le v a n t 
a sp e c ts  o f  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty ,  b o th  as i t  might be a f fe c te d  by a  
com prehensive t r e a ty ,  on one hand, and a  l im ite d  t r e a t y  th a t  would 
l im i t  t e s t i n g  to  o u te r  space, th e  atm osphere and underw ater.
V arious a sp e c ts  o f  th e  problem were examined, such as th e  
e f f e c t  th e  t r e a ty  would have on th e  U nited  S ta te s -S o v ie t  Union 
m i l i t a r y  b a lan ce , w ith  and w ith o u t a  ban; th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  and ex­
t e n t  o f  th e  d if fu s io n  o f n u c le a r  weapons, bo th  w ith  and w ith o u t a  
n u c le a r  t e s t in g  agreem ent, and an a n a ly s is  o f th e  problem  o f main­
ta in in g  re a d in e ss  to  t e s t ;  and th e  e f f e c t s  o f  p o s s ib le  c la n d e s tin e
2
underground t e s t in g  in  v io la t io n  o f an agreem ent.
The conclusions to  th e se  problems were t h a t :  ( l )  e i th e r  a  
p a r t i a l  o r  comprehensive t e s t  ban agreement w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union was 
in  th e  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s ;  and ( 2) i f  th e  S o v ie t 
Union would be u n f ti l l in g  to  accep t " o n -s i te "  in sp e c tio n s  fo r  under­
ground t e s t s ,  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would accep t a  p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban 
t r e a t y  l im ite d  to  o u te r  space , th e  atm osphere and underw ater. These 
d r a f t s  were bo th  subm itted  to  th e  E ighteen  Member N ation Conference
^Documents on Disarmament, I 962 , op. c i t . ,  p . 67O.
^ Ib id .
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in  August, 1962. The d r a f t  fo r  th e  p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  served  
as a  b a s is  f o r  th e  agreement f in a l ly  concluded in  Moscow.^
P r io r  C o n su lta tio n
P re s id e n t Kennedy was w orried  th a t  th e  S e n a te 's  Southern 
Democrats and co n se rv a tiv e  Republicans might be a b le  t o  m uster 
enough s tre n g th  to  b lock  any moves tow ard arms c o n tro l and disarm a­
ment. He took  g re a t p a in s  to  keep Congress a s  w e ll inform ed as 
p o ss ib le  and sought ou t t h e i r  ad v ice .
On August 26, 1962, Mr. W illiam  C. P o s te r  o f th e  ACDA 
appeared b e fo re  th e  J o in t  Committee on Atomic Energy to  d iscu ss  
th e  proposed n u c le a r  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  th a t  was to  be proposed by 
th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  U nited  Kingdom on August 27, 19^2.^
Mr. P o s te r  had a ls o  appeared on Ju ly  23rd b e fo re  th e  J o in t  
Committee on Atomic Energy and th e  Disarmament Subcommittee on 
P oreign  R ela tio n s  to  d iscu ss  th e  s ta tu s  o f  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  a t  
th e  E ighteen  N ation Disarmament Conference a t  Geneva.^
On August 2, 1962, Ambassador A rthur Dean and Mr. P o s te r  
appeared b e fo re  th e  two committees to  d iscu ss  th e  p ro p o sa ls  th a t  
th e  Ambassador was p re se n tin g  a t  Geneva reg ard in g  th e  concept o f 
a  comprehensive and a  l im ite d  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .^
^ Ib id . , p . 1241.
^C ongressional Record, CIX, op. c i t . ,  pp. I 765O -I765I .
3 lb id .
^ Ib id .
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The P reparedness In v e s tig a t in g  Subcommittee o f th e  Senate 
Armed S e rv ices  Committee i n i t i a t e d  h ea rin g s  on September YJ, I 962, 
and on th a t  day M essrs. P o s te r  and P au l H. l i t z e  t e s t i f i e d .  On 
September 19th ,  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  Rusk appeared b e fo re  th e  same 
com m ittee.^
On March 19^3^ th e  J o in t  Committee on Atomic Energy h e ld
h earin g s  reg a rd in g  th e  d e te c tio n  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f th e  U nited  S ta te s
through P ro je c t  VELA. A ppearing b e fo re  t h i s  committee w ere; W illiam
P o s te r  and P ran k lin  Long o f  th e  ACDA; Jack  P . R uina, D ire c to r  of th e
Department o f  Defense Research P ro je c ts  Agency; and Major G eneral
A. W. B e t ts ,  D ire c to r  of th e  D iv is io n  o f  M ili ta ry  A p p lica tio n  of
0
th e  Atomic Energy Commission.
On March 11, 1963, th e  s ta tu s  o f  th e  l im ite d  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  
and a  d r a f t  was shown and d iscu ssed  b e fo re  th e  Subcommittee on D is­
armament o f th e  P oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee by S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  
Rusk and A drian S . P ish e r  o f  th e  Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency.3
P r io r  t o  th e  s p e c if ic  n e g o tia tio n s  in  Moscow on Ju ly  19th ,
"key members o f  th e  Senate  were ad v ised  in fo rm a lly  o f  th e  s ta tu s  o f 
th e  n e g o tia tio n s  and were asked fo r  th e  adv ice  o f th e  com m ittee.
^ Ib id .
^ Ib id .
3 lb id .
^ Ib id .
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Treaty Groundwork
A fte r th e  June 10th ad d ress  a t  American U n iv e rs ity , the
Committee o f P r in c ip le s  met on June 14, 1963.^ The J o in t  C hiefs
of S ta f f  were asked to  co n sider a l im ite d  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  by
General Maxwell T ay lor, ano ther R epublican appo in ted  by P re s id e n t
Kennedy as C hief o f S ta f f  o f th e  Armed S e rv ice s .
On Ju ly  2, 1963, Premier Khrushchev, in  a speech in  B e r lin ,
in d ic a te d  th e  S ov ie t Union was ready  to  conclude an agreem ent fo r
2
a p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban.
At th i s  tim e the  ACDA began p re p a ra tio n s  fo r  th e  n e g o tia tio n s . 
Background papers on fa c ts  and is su e s  were p repared  in  c o n su lta tio n  
w ith  U ndersecre tary  o f S ta te  A v e re ll Harriman, who had been named 
by P res id e n t Kennedy to  p e rso n a lly  head th e  U nited S ta te s  d e le g a tio n  
to  Moscow. ACDA's Deputy D ire c to r , A drian S. F ish e r, was named 
Ambassador H arrim an 's p r in c ip a l  a d v ise r . Accompanying th e  Ambassador 
and Mr. F ish e r w ere: Carl Kyasen, White House S ta f f ;  W illiam  R.
T y ler, Department o f Defense; Frank E. Cash, Department o f S ta te  
w ith  a background in  German a f f a i r s ;  and from th e  ACDA came Alexander 
Akalovsky, t r a n s la to r ;  F ran k lin  A. Long, A ss is ta n t D ire c to r  of 
Science and Technology; N ed v ille  E. Nordness, P u b lic  A f fa ir s  A dviser; 
and Dr. Frank E. P ress , D ire c to r  of th e  C a lifo rn ia
^Documents on Disarmament, 1963, op. c i t . 
^ Ib id . , p. 244.
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I n s t i t u t e  o f T echno log ica l S e ism o lo g ica l L ab o ra to ry .^
The cho ice  o f A v e re ll Harriman over th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  
•was made by P re s id e n t Kennedy and caused some o p p o s itio n  w ith in  
th e  S ta te  D epartm ent. In  a d i t io n ,  th e  P re s id e n t had a lso  p icked  
h i s  most t r u s t e d  men from h is  O'wn ex ecu tiv e  s t a f f  to  accompany 
Mr. Harrim an. John J .  McCloy had been th e  P r e s id e n t’s f i r s t  ch o ice , 
b u t Mr. McCloy -was no t a v a ila b le  due to  p e rso n a l business.^
Before th e  n e g o tia tin g  team  l e f t  f o r  Moscow, th e  P re s id e n t 
made i t  c le a r  t h a t ;
1 . This "was th e  l a s t  c le a r  chance to  s to p  th e  d if fu s io n  o f 
n u c lea r t e s t s  and po isons and to  s t a r t  b u ild in g  m utua lcoonfi- 
dence w ith  th e  R ussians;
2 . . . . t h a t  th e  d e le g a tio n  should  keep in  d a i ly  c o n ta c t w ith  
him;
3 . . . . t h a t  extrem e p re c au tio n s  should  be ta k en  to  p rev en t 
t h e i r  p ro sp e c ts  o f success from being  ru in ed  by any p re -  
ma’bure le a k  o f t h e i r  p o s i t io n .3
To ensure th a t  s e c u r i ty  le ak s  would n o t o ccu r, th e  P re s id e n t 
made arrangem ents f o r  only  one decoding c le rk  to  hand le  a l l  m essages. 
The c le rk  -would p e rso n a lly  hand th e  messages to  Dean Rusk, S e c re ta ry  
B a ll, R obert McNamara, John McCone, Ambassador Thompson, and Mr. 
F o s te r  o f th e  ACDA.
A ll  messages and in s t r u c t io n s  from th e  S ta te  Department were 
c a re fu l ly  gone over, and in  some in s ta n c e s  th e y  were re w r i t te n  by
S . ,  Department o f S ta te  B u l le t in , ( J u ly  29, 19^3), p . 1^9.
2
A rthur M. S c h le s in g e r J r . ,  A Thousand Days:John F . Kennedy in  
th e  White House (Boston: Houghton M if f l in  C o., 1965) ,  p . 903 .
% orenson , op. c i t . ,  p . 734.
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th e P resid en t.^
The N eg o tia tio n s
Theodore Sorenson in  h is  book, Kennedy, in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  
s u c c e s s fu l a tta in m en t o f a  more p e a c e fu l atm osphere w ith  th e  S ov ie t 
Union was th e  most im portan t p e rso n a l a s p i r a t io n  o f P re s id e n t Kennedy. 
The P re s id e n t would have g la d ly  fo rsak en  any chances f o r  r e - e le c t io n  
in  1964 i f  he cou ld  bu t o b ta in  a  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  to  a l l e v i a t e  co ld
pwar te n s io n s .
I n i t i a l l y ,  a f t e r  th e  p u b lic  cerem onies were over and th e  
hard  n e g o tia tio n s  were underway, th e  R ussians im m ediately d ism issed  
th e  id e a  o f  a  com prehensive t e s t  ban t r e a ty  which would re q u ire  "on­
s i t e "  in s p e c tio n s . Prem ier Khrushchev a lso  wanted a  no n -ag g ress io n  
p a c t which he had m entioned in  h is  E ast B e r lin  ad d ress  on J u ly  2nd. 
Ambassador Harriman p o in ted  out t h a t  such a  p a c t would ta k e  co n sid ­
e ra b le  c o n s u lta t io n  w ith  th e  N orth A tla n t ic  T rea ty  O rg an iza tio n  a l l i e s ,  
b u t a  p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  could  be com pleted in  a  ve ry  sh o r t 
t im e . The American Ambassador a ls o  p re sen te d  th e  id e a  o f  a  non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  b u t th e  R ussian  P rem ier p o in ted  ou t th a t  as
A drian P is h e r  r e la te d  t h a t  he and o th e rs  were warned to  watch 
even t h e i r  p e rso n a l conduct w hile  in  Moscow, p a r t i c u la r ly  w ith  in d iv id u a l 
R u ssian s. Any change to  d i s c r e d i t  th e  n e g o tia tio n s  and th e  n e g o tia to rs  
should  be avo ided .
2
Sorenson, op. c i t . ,  pp. 906- 909 . A m itai B bzioni in  an 
a r t i c l e  in  th e  W estern P o l i t i c a l  Q u a r te r ly , June , I 967 , has an 
in te r e s t in g  h y p o th esis  t h a t  P re s id e n t Kennedy, a f t e r  hav ing  a  
s o c io lo g ic a l-p sy c h o lo g ic a l c h a ra c te r  a n a ly s is  made o f  P rem ier 
K hrushchev, pursued  a  p o lic y  o f a c t io n - r e a c t io n .  The id e a  being  
t h a t  a  p e a c e fu l g e s tu re  would beget a  p e a c e fu l g e s tu re .
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o th e r  n a tio n s  signed  th e  t r e a ty  n o n -p ro lif e ra t io n  -would cease to  
be a  problem . The id e a  t h a t  a  n o - tr a n s fe r  o f atom ic weapons would 
have to  be d e fe rre d  fo r  fu tu re  co n sid e ra tio n s  was evidenced th e n .
Two im portan t qu estio n s  came up in  th e  beginn ing  o f th e  
n e g o tia t io n s . Both qu estio n s  d e a lt  w ith  th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  of 
th e  wording of p o rtio n s  o f th e  t r e a ty .  The Pream ble, accord ing  to  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  in te r p r e ta t io n ,  im p lied  t h a t  n u c le a r  weapons -would 
be banned in  th e  course  o f  s e lf -d e fe n s e . Ambassador Harriman knew, 
from conferences w ith  P re s id e n t Kennedy and h is  own knowledge o f 
th e  dom estic p o l i t i c s  o f  th e  S en a te , th a t  t h i s  would never re c e iv e  
approva l o f th e  S en a te . The second problem  was th e  f a c t  th a t  a  
w ithdraw al c lau se  had been l e f t  out o f  th e  o r ig in a l  d r a f t .  Ambassador 
Harriman to ld  th e  R ussians th a t  w ith o u t a  w ithdraw al c lau se  th e re  
could be no t r e a ty .
A rthur Dean, c h ie f  n e g o tia to r  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  a t  Geneva, 
says t h a t  th e  "only  m ajor su b s ta n tiv e  change in  th e  1963 t r e a ty  and 
th e  o r ig in a l  t r e a ty  proposed a t  Geneva was th e  problem  o f o n s ite  
in s p e c tio n s ." ^  O r ig in a lly ,  th e  Geneva p ro p o sa l would have allow ed 
n u c le a r  t e s t  exp losions in  a l l  environm ents, under c a r e fu l ly  con­
t r o l l e d  c ircum stances, p rov ided  th a t  th e  o r ig in a l  p a r t i e s  ag reed  to  
them. The R ussians re fu sed  to  go along w ith  t h i s  id e a  and i t  became 
a  m ajor p o in t f o r  th e  a n t i - t r e a t y  S enato rs  in  th e  debate b e fo re  th e  
S en a te . As such, i t  d id  n o t a llow  th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  conduct th e
^A rthur Dean, T est Ban and Disarmament (New York; H arper and 
Row f o r  Council on I n te r n a t io n a l  R e la tio n s , I 966) ,  p . 98*
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proposed "Plowshare" program. The Plowshare id e a  was co n ta ined  in  
a  th e o r e t ic a l  study  to  b u ild , by n u c le a r  power, a  new can a l acro ss  
th e  Isthm us o f  C e n tra l America to  re p la ce  th e  e x is t in g  Panama C anal.
Mr. Dean b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  would be b e t t e r  o f f  
w ith  th e  t o t a l  p ro h ib i t io n  on t e s t in g  th an  where we.rwould have been 
i f  th e  o r ig in a l  p ro v is io n , which p e rm itte d  n u c lea r exp losions fo r  
p e a c e fu l pu rposes, had been re ta in e d . I t  should  be obvious th a t  
even p e ac e fu l exp losions would be b e n e f ic ia l  m i l i t a r i l y ,  i f  th ey  were 
so designed . This would in v i te  b la ta n t  ch ea tin g  under th e  g u ise  of 
le g a l  t e s t in g .
The problem  o f "de fa c to "  and "de ju re "  re c o g n itio n  o f s ta te s  
a ls o  w orried  th e  U n ited  S ta te s .  The questio n  o f E as t German and 
Chinese re c o g n itio n  had long been a  p a r t is a n  p o l i t i c a l  q u estio n  in  
th e  U nited  S ta te s .  The U nited  S ta te s  suggested  and th e  R ussians 
r e je c te d  th e  id e a  th a t  any access io n  to  th e  t r e a ty  by e i th e r  E ast 
Germany o r China d id  n o t c o n s t i tu te  re c o g n itio n . E v en tu a lly  law yers 
F ish e r  and McUaughton came up w ith  th e  id e a  th a t  every  s ig n a to ry  was 
f r e e  to  s ig n  in  a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  n a tio n s  o f which i t  approved.
A fte r  th e  t r e a ty  had been i n i t i a l e d .  Ambassador Harriman 
q.uestioned Prem ier Khrushchev about th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f g e tt in g  
Red China to  s ig n  th e  t r e a ty  i f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  could  g e t France 
to  s ig n . The Prem ier m erely s a id :  "T h a t's  your problem . . . . " A s  
b r i e f  as th e  answer m ight have been, i t  h e ld  more In fo rm ation  about 
th e  problems th e  S o v ie t Union were having w ith  t h e i r  own a l l y  than  
was r e a l iz e d  a t  th a t  moment. G eneral Maxwell T a y lo rto ld  t h i s  w r i te r
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t h a t  th e  id ea  th a t  a  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  would d riv e  th e  S o v ie t Union
and China f u r th e r  a p a r t  was th e  g r e a te s t  p o l i t i c a l  advantage o f
th e  t r e a ty .  I f  th e  t r e a t y  ach ieved  n o th in g  more th a n  t h i s ,  th en
i t  was a  su cc e ss .^
A rthu r S c h le s in g e r g iv es  la v is h  p ra is e  to  A v e re ll  Harrim an,
and th e  back o f  h is  hand t o  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent:
L e ft to  i t s e l f ,  th e  Department o f  S ta te  would n o t have 
p e rse rv e re d  w ith  th e  is s u e ,  n o r would i t  have ev er p ro ­
posed an American U n iv e rs ity  speech . . . t h a t  speech which, 
in  i t s  modesty, c l a r i t y ,  and p e rc e p tio n , re p u d ia te d  th e  
s e lf - r ig h te o u s  cg ld  war rh e to r ic  o f  a  su ccessio n  o f  S ec re ­
t a r i e s  o f S ta te .
While S c h le s in g e r was generous in  h is  p r a is e  o f th e  Ambassador,
P re s id e n t Kennedy and h is  a d v ise rs  in  th e  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament
Agency should have been g iven  th e  p rem ier sp o t f o r  a p p ra is a l  o f  th e
t e s t  ban t r e a ty .  Harriman was m erely th e  in s tru m en t th a t  capped
th e  tremendous work done by th e  ACDA and A rth u r Dean a t  Geneva.
On Ju ly  26t h ,  P re s id e n t Kennedy add ressed  th e  n a tio n  over
n a t io n a l  t e le v is io n  in  th e  f i r s t  o f h is  many e f f o r t s  to  e x p la in  th e  .
t r e a ty  to  th e  American people  and g a in  t h e i r  su p p o rt. He s a id ;
I  speak to  you to n ig h t in  a  s p i r i t  o f  hope. . . .S in ce  th e  
advent o f  n u c lea r weapons, a l l  mankind has been s tru g g lin g  
to  escape from th e  darkening p ro sp e c t o f mass d e s tru c t io n  on 
e a r th . . . .Y esterday  a  s h a f t  o f  l i g h t  cu t in to  th e  darkness.
^ In te rv iew  w ith  G eneral Maxwell T ay lo r w hile  he was on campus 
a t  Mankato S ta te  C ollege to  add ress th e  fou n d a tio n  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  
C o lle g ia te  V e te ran s ' Club, sponsored by th e  Mankato V e te ra n s ' Club o f 
which th e  au th o r was f a c u l ty  sponso r.
2
S c h le s in g e r, op. c i t . ,  p . 909 .
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This t r e a ty  i s  no t th e  m illennium . . . .But i t  i s  an im­
p o r ta n t f i r s t  s te p  . . .a  s te p  tow ard peace , a  s te p  tow ard 
reaso n , a  s te p  away from w ar. . . .
According to  th e  a n c ie n t Chinese p roverb , "A journey  o f a  
thousand m iles must beg in  w ith  a  s in g le  s te p ."  , . .L e t 
us tak e  t h a t  f i r s t  s te p .
P r e s id e n t’Eennedy"s words were in s p ir in g  to  most o f th e  
n a tio n , b u t he knew t h a t  th e r e  were pow erfu l fo rce s  in  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  Senate  who d id  n o t have h is  hopes n o r th e  d e s ire  to  ta k e  
any s te p  toward le sse n in g  th e  te n s io n s  between th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
and th e  S o v ie t Union. The f a c t  t h a t  th e  P re s id e n t e v en tu a lly  was 
a b le  to  r a l l y  th e  American peop le  and th e  le a d e rs h ip  o f th e  Re­
p u b lican  p a r ty  was a  monumental ta s k .
From th e  beg inn ing  th e  dom estic scene had no t been a t  a l l  
h o p e fu l o r encouraging . As e a r ly  as February  21, I 963, S enato r 
Dodd had a tta c k e d  th e  rumors t h a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had lowered 
i t s  demands fo r  " o n -s ite "  in s p e c tio n s . S en ato rs  R u sse ll , Symington, 
and Jackson of th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee had inform ed th e  P r e s i ­
den t th a t  they  could  no t support o r approve any t r e a t y  w ith  th e  
S o v ie t Union th a t  would c u r t a i l  th e  U nited  S ta te s  Armed Forces o r th e
puse  o f atom ic weapons. The R epublicans under th e  guidance o f Repre­
s e n ta t iv e  C raig Hosmer had s e t  up a  Conference Committee on N uclear 
T es tin g  to  watch f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f any move tow ard disarm am ent.
^Quoted in  Sorenson, op. c i t . ,  p . 737. 
W ash ing ton  P o st (March 5; 19&3) •
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To co u n ter th e se  a t ta c k s .  P re s id e n t Kennedy c a l le d  upon 
h is  app o in tee  to  th e  ACM, Deputy D ire c to r  A drian F is h e r ,  to  
answer th e  S e n a to r ia l  c r i t i c s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  S en a to r Dodd. Mr.
F is h e r  w rote a  l e t t e r  to  S en a to r Dodd which was p u b lish ed  in  th e  
W ashington P o st on March 1 , I 963 . S ena to r Humphrey made a  major 
speech on th e  f lo o r  o f th e  Senate on March 7; 19^3, v ig o ro u sly  
su p p o rtin g  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  p o s i t io n .^  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  Dean 
Rusk appeared b e fo re  th e  Senate  F oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee fo u r  
days l a t e r ,  accompanied by F o s te r  and Long o f th e  ACM. They a ls o  
appeared b e fo re  th e  Committee on Atomic Energy to  e x p la in  why th e  
U nited  S ta te s  had low ered i t s  demands f o r  " o n -s i te "  in s p e c tio n s . 
They p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th rough  advances o f  P r o je c t  VELA,^ which 
had been under th e  c o n tro l  o f th e  Department o f D efense, th e  U n ited  
S ta te s  was engaged in  th e  development o f tech n iq u es  f o r  th e  improve­
ment o f  our c a p a b i l i ty  to  d e te c t ,  lo c a te  and id e n t i f y  n u c lea r
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp. 3711-3724.
^ P ro je c t VEM was a  p ro je c t  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Coast and 
G eodetic Survey which was in  th e  p ro cess  o f  c o n s tru c tin g  a  w orld­
wide se ism o lo g ic a l netw ork. The s ta t io n s  would be o p e ra ted  by 
f r ie n d ly  governments and o th e r  p r iv a te  groups such as u n iv e r s i t i e s  
th roughou t th e  w orld . There were seven se ism o lo g ic a l s ta t io n s  in  th e  
U nited  S ta te s .  The f i r s t  o f  th e  s ta t io n s  was c o n s tru c te d  a t  F o r t S i l l ,  
Oklahoma, and became o p e ra tio n a l in  O ctober, I 96O. These se ism o lo g ic a l 
s ta tè o n s  were a b le  to  p ic k  up and id e n t i f y  c o r r e c t ly  a  s e c re t  d e to n a tio n  
by France in  an underground cavern in  a  d e so la te  reg io n  o f  A lg e r ia  in
1962. (se e  The Hew York Times da ted  Ju ly  24, I 962) The sh o t was a  low- 
y ie ld  megaton n u c le a r  d ev ice . A pparently  th e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f th e se  
seism ographs cou ld  be in c re a se d  by a  f a c to r  o f f iv e  o r te n  by p la c in g  
them in  deep h o le s  r a th e r  th an  on th e  e a r th  su r fa c e . Documents on 
Disarmament, op. c i t . ,  pp . 246-248.
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n u c lea r d e to n a tio n s  in  a l l  environm ents and e v e n tu a lly  develop 
a system capable o f adequate ly  m onitoring  a comprehensive n u c lear 
t e s t  ban.^
The P r e s id e n t 's  e f f o r t s  began to  have a p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t .
Senator Dodd subm itted  a re s o lu t io n  on May 27th , s ta t in g  th a t :
The United S ta te s  should again  o f f e r  th e  S o v ie t Union an 
immediate agreem ent banning a l l  t e s t s  th a t  contam inate the 
atmosphere or th e  oceans, bearin g  in  mind th a t  such t e s t s  
can a lread y  be m onitored by the United S ta te s  w ith o u t on­
s i t e  in sp e c tio n  on Soviet t e r r i t o r y .
Senator Dodd was jo in e d  by Senator Humphrey and th ir ty - tw o  o th e r 
S enators in  sponsoring  th e  r e s o lu t io n .
P res id en t Kennedy s t i l l  had the  most d i f f i c u l t  h u rd le  o f 
a l l  to  overcome. Senate r a t i f i c a t i o n  and the  c o a l i t io n  o f Souther 
co n se rv a tiv es  and th e  Republican P arty .
^Documents on Disarmament,1963, op. c i t .
2This support by Senator Dodd was c la s s i f i e d  by Mr. Humphrey 
as being a " c o u p .” The Senator from M innesota in d ic a te d  th a t  he was 
in ten d in g  to  in tro d u ce  a r e s o lu t io n , but he and th e  a d m in is tra tio n  
needed a "hawk” or a man as s tro n g ly  opposed to  th e  t r e a ty  as  p o ss ib le  
to  support i t .  A fte r a p e rio d  o f personal v i s i t a t i o n s  by Humphrey, 
Senator Dodd in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  idea of a l im ite d  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  was 
a p r e t ty  good idea a f t e r  a l l  and asked Mr. Humphrey to  in tro d u ce  such 
a r e s o lu tio n . But Humphrey w ise ly , as i t  tu rn ed  o u t, asked Senator 
Dodd to  in tro d u ce  th e  r e s o lu t io n  and they were jo in e d  by a t o t a l  o f 
th ir ty - tw o  o th e r U nited S ta te s  S ena to rs .
CHAPTER V
RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY
The prim ary fu n c tio n  o f th e  committee system o f Congress 
i s  to  p rov ide  open forums to  inform  i t s e l f  and th e  p u b lic  concerning 
a c tio n s  o f th e  E xecutive and th e  need fo r  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Congress 
has access to  c l a s s i f i e d  in fo rm atio n ; i t  i s  organ ized  in to  committees
and subcom m ittees; i t  has s k i l l e d  and sp e c ia liz e d  agencies a v a ila b le
in  th e  form  o f p e rso n a l a s s i s ta n t s  and subcommittee s t a f f ;  i t  can 
re le a s e  th e  r e s u l t s  o f i t s  h ea rin g s  and in v e s t ig a tio n s  to  th e  
p u b lic  in  th e  form o f  verba tim  reco rd s  and h e a r in g s , re p o r ts  and 
p re s s  r e le a s e s .
P e r io d ic a l ly  committees o f Congress v i l l  h o ld  h ea rin g s  to  
a i r  fundam ental d if fe re n c e s  between o f f i c i a l s  and ag encies con­
cerned  w ith  n a t io n a l  p o lic y , o r th ey  may m erely be forums which 
a re  p a r t is a n - in s p i r e d  to  em barrass th e  P re s id e n t.
In  th e  case  o f th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  th e  reco rd  in d i ­
c a te s  t h a t  Congress had an Im portan t r o le  in  shaping U nited  S ta te s  
p o lic y . The C ongressional h earin g s  produced a  w ealth  o f te c h n ic a l  
and p o l i t i c a l  d a ta .
P re s id e n t Kennedy p re sen te d  th e  t r e a ty  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
S enate  fo r  i t s  adv ice  and consent to  r a t i f i c a t i o n  on August 8 , 1963 . 
In  h is  message o f com m ittal th e  P re s id e n t sa id :
This t r e a ty  i s  in  our n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .  While experience  
teach es  us to  be cau tio u s  in  our ex p ec ta tio n s  and everso  
v ig i la n t  in  our p re p a ra t io n s , th e re  i s  no reason  to  oppose 
t h i s  h o p e fu l s te p .
C o n g re s s io n a l R ecord, op. c i t . ,  p . l4$$8.
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When th e  motion to  commit th e  t r e a t y  to  th e  Senate  Foreign  
R e la tio n s  Committee was made by S en a to r Sparkman, he made no te  o f 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  Senate Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee had req u ested  
th a t  i t  be g iven  ju r i s d ic t io n  o r be allow ed to  h o ld  h ea rin g s  on 
th e  m i l i t a r y  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  t r e a ty .  Leading th e  o b je c tio n s  to  
such a  move was S en a to r E v ere t D irksen, m in o rity  le a d e r  o f  th e  
R epublican P a r ty .
The Senate  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee had been w atching th e  
Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n  v ery  c lo s e ly  and had e s ta b lis h e d  a  sub­
committee to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and e f f e c ts  t h a t  ta lk s  
might have on th e  l im i ta t io n ,  c o n tro l and re d u c tio n  o f th e  Armed 
F o rces . The chairm an. S en a to r S te n n is , p u t h is  fe a r s  more d i r e c t ly  
when he c h a ra c te r iz e d  th e  t a lk s  as a  s te p  tow ard th e  " e lim in a tio n  
o f our Armed Forces and Armaments.
The ju r i s d ic t io n  over th e  t r e a t y  f e l l ,  acco rd ing  to  Senate  
custom, to  th e  Committee on F oreign  R e la tio n s . There have been 
few tim es t h a t  any o th e r  committee ch a llen g ed  t h i s  p e ro g a tiv e . I t  
may be s a id  th a t  th e  body o f ru le s  and p reced en ts  o f th e  Senate  
d iscou rages one co n g re ss io n a l committee from  s t ic k in g  i t s  nose in to  
a n o th e r ’s a re a  o f  a u th o r i ty .
In  th e  case  o f  th e  L im ited T est Ban T rea ty  i t  must be 
remembered th a t  th e  Senate Armed S e rv ices  Committee had f o u ^ t  
th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency.
^U .S ., Congress, S en a te , Committee on Armed S e rv ic e s ; P re ­
paredness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee, M ili ta ry  A spects and Im p li­
c a tio n s  o f  R uclear T es t Ban P ro p o sa ls  and R e la ted  M atte rs , 88th  
Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  V ol. I ,  p . 2 .
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S enato r Goldwater had wanted to  k i l l  th e  agency by a p p ro p ria tio n s ; 
S enato r Thurmond had s a id  t h a t  i t  was a  s ig n  o f weakness and a 
s la p  in  th e  face  o f  our a l l i e s .
A c lo se  look  a t  th e  membership o f th e  Senate  Armed S e rv ices  
Committee which o v e rlap s  th e  A p p ro p ria tio n s  Committee and th e  J o in t  
Atomic Energy Committee, i . e . ,  S en a to rs  h o ld  more th a n  one s e a t  on 
committees in  th e  S en a te , re v e a ls  th a t  th e  th re e  to p -ran k in g  members 
o f  th e  Armed Sezirices Committee, R u sse ll , S ten n is  and Smith o f Maine, 
a ls o  se rv e  on th e  A p p ro p ria tio n s  Committee. S en a to rs  R u sse ll  and 
Jackson a lso  s i t  on th e  J o in t  Atomic Energy Committee, as w e ll as 
th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee. Three o th e r  members o f th e  Armed 
S e rv ices  Committee, Democrat Howard Cannon o f Nevada, Strom Thurmond 
o f South C aro lin a  and R epublican B arry Goldwater o f  A rizona, a re  
Major G enerals in  th e  A ir  F orce  and Army R eserve. S en a to r Symington 
o f  M issouri was deep ly  imbued w ith  th e  Armed S e rv ic e s . S enato r 
Henry Jackson, o f  W ashington, has been c a l le d ,  somewhat d e r is iv e ly ,  
th e  S enato r from "B oeing," in d ic a t in g  h is  c o n s ti tu e n c y 's  dependence 
on m il i ta r y  spending in  th e  m anufacture o f a irp la n e s  and m is s i le s .
I t  may be c o n jec tu re d  th a t  th e  S en a to rs  had more th a n  a  p ass in g  
in t e r e s t  in  th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty .
The t r e a ty  was O f f i c ia l ly  subm itted  to  th e  F o re ign  R e la tio n s  
Committee and h ea rin g s  commenced on August 1 2 th , and la s te d  through  
August 27t h .
The In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee o f th e  Senate  Armed S e rv ices  
Committee had s ta r te d  i t s  h ea rin g s  in  e a r ly  May and con tinued  to  
h o ld  h ea rin g s  s im u ltan eo u sly  w ith  th e  F o re ign  R e la tio n s  Committee.
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The Senate  F o re ign  R e la tio n s  Committee in v i te d  th e  e n t i r e  
membership o f  th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee and th e  Atomic Energy 
Commission to  s i t  w ith  them in  th e  q u estio n in g  o f w itn e sse s  c a l le d  
to  t e s t i f y  f o r  and a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y .  By t h i s  p rocedure th e  
Senate  F oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee could  inform  i t s e l f  on th e  
m i l i t a r y - s c i e n t i f i c - p o l i t i c a l  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  t r e a ty  and make a  
judgment about recommendations to  th e  S en a te .
C e rta in  q u estio n s  had to  be asked in  fo rm u la tin g  a  r a t io n a l  
d e c is io n  re g a rd in g  th e  n u c lea r  t e s t  ban t r e a ty ;
1 . 'What were th e  dangers o f r a d io a c t iv i ty  i n  con tinued  
t e s t in g  o f n u c le a r  d ev ices w ith  re s p e c ts  t o  th e  immediate and long 
range g e n e tic  e f fe c ts ?
2 . What would be th e  g a in s  in  weapon technology w ith  and 
w ith o u t f u r th e r  te s t in g ?
3 . What ty p e  and q u a l i ty  o f  n u c le a r  weapons does th e  o th e r
s id e  po ssess  as compared w ith  th e  U nited  S ta te s?
k.  What methods o f d e te c tio n  o f  c la n d e s tin e  t e s t in g  were
a v a ila b le ?
5. What e f f e c t  would th e  t r e a ty  have on p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f 
n u c lea r weapons among n o n -n u c lea r n a tio n s?
6 . What dangers e x i s t  to  th e  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  o f  a  n a tio n
during  tim e o f  war and p e a c e fu l experim entation?
7« What k in d  o f  t r e a t y  would th e  American p eo p le , th e  a l l i e s  
o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s ,  and th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Senate A ccept?^
^ o r  a  d isc u ss io n  o f  th e  s c i e n t i f i c - m i l i t a iy  a sp e c ts  o f th e  
t r e a t y  see  th e  McBride D is s e r ta t io n ,  op. c i t .
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In h e re n t in  th e se  q u estio n s  i s  a  g e n e ra l overlapp ing  o f 
knowledge o r e x p e r tis e . I t  would he d i f f i c u l t  f o r  one man o r one 
ex p e rt to  answer any o r a l l  o f them eq u a lly  w e ll .  The m i l i t a r y , 
th e  s c i e n t i f i c ,  and th e  p o l i t i c a l  a l l  o v e rla p . One would assume 
th a t  a  S ena to r s i t t i n g  on an in v e s t ig a tin g  committee would ta k e  
in to  account any p e rso n a l inadequacy on h is  p a r t  on m il i ta r y  and 
s c i e n t i f i c  m a tte rs  by ask ing  i n t e l l i g e n t  q u e s tio n s . U n fo rtu n a te ly , 
th e  a b i l i t y  to  ask  q u estions sometimes depends upon a  minimal 
background and, more im p o rtan tly , a  w illin g n e ss  to  h e a r w itn esses  
w ith  in fo rm atio n  th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l S ena to r might n o t l ik e  to  
h e a r .
P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee
The Committee on Armed S e rv ices  was ch a ired  by E ichard  B. 
R u sse ll  o f G eorgia. I t s  members were H arry P . Byrd, V irg in ia ; 
S tu a r t  Symington, M issouri; Henry M. Jackson , W ashington; San J .  
E rv in , J r . ,  Worth C aro lina ; Howard Cannon, Nevada; R obert C. Byrd, 
West V irg in ia ; Stephen Young, Ohio; D aniel K. Inouye, Hawaii; 
L e v e re tt S a l to n s ta l l ,  M assachusse tts; M argaret Chase Sm ith, Maine; 
J .  Glenn B ea ll, Maryland; B arry G oldwater, A rizona; and C lif fo rd  P. 
Chse, New J e rse y .
The P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee was ch a ired  by 
John S te n n is , M iss is s ip p i; S tu a r t  Symington, M issouri; Henry M. 
Jackson , W ashington; Strom Thurmond, South C aro lin a ; L e v e re tt 
S a l to n s ta l l ,  M assachusse tts; M argaret Chase Sm ith, Maine; Barry 
G oldw ater, A rizona. L egal counse l f o r  th e  subcommittee was Mr. 
James T. K endall and R ussel J .  Fee .
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From th e  tim e o f i t s  in c e p tio n  in  May, u n t i l  th e  l im ite d  
t e s t  ban t r e a ty  was n e g o tia te d  and i n i t i a l e d  in  Moscow, th e  P re ­
paredness In v e s t ig a t in g  Committee h e ld  h earin g s  about a  comprehensive 
t e s t  ban t r e a ty  t h a t  would b a r a l l  t e s t in g  in  any elem ent. Because 
th e  f i n a l  t r e a ty  l im ite d  t e s t in g  to  underground, th e re  was some 
confusion  on th e  p a r t  o f some S en a to rs  in  making th e  d is t in c t io n s  
between "com prehensive” and " l im i te d ." Because th e  members o f 
t h i s  committee had s ta te d  as e a r ly  as I 96I  t h a t  th ey  were opposed 
to  any moves tow ard disarmament, du ring  th e  debate  on th e  e stab lish m en t 
o f th e  ACDA., i t  could  be sunnised  th a t  th e  S ena to rs  were u n w illin g  
to  even co n sid e r a  t r e a ty  o f  any k in d , l im ite d  o r com prehensive.
!Ehe J o in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f  were a g a in s t  th e  id e a  o f a  compre­
h ensive  t e s t  ban and t h e i r  p o s it io n  was s ta t e d  by A dm iral George W. 
Anderson, J r . ,  C hief o f Naval O pera tions, on June 26th :
The J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  have exp ressed . . . t h a t  i t  i s  th e  
judgment o f  th e  J o in t  Chiefs o f  S ta f f  t h a t  th e  proposed 
t e s t  ban t r e a ty  i s  no t adequate t o  p rev en t th e  S o v ie t Union 
from making im portan t advances in  n u c lea r weaponry th a t  ctiuld 
a l t e r  th e  p re se n t m il i ta r y  r e la t io n s h ip  in  fav o r o f  th e  s o v ie ts .  
They concluded th e re fo re , th a t  th e  proposed comprehensive 
t r e a ty  i s  n o t c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty .^
While A dm iral Anderson was b e fo re  th e  com m ittee. S ena to r
Symington took  th e  occasion  to  q u estio n  th e  Adm iral about th e
Twining R eport, which had been used e x te n s iv e ly  to  support th e
concept o f  a  n u c le a r  t r e a ty .  Although th e  A dm iral s ta te d  th a t
he was f a m il ia r  w ith  i t .  S enato r Symington r e i t e r a t e d  th e  p r in c ip a l
^Preparedness Subcommittee, op. c i t . , p . 310.
85
parts o f th e report in  question;
The U nited  S ta te s  le ad s  in  n u c lea r  technology  and would 
m ain ta in  th e  le a d  i f  th e re  i s  a  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .
N uclear technology  i s ,  a t  t h i s  p o in t ,  o f d im in ish in g  r e ­
tu rn s  and under a  t e s t  ban no developments a re  l i k e ly  th a t  
would u p se t th e  b a lance  o f power.
The r i s k  o f  s u rp r is e  and ab ro g a tio n  can be reduced to  an 
a ccep tab le  l e v e l  i f  we m ain ta in  s tro n g  weapons la b o ra to r ie s  
and t e s t  f a c i l i t y  re a d in e s s .^
Under c ro ss exam ination, once ag a in  by S en a to r Symington,
Adm iral Anderson concluded th a t  th e  S o v ie ts  would n o t a u to m a tic a lly
ach ieve m i l i t a iy  s u p e r io r i ty  i f  we kep t our own program  o f t e s t in g
and development in  a  v igorous s t a t e  o f a c t i v i t y .
G eneral C urtiu s LeMay was c a l le d  on Thursday, June 27, I 963 .
The G en era l' s s ta tem en ts  in d ic a te d  th a t  he was n o t in  fa v o r o f  a
comprehensive t r e a ty  th a t  p reven ted  t e s t in g  in  th e  atm osphere o r
th e  e f f e c t  o f  bombs being  dropped on launch s i t e s  to  determ ine what
e f f e c t  th e  bomb would have on them.
G eneral LeMay and S en a to r Jackson were a b le  d u ring  th e  h ea rin g s
to  d iscu ss  th e  e f f e c ts  and dangers th e  "Ban-the-Bomb" movement was
having on in d iv id u a ls  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  who were p la y in g  a  r o le
in  disarmament t a lk s ;
The reason  I  say th a t  i s  t h a t  a  v ery  la rg e  m a jo rity  o f  our 
p eop le , p robab ly  99*9 p e rc e n t, a re  h ig h ly  h o n e s t, p a t r i o t i c  
Americans, b u t th e re  a re  some in  t h i s  f i e l d  o f  disarmament 
I  have become su sp ic io u s  o f , and I  would l ik e  t o  f in d  ou t i f  
t h i s  ZmovemenS^ had any e f f e c t  o r c o n tac t w ith  them.
^ Ib id . , p . 311 . 
^ I b id . , p . 360 .
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Up u n t i l  t h i s  tim e , th e  P reparedness Subcommittee had. heard, 
testim ony  re in fo rc in g  t h e i r  s ta ted , o p p o sitio n  to  any form o f d i s ­
armament o r arms c o n tro l .  Between August lU th and August l 6th .
G eneral Maxwell T ay lo r, Chairman o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f ,  
t e s t i f i e d ,  and th e  h ea rin g s  took  an ab ru p t and dram atic  r e v e r s a l  
f o r  th e  opponents o f  th e  T est Ban T rea ty .
G eneral Maxwell D. T ay lo r, Chairman 
J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f
P re s id e n t Kennedy asked th e  subcommittee to  suspend i t s  
h e a rin g s  -while n e g o tia tio n s  were in  p ro g ress  in  Moscow, and th e y  
d id  suspend them. Now th a t  th e  t r e a ty  had been i n i t i a l e d ,  th e  
committee -was in  se ss io n  once more and G eneral Maxwell T aylor -was 
th e  " le a d -o f f"  m i l i t a r y  w itn e s s . The o th e r  members o f th e  J o in t  
C hiefs o f S ta f f  were scheduled  f o r  a  l a t e r  d a te .
G eneral Taylor v ery  c a r e fu l ly  ex p la in ed  th a t  th e  J o in t  
C hiefs o f S ta f f  had thrown a s id e  a l l  p rev ious c o n s id e ra tio n s  in -  
v o lin g  a  comprehensive t e s t  ban t r e a ty  and focused  t h e i r  a t te n t io n  
on th e  l im ite d  t e s t  ban " a t  t h i s  p a r t i c u la r  p o in t in  tim e ."  G eneral 
T ay lo r was q u ite  emphatic th a t  t h e i r  c o n s id e ra tio n s  o f  th e  p a s t ,  as 
re p re se n te d  by Adm iral Anderson a t  a  much e a r l i e r  d a te , were no lo n g er 
v a l id .  Using new c r i t e r i a ,  th e  J o in t  C hiefs had e s ta b lis h e d  fo u r 
p o in ts  t h a t  would make t h i s ,  a  l im ite d  t e s t  ban, a ccep tab le  as  to  
"co n ten t o f  tim in g  o f  a  l im ite d  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  which would p ro h ib i t  
n u c le a r  t e s t  exp losions in  a l l  environm ents excep ting  underground.
^Ibid. , p. 587.
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FIRST: The U nited  S ta te s  should  n o t accep t l im i ta t io n s  on
te s t in g  i f  th e  S o v ie t Union had or cou ld  ach ieve  a  s i g n i f i ­
can t advantage in  any m i l i t a r i l y  im portan t a re a  o f  n u c lea r 
weapon techno logy  which under th e  t r e a t y  cou ld  n o t be o ver­
come by th e  U nited  S ta te s .
SECOND: R ecognizing t h a t  th e  U .S .8 .R . could  be expected to
ta k e  advantage o f any reaso n ab le  s a fe  o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  c la n ­
d e s tin e  t e s t i n g ,  th e  J o in t  C hiefs determ ined t h a t  a  t e s t  ban 
t r e a ty  would have no s e r io u s ly  adverse  e f f e c t  on th e  r e l a t iv e  
balance  o f m i l i t a r y  power.
THIRD: I t  was co n sid ered  im portan t t h a t  w ithdraw al from th e
t r e a ty  should  be uncom plicated , a llo w in g  th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  
w ithdraw  w ith o u t undue d e lay  upon a cq u ir in g  reaso n ab le  evidence 
o f  a  t r e a t y  v io la t io n  o r in  th e  even t our n a t io n a l  in t e r e s t s  
were im p e rile d .
FOURTH: I f  th e  co n d itio n s  o f  c r i t e r i a  Numbers 1 and 2 were
n o t com pletely  m et, th e  t r e a ty  must convey adequate compen­
sa to ry  advantages e lsew here .
The J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  s t ip u la te d  fo u r  safeguards f o r  t h e i r
support:
1 . The conduct o f com prehensive, a g g re ss iv e  and co n tin u in g  
underground n u c le a r  t e s t  programs designed  to  add to  our 
knowledge and improve our weapons in  a l l  a re a s  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  
to  our m i l i t a r y  p o s tu re  f o r  th e  f u tu r e .
2 . The m aintenance o f modem n u c le a r  la b o ra to ry  f a c i l i t i e s  
and programs in  t h e o r e t i c a l  and ex p lo ra to ry  n u c le a r  technology  
which w i l l  a t t r a c t ,  r e t a in ,  and in s u re  th e  con tinued  a p p l i ­
c a tio n  o f  our human s c i e n t i f i c  re so u rce s  to  th e se  programs
on which con tinued  p ro g ress  in  n u c le a r  technology  depends.
3 . The m aintenance o f th e  f a c i l i t i e s  and re so u rce s  n ecessa ry  
to  i n s t i t u t e  prom ptly n u c le a r  t e s t s  in  th e  atm osphere should  
th ey  be deemed e s s e n t i a l  to  our n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  o r should  
th e  t r e a t y  o r  any o f i t s  term s be ab ro g a ted  by th e  S o v ie t 
Union.
^ i d . ,  p .  5 8 8 .
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4. The improvement o f  our c a p a b i l i ty ,  -within f e a s ib le  and 
p r a c t i c a l  l im i t s ,  to  m onitor th e  term s o f  th e  t r e a ty ,  to  
d e te c t  v io la t io n s  and to  m ain ta in  our knotfledge o f S ino- 
S o v ie t n u c le a r  a c t i v i t y ,  c a p a b i l i ty  and achievem ents.^
G eneral T ay lo r nex t in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  J o in t  C hiefs had taken
in to  account more th an  ju s t  m i l i ta r y  m a tte rs  in  th e  d e c is io n . They
made th e  d e c is io n :
. . .having  tak en  n o te  o f th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  t r e a ty  in  th e  
b road  f i e l d  o f In te r n a t io n a l  R e la tio n s  and o f world--wide 
m il i t a r y  s t r a te g y ,  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  recognized  
th a t  co n s id e ra tio n s  o f  n u c le a r  techno logy  and weaponry 
were no t th e  so le  de term inan ts  o f  th e  m e rits  o f  th e  t r e a ty ;  
t h a t  i f  i t  would c o n tr ib u te  to  a  f u r th e r  d iv is io n  o f th e  
S in o -S o v ie t b lo c , t h i s  t r e a ty  would be a  m ajor achievement 
w ith  im portan t and fa v o ra b le  im p lic a tio n s .
The t r e a ty  should  a ls o  c o n tr ib u te  tow ard r e s t r a i n t  o f f u r th e r  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f n u c le a r  weapons. "Both o f th e se  advan tages, i f  
ach ieved , should  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  fundam ental o b je c tiv e  o f  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  Armed F o rces , namely th e  d e te rre n ce  o f war and th e  
m aintenance o f peace on honorab le  term s.
In  co n clu sio n , th e  J o in t  C hiefs had reached  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  
t h a t ,  w hile  th e re  were m il i ta r y  d isadvan tages to  th e  t r e a ty ,  th e
^ I b id . , p . 590.
^G eneral T ay lo r, in  a  p e rso n a l in te rv ie w  -with th e  w r i te r ,  i n ­
d ic a te d  t h a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s p l i t  and th e  com plications between th e  
S o v ie ts  and th e  Chinese was o f  th e  g r e a te s t  im portance and th a t ,  i n  
h is  mind, in  I 968, th e  t r e a ty  -was a  success beyond anyone's dreams in  
1963. The im plica-tion  -was t h a t  t h i s  was th e  " p o l i t i c a l  ga in"  s o u ^ t  
and was m entioned tim e a f t e r  tim e by th e  m i l i t a r y  in  t h e i r  testim ony  
befo re  th e  P reparedness Subcommittee.
P re p a re d n e s s  Subcommittee, op. c i t . ,  p . 590*
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d isadvantages were n o t so s e r io u s  as to  ren d er th e  t r e a ty  un­
a c c e p ta b le .^
The com m ittee, to  a  man, a tta ck e d  th e  testim ony  o f  G eneral 
T ay lo r. The l in e  o f a t ta c k  was t h a t  th e  Chairman and th e  J o in t  
C hiefs o f S ta f f  were responding  to  "arm -tw is tin g "  by th e  'White 
House and th e  S e c re ta ry  o f D efense. S en a to rs  G oldwater, Thurmond, 
and S ten n is  were p a r t i c u la r ly  adamant th a t  th e  C hiefs and th e  
m il i ta r y  as a  t o t a l i t y  were being  "gagged" by th e  E xecutive b ranch . 
S ena to r Goldwater wanted to  know i f  G eneral T ay lo r had even taken  
th e  tro u b le  to  c o n su lt th e  in d iv id u a l  C hiefs o r i f  he had made t h i s  
d e c is io n  f o r  them. S en a to r Goldwater even q u estioned  th e  v e ra c i ty  
o f G eneral T a y lo r’s knowledge concerning th e  p e rso n n e l o f th e
pn e g o tia tin g  team in  Moscow.
S en a to r Goldwater th en  demanded to  know why th e  J o in t  C hiefs 
o f  S ta f f  had changed t h e i r  p o s i t io n  from one o f  o p p o s itio n  to  a  
t e s t  ban t r e a ty  to  a  q u a l i f ie d  endorsement a f t e r  only  one and a  h a l f  
months. G eneral T ay lo r a ttem p ted  to  e x p la in  th a t  o r ig in a l ly  th e  
C hiefs had co n sidered  a  comprehensive t r e a t y  b a n n in g '-a l l  t e s t s  and 
th e y  could  n o t accep t such a  r e s t r i c t i o n .  However, under a  l im ite d  
t r e a ty  th e  U nited  S ta te s  would be allow ed to  con tinue  te s t in g  under­
ground and our technology  would n o t be hampered by such a  t r e a ty .  
S en a to r Goldwater ad m itted  th a t  he could n o t comprehend th e  use  o f
^ Ib id .
^ I b i d . , p .  6 0 6 .
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term s having to  cLo w ith  "n u c lea r technology  and n u c le a r  weapons."
To him th ey  were n o t two d i s t i n c t  concep ts , b u t were th e  same. A 
q u estio n  pu t d i r e c t ly  to  S ena to r A lb e rt Gore by th i s  w r i te r  in d i ­
ca ted  th a t  S en a to r Goldwater a c tu a l ly  d id  n o t un d ers tan d  th e  d if fe re n c e s  
between th e se  two term s, nor would he adm it t h a t  th e r e  were d if fe re n c e s  
between comprehensive and l im i te d .^
S enato r Thurmond, a  Major G eneral in  th e  R eserves, proposed 
" i f /a n d /o r"  qu estio n s  to  G eneral T ay lo r which would d i s c r e d i t  th e  
G e n e ra l 's  testim o n y . G eneral T ay lo r re fu se d  s te a d f a s t ly  to  sp e c u la te  
on th e  g e n e r a l i t ie s  p u t to  him by S en a to r Thurmond. S en a to r Thurmond 
im plied  th a t  G eneral T ay lo r, s in ce  he had been appo in ted  by P re s id e n t 
Kennedy, had "so ld -o u t"  h is  m i l i t a r y  p o s i t io n  to  a  p o l i t i c a l  one f o r  
reasons o f p e rso n a l g a in , g lo iy , o r  because o f  "a rm -tw is tin g "  by th e  
P re s id e n t. S en a to r Thurmond asked , "Do you n o t c la s s  y o u rs e lf  in  th e  
ca teg o ry  o f o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  app o in tees  o f th e  P re s id e n t who a re  n o t 
in  th e  m il i ta ry ? "  G eneral T ay lo r answered, "Of course  n o t .  I  am a 
fo u r s t a r  G eneral o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Army, s e le c te d  by th e  P re s id e n t 
t o  be Chairman o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f .  W hatever th a t  i s ,  t h a t  i s  
ny s ta tu s .
S en a to r Thurmond th e n  produced as "proof" th a t  th e  m il i ta r y  
had been "gagged," a  copy o f th e  Freedom P ress  o f S an ta  B arbara,
P e r s o n a l  in te rv ie w  w ith  S en a to r A lb e rt Gore, Democrat from 
Tennessee, O ctober, 1969.
P re p a re d n e s s  Subcommittee, op. c i t . ,  p . 6I 5 .
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C a lifo rn ia ;  s ta t in g  in  h ead lin e s  t h a t  th e  "U.S. M ili ta ry  Told to  
Shutup on N uclear T re a ty ."
G eneral T a y lo r 's  o rd e a l -with th e  "m ilita ry -m inded" S en a to r 
Thurmond ended w ith  an exchange o f id e a s  th a t  summarized th e  ap p ear­
ance o f  th e  m i l i t a r y  b e fo re  th e  h e a r in g s :
SENATOR THURMOND: . . .W ell; I  was very  d isap p o in ted  to  see
th a t  th e  C hiefs have come up w ith  th e  second s ta tem en t. I  
th o u g h t your s ta tem en t in  your f i r s t  p o s i t io n  paper was more 
r e a l i s t i c .  But I  cannot ag ree  w ith  you on t h i s  one.
GENERAL TAYLOR: We th in k  t h i s  one i s  q u ite  a  d i f f e r e n t
s i tu a t io n ;  S en a to r; from th e  com prehensive t e s t  b an .^
G enera l T ay lo r ex p la in ed  th e  d if fe re n c e s  between th e  p o s i t io n
o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f  reg a rd in g  a  com prehensive t r e a ty  and a
lim ite d  t r e a t y .  Under a  com prehensive t r e a t y  th e re  was a  g re a t  danger
o f c la n d e s tin e  t e s t i n g .  Underground t e s t s  were th e  most d i f f i c u l t
t o  d e te c t  and; f o r  t h i s  reaso n ; th e  J o in t  C hiefs were a g a in s t  th e
comprehensive t r e a t y .  Under a  l im ite d  t r e a ty  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  cou ld
t e s t  underground to  prove o u t technology  o f m a tte rs  a lre ad y  g a th e red
in  a tm ospheric  and underw ater t e s t s .  F urtherm ore; our a r t  o f  d e te c tin g
t e s t s  in  th e  atm osphere and underw ater were p e r fe c te d  t o  such a  degree
t h a t  t h i s  was no lo n g e r a  m a tte r  o f  concern t o  th e  m i l i t a r y .^
The su sp ic io n  s t i l l  p e r s i s te d  among th e  S en a to rs  t h a t  th e
second p o s i t io n  o f  th e  J o in t  C hiefs was n o t based upon e n t i r e ly  new
^ I b id . ,  p . 6kh. 
^ I b id . , p . 6k j .
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evidence and a  new t r e a ty ,  b u t was r a th e r  due to  th e  c lo sen ess
o f  G eneral T ay lo r to  P re s id e n t Kennedy and to  th e  p re s su re s  o f
1
th e  S e c re ta ry  o f Defense R obert McNamara.
SENATOR INOUYE; G eneral T ay lo r, I  r e a l iz e  t h a t  you a re  under 
oa th  and you a re  a ls o  a  member o f  th e  m i l i t a r y .  I  donot in  
any way q u estio n  your i n t e g r i t y  o r  y ou r h o n esty . . . .1  hope 
you w i l l  n o t co n sid er t h i s  q u e s tio n  in s u l t in g  in  any way.
In  re c e n t weeks a r t i c l e s  have been w r i t te n  and s ta tem en ts  have 
been made im plying t h a t  members o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  
might no t be com pletely  cand id  and f o r th r ig h t  in  t h e i r  d i s ­
cu ssio n s  w ith  Congress, e s p e c ia l ly  w ith  th e  S en a te , on th e  
T es t Ban T rea ty . So my q u e s tio n  i s ,  have you d i r e c t ly  o r i n ­
d i r e c t ly  re c e iv e d  o rd e rs , d i r e c t io n s ,  o r  su g g estio n s  from your 
su p e r io rs  which in  any way would have in h ib i te d  your testim ony  
b e fo re  t h i s  committee in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty ?
GENERAL TAYIOR: Neb i n  th e  s l i g h t e s t .  And I  would go f u r th e r
and say th a t  I  have been a  member o f  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f  
f o r  fo u r y e a rs  as  Army C hief o f  S t a f f ,  and I  am in  my f i r s t  
y e a r  as Deputy C hief o f S ta f f .  . . .1  have never known th e  
J o in t  C hiefs to  be exposed to  t h i s  k in d  o f  p re s su re  you t a l k  
ab o u t. O bviously, we know how our Commander-in-Chief and our 
S e c re ta ry  a re  o r ie n te d  tow ard c e r ta in  d ir e c t io n s .  But, we a re  
c o n s ta n tly  aware o f th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  J o in t  C h ie fs , as a  body, 
have a  s ta tu to r y  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  to  g iv e  sound ad v ice  and, i f  
we indeed  a re  lo y a l  to  our oa th  o f  o f f ic e ,  we must g ive  adv ice  
as we see  i t . ^
On Thursday, August 15, 19^3, G enera l W heeler o f th e  U nited  
S ta te s  Army appeared b e fo re  th e  subcommittee and supported  th e  p o s i t io n  
o f  G eneral T ay lo r.
The q u estions p u t to  G eneral W heeler by S en a to r Goldwater a re  
im portan t and in te r e s t in g  because o f th e  n a tu re  o f th e  1^64 p r e s i ­
d e n t ia l  campaign and evidence o f  a  " m ili ta ry  m ind."
~*T b id . , p . 625 .
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S en a to r G o ld m te r chaJ-lenged G eneral TO ieeler's s ta tem en t th a t
th e re  were no s id e  agreem ents made a t  Moscow between S e c re ta ry  of
S ta te  Dean Rush and th e  R ussians. G eneral Wheeler in d ic a te d  th a t
th e  s ta tem en ts  o f th e  P re s id e n t, th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te ,  and th e
le g a l  op in ion  th a t  he had o b ta in ed  from th e  Advocate G eneral th a t
th e  U nited  S ta te s  could  u se  atom ic weapons in  th e  course  o f  s e l f -
defense o r  t a c t i c a l  weapons in  Worth Korea o r Vietnam was s a t i s f a c to r y .
S en a to r Goldwater responded t h a t  " I  don’t  tak e  th e  word o f th e
P re s id e n t o r Mr. Rush on t h i s .  . . . Af t e r  an exchange on th e
d if fe re n c e  between a  "com prehensive" and a  " lim ite d "  t r e a ty .  S enator
Goldwater r e s ta te d  h is  fe a rs  t h a t :  ( l )  th e re  was a  consp iracy  to
dep riv e  th e  subcommittee o f th e  m a te r ia l  i t  wanted to  h e a r , i . e . ,
t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  was a  th r e a t  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  and (2) th e  J o in t
C hiefs were ly in g  in  t h e i r  testim ony  and had been m isled  in to  b e lie v in g
th a t  p o l i t i c a l  advantages were more b e n e f ic ia l  th an  th e  m il i t a r y .
G eneral W heeler r e p l ie d  t h a t  he had to ld  th e  S en a to r th e
"ab so lu te  and com plete t r u t h . T h e  G eneral f u r th e r  e la b o ra te d  on
th e  m il i ta r y  advantages o f th e  S in o -S ov ie t s p l i t :
. . . i t  i s  always a  sound m il i ta r y  p r in c ip le  to  d iv id e  your 
enemies i f  you can, o r  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  con tinued  d iv is io n  
between th e  S o v ie ts  and th e  Chinese Communists, t h i s  i s  a  s o l id  
m il i ta r y  ad v an tag e .3
^ Ib id . , p . 658 .
^ Ib id . , - p .  665 .
^I b id . , p . 677 .
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A dm iral McDonald appeared th e  same a fte rn o o n  and gave some­
what th e  same in fo rm atio n  as  had G enerals T ay lor and VJheeler. The 
q u estions and im p lic a tio n s  by th e  S ena to rs  were th e  same, except 
S en a to r S ten n is  in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  subcommittee was beginning  to  
r e a l iz e  th e  s u b s ta n t ia l  d if fe re n c e  between a  l im ite d  t r e a ty  and a  
comprehensive t r e a ty .  But, " i f  you ^ [d m ira l  McDonal^V wish to  f i l e  
something on th e  comprehensive concept o f n u c le a r  t e s t in g  you may do 
s o . " l  Adm iral McDonald d id  n o t ta k e  th e  lu r e ,  b u t upheld  h is  co lleagues 
com pletely .
G eneral C uris E. LeMay o f  th e  A ir  Force was th e  l a s t  o f th e  
J o in t  C hiefs to  t e s t i f y  and, a lthough  he gave a  more q u a lif ie d  s t a t e ­
ment o f  su p p o rt, he made th e  endorsement o f th e  t r e a t y  by th e  J o in t  
C hiefs unanimous. Under th e  same r e le n t le s s  q u estio n in g  by S enators 
G oldw ater, Thurmond, S te n n is , and Jackson , G eneral LéMay adm itted  
th a t  he  was on th e  low-end o f th e  s c a le  as to  optimism regard ing  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  advantages o f th e  t r e a ty .  The p r in c ip a l  reason  he supported  
th e  t r e a ty  was th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  t r e a t y  had been signed  and endorsed 
by a  g re a t number o f n a tio n s . To one o f S en a to r Thurmond’s " in /a n d /o r"  
q u es tio n s . G eneral LeMay s a id  t h a t  in  a l l  p ro b a b i l i ty  he would no t 
have approved th e  t r e a ty  i f  i t  was s t i l l  in  th e  p ro p o sa l s ta g e .^
S enato r Goldwater to ld  th e  G eneral t h a t  "your opinions in  th i s  
f i e l d  a re  more h ig h ly  re sp ec te d  by th e  American people  th an  a l l  th e
^ I b id . , p . TOT. 
^ I b id . ,  p . T5T.
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r e s t  o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs pu t to g e th e r ." ^
With th e  ex cep tion  of th e  r e c a l l  of Adm iral Anderson on 
August 23rd , th e  committee c a l le d  upon a  parade o f r e t i r e d  Amy and 
A ir  Force G enerals known f o r  t h e i r  b i t te r n e s s  tow ard th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f  D efense.2
G eneral (Ehomas S . Power was a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty  and responding 
to  S ena to r llhurmond's " i f /a n d /o r"  q u estio n s  spoke a t  le n g th  on th e  
n e c e s s ity  f o r  t e s t in g  s u rv iv a b i l i ty  o f Minuteman s i lo s ;  s u r v iv a b i l i ty  
o f warhead and re -e n try  v e h ic le s  in  a  n u c lea r environm ent; th e  S o v ie t 
ÈÆ. system  v e rsu s  th e  U nited  S ta te s  ABM system ; and, in  agreement w ith  
Senato r Jackson , minimized th e  th r e a t  o f  " o v e r k i l l ."
R ec a ll o f Adm iral Anderson
The subcommittee r e c a l le d  A dm iral Anderson on August 23rd.
A dm iral Anderson had t e s t i f i e d  e a r l i e r  on th e  m e rits  o f  a  comprehensive 
t e s t  ban t r e a ty .  From th e  remarks o f S en a to r Jackson, i t  was ap p aren t 
th a t  th e  subcommittee expected a  re a f f irm a tio n  o f th e  A dm iral’s e a r l i e r  
p o s it io n  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y .  Admiral Anderson had r e t i r e d  on August 1, 
1963, and was now Ambassador to  Spain; th e re fo re  he d id  nob p a r t i c ip a te  
in  th e  l a t e s t  a p p ra is a l  by th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S t a f f .  He p o in ted  out 
t h a t  h is  testim ony  would be l im ite d  because he d id  n o t have access 
to  c l a s s i f i e d  in fo rm atio n  th a t  th e  J o in t  C hiefs had tdien th ey  considered  
th e  new l im ite d  t r e a ty .  His te stim ony , th e re fo re ,  wou3d be l im ite d  to
^ i d . ,  p . 727 .
^The New York Times (August I 9 , I 963) •
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h is  p e rso n a l o p in io n s . His s ta tem en t went in to  depth  on th e  m i l i t a r y -  
t e c h n i c a l - p o l i t i c a l  im p lic a tio n s  and th e  safeguards n ecessa ry  to  min­
im ize any dangers. His con clu sio n s  came as  a  shock to  th e  S en a to rs : 
"S ub jec t to  th e  fo reg o in g  s t i p u l a t i o n s / ; ^ e  fo u r sa feguards mentioned 
by th e  J o in t  GhiefsX  I  b e lie v e  t h a t  th e  S enate  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
shou ld  r a t i f y  t h i s  t r e a ty ." ^
S en a to r Goldwater was fu r io u s  over th e  A dm ira l’s r e l ia n c e  on 
p o l i t i c a l  f a c to r s  over m i l i t a r y  f a c to r s .  However, Adm iral Anderson 
s ta t e d  th a t :
. . . i f  we do no t ta k e  a  s te p  forw ard a t  t h i s  tim e , we w i l l  
never know w hether any c le a r  avenue la y  ahead which might 
le a d  to  th e  s e tt le m e n t o f  o th e r  is s u e s  which a re  o f  t r a n s ­
cending im portance to  us a l l .  F ran k ly , S en a to r, we a re  
d ea lin g  m ostly  in  th e  a re a  o f  hope as to  th e  r e a l  p o l i t i c a l  
advan tages.
Although Adm iral Anderson re fu se d  to  answer any q u estio n s  
o u ts id e  o f h is  f i e l d ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  th o se  o f a  s c i e n t i f i c  n a tu re , he 
p o in te d  out t h a t  " i t  i s  im p o ssib le  f o r  us in  th e  w orld  in  which we 
l i v e ,  th e  env ironm sit in  which th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S t a f f  l i v e ,  to  
com pletely  d iv o rce  them selves from th e  p o l i t i c a l  and th e  p sy ch o lo g ica l 
and economic f a c to r s .
The l a s t  m i l i ta r y  w itn e sse s  c a l le d  b e fo re  th e  subcomm ittee were 
A dm iral A rle ig h  Burke, r e t i r e d ,  and G enera l Twining. A dm iral Burke was
^ Ib id . , pp. 890-894 . 
^ Ib id . , p . 896 . 
^ I b id . , p . 915*
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a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty  and so was G eneral Twining, h u t G eneral Twining 
to ld  th e  committee t h a t  " p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  have to  he con­
s id e re d .
S c ie n t i s t s  and th e  Subcommittee
The P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee c a l le d  th e  fo llo w in g  
s c i e n t i s t s  to  t e s t i f y :  Dr. M orris E. B radbury, D ire c to r  o f th e  Los 
Alamos S c ie n t i f i c  L abora to ry , U. S . Atomic Energy Commission; Dr.
H arold  Brown, D ire c to r  o f D efense Research and E ng ineering , D epart­
ment o f Defense and form erly  o f  th e  s t a f f  a t  th e  Liverm ore L abora to ry  
where Dr. John P o s te r  was h is  su p e r io r ; Dr. John F o s te r  J r . ,  D ire c to r , 
Lawrence R ad ia tio n  L abora tory ; Dr. W illiam  0 . P o s te r ,  D ire c to r , U n ited  
S ta te s  Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency; Dr. L eland  J .  Haworth, 
Commissioner, U. S . Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. F ra n k lin  A. Long, 
A ss is ta n t D ire c to r , Science and Technology, U. S . Arms C o n tro l and 
Disarmament Agency; and Dr. Edward T e l le r ,  U n iv e rs ity  o f  C a l ifo rn ia .
The testim ony  o f th e  s c i e n t i s t s  i s  in fo rm a tio n a l to  t h i s  s tu d y  
fo r  two re a so n s : ( l )  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tu d e s  o f  th e  S en ato rs  and (2 ) 
th e  d if fe re n c e s  between th e  Livermore and th e  Los Alamos L a b o ra to rie s  
as a  c o n tin u a tio n  o f th e  s p l i t  between th e  F in i te  and th e  I n f i n i t e ^ 
S ch o o ls ' a t t i t u d e s  tow ard disarmament and th e  p ro p o s it io n  t h a t  two 
o r more s c i e n t i s t s  u s in g  th e  same in fo rm atio n  may a r r iv e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
co n c lu s io n s , depending on t h e i r  p e rso n a l o r ie n ta t io n .
^ u p r a .  C hapter IX.
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W illiam  C. F o s te r , D ire c to r 
Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency
Dr. W illiam  C. F o s te r , Arms C ontro l and Disarmament Agency 
D ire c to r , was c a l le d  b e fo re  th e  subcommittee on May T, I 963, a lm ost 
a  f u l l  month b e fo re  P re s id e n t Kennedy’s speech a t  American U n iv e rs ity . 
As a  consequence, he and th e  S en a to rs  were d iscu ss in g  th e  compre­
h en siv e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  t h a t  was l a t e r  r e je c te d  a t  Moscow.
I t  ■was ev id en t from  th e  very  f i r s t  t h a t  th e  S en a to rs  o f  th e  
subcommittee s t i l l  regarded  Dr. F o s te r 's  Agency as be ing  u n accep t­
a b le  because o f th e  b a t t l e  th e  S enato rs  had l o s t  in  I 961 over th e  
e stab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency. The u su a l 
custom i s  to  a llow  a  -witness to  re a d  an opening s ta tem en t -without 
being  in te r ru p te d .  In  th e  case o f Dr. F o s te r  t h i s  -was n o t to  be 
a llow ed . Dr. F o s te r 's  p o s i t io n  was based  very  h e a v ily  on th a t  o f  
Dr. H arold  Brown o f  th e  Department o f  D efense. S en a to r Symington 
o b jec ted  v e iy  s tro n g ly  to  t h i s  and a ttem pted  to  d i s c r e d i t  Dr. Bro-wn's 
e x p e r t is e  by say ing :
. . . I f  you a re  basin g  your p o s i t io n  e n t i r e ly  on sta tem en ts  
by Dr. Brown, we should  know th a t  q u a l i f ie d  peop le  d isag ree  
-with Dr. Brown. P eople a t  l e a s t . a s  a b le  in  t h i s  f i e l d  o f 
n u c le a r  ph y sics  com pletely  d isag ree  w ith  Dr. Brown. . . .
There a re  o th e r  n u c le a r  p h y s ic is ts  who a re  w il l in g  to  come 
b e fo re  tM s  committee and s t a t e  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  on th e se  
m a tte rs .
^P reparedness Subcommittee, op. c i t . ,  pp . I 8 -3O.
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Dr. Brown had fo rm erly  been a t  Livermore L abora to ry , which was 
dominated by s c i e n t i s t s  o f  th e  I n f i n i t e  schoo l, b u t had changed 
h is  p o s i t io n  to  t h a t  o f th e  F in i te  schoo l.
S en a to r Thurmond's q u estio n in g  was more d i r e c t  and to  th e  
p o in t .  He d id  n o t l i k e  S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense MacNamara, no r th e  
S e c re ta ry 's  a ttem p t to  e x e r t c iv i l i a n  c o n tro l over th e  m i l i t a r y  in  
th e  Pentagon. He asked  Dr. F o s te r  i f  he was aware th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l 
C hiefs o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  were opposed to  th e  comprehensive 
t e s t  ban t r e a ty .  . .So your sta tem en t Dr. F o s te r  i s  based  on 
adv ice  o f th e  S e c re ta ry  o f Defense and n o t on th e  m i l i t a r y  p e o p le ."^
Dr. F o s te r  a ttem p ted  to  answer th e  S en a to r t h a t  i t  was th e  
p o lic y  o f  th e  Arms C on tro l and Disarmament Agency to  co n su lt th e  
head o f every departm ent concerned fo r  ad v ice . Dr. F o s te r 's  exp la­
n a tio n  was in te r ru p te d  by S en a to r Thurmond's in s ta n c e  th a t  th e  th re e  
se rv ic e s  heads had n o t been co n su lted  se p a ra te ly  f o r  t h e i r  o p in io n s. 
Chairman S ten n is  rem inded S en a to r Thurmond th a t  Dr. F o s te r  could n o t 
g iv e  th e  th in k in g  o f  o th e r  men.
S en a to r Symington asked Dr. F o s te r  about th e  s e c u r i ty  o f  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  under a  comprehensive t e s t  ban t r e a t y .  Dr. F o s te r  
responded th a t  he had follow ed th e  g u id e lin e s  s e t  up by Congress and 
th e  E xecutive Order f o r  making d e c is io n s . S en a to r Symington r e je c te d  
th e se  p rocedures which in c lu d ed  th e  Atomic Energy Commission and th e  
in te l l ig e n c e  ap p ara tu s  o f th e  C en tra l In te l l ig e n c e  Agency and th e  
adv ice  o f th e  Committee on P r in c ip le s  in  th e  ACDA. " I have ta lk e d
^ Ib id ., p . 29.
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to  persons who I  b e lie v e  know more about s e c u r i ty  th an  any o th e r 
people  in  th e  w o rld .” From testim ony  tak en  l a t e  in  August i t  was 
ev id en t th a t  S en a to r Symington was r e f e r r in g  to  Dr. Edward T e l le r ,  
who based h is  o p p o s itio n  to  th e  t r e a ty  in  p a r t  t o  h is  la c k  o f 
t r u s t  in  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  in te l l ig e n c e  during  h is  
ro le  in  th e  development o f th e  atom ic bomb.
From t h i s  exchange th e  l in e s  were drawn between th e  F in i te  
and I n f i n i t e  schools o f  atomic s c i e n t i s t s . ^
Livermore v e rsu s  Los A.lamos
The most in fo rm ativ e  and p ro d u c tiv e  testim ony  was g iven  on 
August 1, 1963,  when Dr. John F o s te r , D ire c to r  o f th e  Livermore 
L aborato ry  and Dr. N orris  E. Bradbury, D ire c to r  o f th e  Los Alamos 
S c ie n t i f ic  L aboratory  appeared b e fo re  th e  committee.
Dr. F o s te r  le d  o f f  th e  h ea rin g s  w ith  a  s ta tem en t o f  th e  
p o s i t io n  o f  th e  Liverm ore L abora to ry . The la b o ra to ry  a t  Liverm ore 
had in  th e  p a s t  devoted more th a n  o n e -h a lf  o f  i t s  t o t a l  e f f o r t  to  
th e  problem  o f n u c lea r  ex p lo siv es  and t h e i r  a p p lic a t io n  to  m il i t a r y  
pu rposes. The key to  success a t  Livermore c o n s is te d  in  o b ta in in g  
and r e ta in in g  people  w il l in g  to  work on such p ro je c ts  and a  t e s t  
ban would "put t h e i r  s k i l l s  on th e  s h e l f ."  This "sh e lv in g "  had 
accompanied th e  1958- I 96O m oratorium . Both Dr. F o s te r  and Dr. Edward 
T e l le r  were "extrem ely anxious to  move ahead as f a s t  as  p o s s ib le ." ^
% u p ra . C hapter I I .
^Preparedness Subcommittee, op. c i t . ,  p . 395*
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From a  p u re ly  p o l i t i c a l  view . Dr. F o s te r 's  most im portan t 
s ta tem en t was;
During re c e n t y ea rs  i t  i s  becoming more and more d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  th e  la b o ra to ry  to  a t t r a c t  good young s c i e n t i f i c  t a l e n t  
ou t o f c o lle g e . These peop le  a re  more and more g e t t in g  th e  
op in ion  th a t  we a re  in  a  shady b u s in e ss , an e f f o r t  t h a t  could  
w e ll le a d  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  in to  a  h o lo c a u s t. And so as  I  
read  th e  t r e a ty  and e s p e c ia l ly  th e  pream ble, and i f  th a t  
t r e a ty  goes in to  e f f e c t  and our people  have to  l iv e  under th a t  
t r e a ty ,  I  f e e l  t h a t  th e  p u b lic  o p in io n , and p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  
op in ions o f  th e  young peop le  whom we t r y  t o  b r in g  to  th e  la b o r­
a to ry  w i l l  be much more s tro n g ly  o r ie n te d  a g a in s t  working on 
th e  weapons program th a n  th e y  c u r re n tly  a r e . l
Amazingly enough, a f t e r  a  d iscu ss io n  o f th e  l im i ta t io n s  o f  a
t e s t  ban , he cou ld  make no su g g es tio n  f o r  th e  m aintenance o f th e
s k i l l s  o f h is  peop le  w ith o u t f u r th e r  n u c le a r  experiem en ts .
Dr. Bradbury o f Los Alamos th e n  took  th e  s ta n d  and p o in ted
out th a t  w h ile  h is  remarks would be s im ila r  in  te c h n ic a l  d e ta i l ,
th ey  would be d i f f e r e n t  in  in te r p r e ta t io n .  To p la ce  h is  remarks in
p ro p e r p e rs p e c tiv e , he p o in te d  ou t th e  p rim ary  d if fe re n c e s  between
th e  Los Alamos L aborato ry  and th e  Liverm ore L abora to ry .
The f i r s t  atom ic bomb was developed a t  Los Alamos and by th e
tim e t h a t  th ey  r e a l iz e d  th a t  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  had th e  bomb, Los Alamos
s c i e n t i s t s  came t o  th e  conclusion  t h a t  th e y  were in  a  v ery  unique
p o s i t io n .  While developing n u c lea r  weapons th ey  a ls o  hoped th a t
"someday someone would f in d  a  way to  g e t o u t o f  th e  problem  o f
n u c lea r w ar."  From th a t  p o in t on th e  Los Alamos L aborato ry  sought
^ b i d . , p .  396 .
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to  broaden th e  base  o f th e  l a b o r a to iy 's  work and a c t i v i t y .  The 
la b o ra to ry  s t a r t e d  to  look  f o r  a  number o f  o th e r  p e a c e fu l a p p l i ­
c a tio n s  o f  atom ic energy, n u c le a r  weaponry fu s io n  power, and p ro ­
grams in  b io lo g y  and m edicine.
In  c o n tr a s t ,  th e  Liverm ore L abora to ry  was e s ta b lis h e d  a t  
th e  in s is te n c e  o f  Dr. T e l le r  on a  ve ry  fundam ental assum ption, 
p o s s ib ly  a  c o r re c t  assum ption, th a t  i t s  b a s ic  o b je c t iv e  was 
to  develop n u c le a r  weapons because th e re  was more g o ld  in  
thoæ  h i l l s  so to  speak , th an  th e  la b o ra to ry  a t  Los Alamos 
was by i t s e l f  a b le  to  f in d .^
Because o f  t h i s  d iv e r s i f i c a t io n  th e  Los Alamos L abora to ry  
was now in  b e t t e r  shape t o  w ith s tan d  th e  im pact o f a  p a ir t ia l  o r  
com plete t e s t  ban . Dr. Bradbury saw no d i f f i c u l ty  in  r e c r u i t in g  and 
re ta in in g  peop le  f o r  th e  la b o ra to ry  a t  Los Alamos.
Dr. Bradbury agreed  th a t  th e  R ussians had a  s l i g h t  s u p e r io r i ty  
over th e  U n ited  S ta te s  in  th e  "very , v e ry  la r g e - y ie ld  w eapons,” b u t 
we were ahead o f th e  R ussians in  th e  a re a  o f  sm a lle r system s. Dr. 
Bradbury was r e l a t iv e ly  c e r ta in  t h a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  cou ld  m ain ta in  
i t s  p re s e n t s u p e r io r i ty  and, in  f a c t ,  develop a  la rg e  b u t crude m u lti- 
megaton weapon underground.
During th e  m oratorium  th a t  Dr. F o s te r  had m entioned as  be ing  
a  d i s a s te r  to  th e  la b o ra to ry  a t  Liverm ore, Dr. Bradbury s a id  t h a t  
th e  Los Alamos L aborato ry  regarded  th e  m oratorium  as a  ch a llen g e  to  
see  what th e y  cou ld  do in  a  p e a c e fu l manner, and as a  r e s u l t  th e  
la b o ra to ry  grew.
^ Ib id . , p . kOk. Emphasis su p p lie d .
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S en a to r Jackson o f Washington was th e  f i r s t  o f th e  committee 
to  re a c t  to  Dr. B radbury 's  s ta tem en ts  th a t  w ith  underground t e s t in g  
we could  m ain ta in  our s u p e r io r i ty  and th a t  th e  b u s in ess  o f n u c lea r  
s c i e n t i s t s  was to  p u t n u c le a r  weapons ou t o f b u s in e ss . Dr. Bradbury 
d id  n o t respond as S en a to r Jackson would have d e s ire d  th a t  he would. 
Dr. Bradbury had a ls o  s ta t e d  th a t  Los Alamos made weapons "not be­
cause we l ik e  to  k i l l  p eo p le . We make them only because we b e lie v e
in  some way i t  w i l l  g iv e  th e  coun try  s tre n g th  t o  n e g o tia te ,  to  f in d  a
1
way ou t o f war in  g e n e ra l ."  The h igh  y ie ld  weapons so much d e s ire d  
by S en a to r Jackson, G oldw ater, e t .  a l . ,  were "psy ch o lo g ica l"  weapons. 
"They a r e  mass d e s tru c tio n  weapons and our normal m i l i t a r y  o b je c tiv e s
O
a re  to  f ig h t  a  war and p u t t h a t  coun try  back to g e th e r  ag a in . S enato r 
Symington u l t im a te ly  answered t h i s  p o s i t io n  w ith : "He who g e ts  th e re  
f a s t e s t  w ith  th e  m ostest w in s ."3
W hile Dr. F o s te r  and Bradbury agreed  on d e t a i l s ,  th ey  d isag reed  
on co n c lu s io n s . Dr. F o s te r  w anted con tinued  t e s t in g  in  th e  atmosphere 
w h ile  Dr. Bradbury contended th a t  we had accom plished a l l  we cou ld  
by th i s  manner o f t e s t i n g  and f u r th e r  knowledge cou ld  be gained  from 
underground t e s t i n g .  F urtherm ore, i f  th e  fo u r  safeguards suggested  
by th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  were c a r r ie d  o u t, th e re  would be no r i s k
^ Ib id .
^ I b id . , p . 1+0 9 . 
3 lb id . , p . 421.
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to  th e  U nited  S ta te s .  The a t t i t u d e  o f S en a to r Jackson was: "Speaking 
o f t r e a t i e s ,  I  th in k  we may need two t r e a t i e s  i f  we adopt th e  t r e a ty  
t h a t  i s  to  be subm itted . I  th in k  we might w e ll have a  t r e a ty  be­
tween Congress and th e  E x ecu tiv e ,"  to  a ssu re  th e  E xecu tive  would 
c a rry  out th e  sa feg u a rd s .
Both s c i e n t i s t s  agreed  th a t  th e  danger o f f a l l o u t  was m inim al, 
b u t S enato r Jackson suggested  i t  m ight be b e n e f ic ia l .  Both ag reed  
th a t  th e  a n t i - b a l l i s t i c  m is s i le  system  could  be developed underground 
w ithou t t e s t in g  in  th e  atm osphere. Dr. Bradbury p o in te d  out t h a t  r e ­
l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  ABM system  was n o t a  q u estio n  o f b la ck  and w h ite . I t  
was n o t necessa ry  to  t e s t  p a r t i c u la r  warheads fo r  b a l l i s t i c  defense 
in  th e  atm osphere, because t h i s  could  be accom plished underground.
Dr. Bradbury made th e  most p re c e p tiv e  sta tem en t n ea r th e  end 
o f h is  testim ony  t h a t  a p t ly  d esc rib ed  th e  l im ite d  t e s t  ban t r e a ty :
". . .A c tu a lly  i t  i s  more o f an agreement to  t e s t  underground.
S en a to r Inouye rep ea ted  th e  p rev ious q u estio n  th a t  he had p u t 
t o  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  as to  w hether o r n o t th ey  had been fo rced  
to  g ive  one-sided  testim ony  " e i th e r  by in s t r u c t io n s ,  su g g es tio n s , o rd e rs  
o r d ire c t iv e s  made by th e  P re s id e n t o r o th e r  h igh  o f f i c i a l s . "3 Both 
s c i e n t i s t s  answered "no ."
S enato r Goldwater appeared a t  th e  q u estio n in g  on August 2 , 1963, 
which was th e  second day f o r  Dr. Bradbury and Dr. F o s te r .  Dr. Bradbury
^ Ib id . , p . 425 . 
2 lb id .
3 lb id . , p . 468.
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was th e  o b je c t o f  h is  q u estions and he wanted to  know how Dr.
Bradbury could  be so su re  th a t  weapons w i l l  work u n le ss  th ey  a re  
te s t e d  in  t h e i r  environm ent. "Someday you have t o  t r o t  th e  device 
out and t r y  i t ,  w hether i t  i s  a  .22 c a l ib e r  b u l le t  o r  a  100 megaton 
w arhead." Dr. Bradbury s a id  th a t  in  h is  opin ion  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
had t e s t e d  e n o u ^ t .  " I f  weapons cou ld  be developed w ithou t t e s t in g  
th en  what about our own s i lo s  co n ta in in g  Minutemen m is s i le s ? "  Dr. 
F o s te r  answered f o r  Dr. Bradbury by rem inding S en a to r Goldwater th a t  
Minutemen s i lo s  a re  lo c a te d  in  popu la ted  a re a s  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
where few would ag ree  to  conduct, much le s s  p a r t i c ip a te  in ,  such 
t e s t in g .  Most c e r ta in ly  th e  R ussians would n o t be w il l in g  to  a llow  
us to  t e s t  on one o f t h e i r  s h e l te r s  o r s i l o s .^
S enato r Symington in tro d u ced  in to  th e  re c o rd  a  s ta tem en t by 
Dr. Edward T e l le r  to  Congress, which in  essence s a id  t h a t  we were 
behind th e  R ussians and were ap t to  f a l l  f u r th e r  beh ind  i f  we d id  n o t 
con tinue  to  t e s t  i n  a l l  e lem en ts. Dr. Bradbury c a l le d  th e  s ta tem en t 
" too broad in  i t s  g e n e r a l i t ie s "  and d id  n o t ag ree  w ith  th e  s ta tem en t 
in  g e n e ra l. Dr. P o s te r  d id  ag ree  w ith  i t  in  i t s  g e n e r a l i t i e s .  From 
t h i s  p o in t in  th e  h earin g s  th e  l in e s  were c le a r ly  drawn between th e  
F in i te  schoo l o f  containm ent and th e  I n f i n i t e  sch o o l as re p re se n te d  by 
Dr. F o s te r , Edward T e l le r  and th e  e n t i r e  subcom m ittee. I n  a d d itio n . 
S enato r Goldwater was a c tin g  as  Chairman in  S en a to r S te n n is ' p la c e .
~4cb id ., p. 489.
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S en a to r G oldw ater 's q u estio n s  were fo re ru n n e rs  o f  h is  1^6k
P r e s id e n t ia l  Campaign. The S en a to r from A rizona wanted t o  know
from Dr. Bradbury what would happen:
. . . i f  we found th a t  we had to  use  a  t a c t i c a l  n u c le a r  
weapon o f v e ry , v e ry , lo w -y ie ld . Would th a t  c o n s t i tu te  
a  n u c le a r  explosion? Then assume th a t  we decided  to  
d e fo l ia te  a r a in  f o r e s t  and u sed  a  very  lo w -y ie ld  atom ic 
weapon. Wo humans a re  k i l l e d .  We m erely ta k e  th e  leav es  
o f f  th e  t r e e s  f o r  b e t t e r  f i r e  c o n tro l .
Dr. Bradbury r e p l ie d  th a t  he su sp ec ted  th a t  R ussia  would re g a rd
i t  as b e in g  a  n u c le a r  o r atom ic ex p lo sio n .
Wear th e  end o f  th e  day Sera t o r  Jackson asked Dr. Bradbury
i f  he had e n o u ^  in fo rm ation  : to  come to  adequate  co n clu sio n s  in
th i s  f i e l d  in  th e  l i g h t  t h a t  Dr. P o s te r  had d isag ree d  w ith  him.
In  a d d it io n . Dr. T e l le r ,  Dr. B radbury 's  form er su p e r io r  a t  Los
Alamos, was in  d isagreem ent. Dr. B radbury 's  answer cou ld  be
used  as a  summary o f th e  problems th e  P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g
Subcommittee was having in  conducting  i t s  in v e s t ig a t io n .  Dr.
Bradbury s ta te d :
S en a to r Jackson , I  th in k  th e  answer to  th e  q u estio n  i s  
"y e s ."  Dr. T e l l e r 's  q u estio n  would be "n o ."  Dr. F o s te r  
can make h is  own answ er. And t h i s  i s  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f 
th e  d if fe re n c e  o f o p in io n  o f  p eo p le . We a l l  look  a t  th e  
same s e t  o f  f a c t s ,  and wecome to  d i f f e r e n t  op in ions about 
t h e i r  re lev an ce , in te r p r e ta t io n  and im portance.
^ Ib id . , p . 525. 
^ Ib id . , p . 536.
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Dr. Edward T e l le r
Dr. Edward T e l le r  appeared  b e fo re  th e  subcomm ittee on two 
d i f f e r e n t  o ccasio n s, August 12t h  and August l6 th .  On August 12t h ,
Dr. T e l le r  was q u estioned  e x te n s iv e ly  by S en a to rs  S te n n is  and 
Symington a f t e r  Dr. T e l le r  s ta te d  c a te g o r ic a l ly  t h a t  he was opposed 
to  th e  t r e a t y  and l i s t e d  th e  m i l i t a r y  d isadvan tages o f  th e  t e s t  
ban t r e a t y .  The subcommittee r e l i e d  p r im a r i ly  on Dr. T e l l e r 's  adv ice  
and th e re fo re  th e  fo llo w in g  reaso n s t h a t  Dr. T e l le r  gave opposing 
th e  t r e a t y  a re  im p o rtan t:
1 . The t r e a ty  cannot be com pletely  p o lic e d .
2 . The t r e a ty  w i l l  perm it th e  R ussians to  r e t a in  t h e i r  ad­
van tage  in  m ultim egaton e x p lo s iv e s . With th e  h e lp  o f space 
t e s t i n g  th e  R ussians may even in c re a se  t h i s  advantage.
3 . The t r e a ty  w i l l  i n h i b i t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  t e s t s  d e le te d  
to  v e r i f y  th e  hardness o f  our m is s i le  s i t e s .  The USSR on 
th e  o th e r  hand, can p roceed  w ith  such ex p erim en ts .
4 . The t r e a ty  w i l l  impede th e  development o f  m is s i le  defense  
i n  th e  U n ited  S ta te s .  T h is . . . i s  perhaps th e  most im portan t 
p o in t .  A corresponding  in h ib i t io n  in  R ussia  w i l l  be very  
much l e f f  e f f e c t iv e .
5 . The t r e a ty  i s  ambiguous w ith  re s p e c t to  th e  use  o f  "Plow­
sh a re"  o u ts id e  th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s .  This may
g ive  th e  R ussians a  p o s s ib i l i t y  to  in te rv e n e  in  our d ea lin g s  
w ith  f r ie n d ly  o r  n e u t r a l  n a t io n s .
6 . The language o f th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  a p p a ren tly  p ro h ib i ts  
th e  use  o f  n u c le a r  ex p lo siv es  in  l im ite d  c o n f l ic t s  o u ts id e  
th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  u n le ss  3 months n o tic e
has been served  in  advance. Thus b ad ly  needed prompt response 
t o  ag g re ss io n  m ight be in h ib i te d .
7 . The t r e a ty  e re c ts  a  new b a r r i e r  a g a in s t  our co o p era tio n  
w ith  ou r a l l i e s  in  th e  a re a  o f  p rep a red n ess, p a r t i c u la r ly  in  
m is s i le  de fen se .
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8 . E xcessive c au tio n  in  in te r p r e t in g  th e  t r e a ty  in  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  may le a d  t o  sev ere  l im ita t io n s  on fu tu re  de­
velopm ents. In  t h i s  way p ro g ress  i s  impeded and we d ep rive  
o u rse lv es  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  which might a cq u ire  g re a t im portance 
in  th e  fu tu r e .
Dr. T e l le r  had always been c o n s is ta n t ly  opposed to  any form o f  t e s t  
ban. He was th e  prim e mover f o r  an a c c e le ra te d  program to  develop 
therm onuclear weapons which was u l t im a te ly  tu rn ed  down by th e  Atomic 
Energy Commission upon th e  recommendation o f Dr. R obert Oppenheimer. 
This d e c is io n  was u l t im a te ly  used  by Dr. T e l le r  a g a in s t  Dr. Oppenheimer 
to  remove any o p p o s itio n  to  f u r th e r  t e s t i n g .  Dr. T e l le r  was a ls o  
opposed to  any te c h n ic a l  agreem ent by th e  E ast and West r e s u l t in g  
ou t o f  th e  Conference o f  E xperts in  1958 and he opposed th e  moratoriums 
o f 1958 and 1961.2
An a r t i c l e  th a t  appeared th e  th e  Washington P o s t th e  day b efo re  
Dr. T e l l e r 's  testim ony  p re d ic te d  th a t  Dr. T e l le r  would oppose th e  
t r e a ty ,  b u t s e r io u s ly  qu estio n ed  why Dr. T e lle r  had s ta te d  in  I96O 
th a t  a l l  n ecessa ry  weapons development cou ld  be conducted underground 
and was now c a l l in g  on con tinued  t e s t in g  in  th e  atm osphere. Dr.
T e l le r  s a id  in  e f f e c t  th a t  in  1959 and i960 he d id  n o t " p a r t ic u la r ly  
b e lie v e  in  a n t im is s i le  work. I  t h o u ^ t  i t  was to o  d i f f i c u l t . "  Under 
th e  im pact o f  R ussian su ccesses and a d d i t io n a l  d iscu ss io n s  how i t  
could  be done, he now concluded th a t  i t  was f e a s ib le .  He e lab o ra te d  
on a  p rev ious p o in t t h a t  was to  become in c re a s in g ly  im p o rtan t.
^ Ib id . , p . 5U5.
^The Hew York Times (August 25, I9 6 3 ) .
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"Reviewing th e  h i s to r y  o f my p a s t  s c i e n t i f i c  p re d ic tio n s  , I  can 
t e l l  you th a t  I  do n o t th in k  I  was wrong in  a  s in g le  case  when I  
s a id  th a t  something cou ld  he done. . . .1  d id  n o t change my mind 
because o f th e  p re se n t s i tu a t io n ,  b u t because o f a d d it io n a l  ev id en ce ."^
On August 10, 1963, Drew Pearson in  th e  W ashington P ost s a id  
t h a t  i t  was re v e a le d  during  th e  Senate  debate  on Adm iral Lewis 
S trau ss  th a t  Dr. T e l le r  was be ing  p a id  by b ig  defense  c o n tra c to rs  
a t  th e  r a t e  o f  $1 , 000.00  a  day, and he had re c e iv e d  $20 , 000.00  so 
f a r  t h a t  y e a r . H is b ig g e s t  c l i e n t  was G eneral Dynamics, one o f
p
th e  to p  defense c o n tra c to rs  in  th e  n a tio n . Dr. T e l le r  in d ic a te d  
th a t  i f  Mr. Pearson was c a l le d  to  g iv e  t h i s  in fo rm atio n  under oath  
th a t  Mr. Pearson would p e r ju re  h im se lf .
Dr. T e l le r  had t e s t i f i e d  b e fo re  bo th  committees alm ost sim ul­
tan eo u sly  and i t  was ev id en t th a t  he  had a  low e s tim a te  o f our a r t  
o f in te l l ig e n c e .  He s p e c i f ic a l ly  p o in te d  ou t th a t  in  19^9 our i n ­
te l l ig e n c e  d id  n o t p r e d ic t  t h a t  th e  R ussians would have a  n u c lea r 
weapon in  19^9 * S en a to r Symington, f o r  some reaso n , as  d id  S enato r 
S te n n is , f e l t  t h a t  Dr. T e l le r  needed t h e i r  d efense  by loud p ra is e  o f 
th e  wisdom o f Dr. T e l le r .  However, i t  should  be p o in te d  ou t th a t  
during th e  y ears  m entioned, by most e s tim a te s , our in te l l ig e n c e  
g a th e rin g  ap para tu s was in  i t s  in fan cy  and Dr. T e l le r  had "top c le a r ­
ance" and was p r iv y  to  any in fo rm atio n  th a t  was a v a i la b le  reg ard in g  the  
development o f atom ic energy.
P re p a re d n e s s  Subcommittee, op. c i t . ,  pp . 579- 580 . 
^ Ib id . , p . 566.
110
Dr. T e l l e r 's  s ta tem en ts  b e fo re  b o th  committees were punc tuated
w ith  m isgivings reg a rd in g  th e  in te l l ig e n c e  s e rv ic e , and in  g e n e ra l
t h i s  seemed to  be th e  prim ary concern and  m ainstay  o f h is  arguments
a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty .
I  understand  th a t  our in te l l ig e n c e  has been g re a t ly  s tren g th en ed . 
Y et, I  con tin u e  to  be im pressed and w o rried  about th e  f a c t  t h a t  
th e  s ta tem en ts  concern ing  ou r s a f e ty  a re  based  on in te l l ig e n c e  
d a ta  which in  th e  p a s t  have f a i l e d  to  p re d ic t  dangers in  many 
im portan t in s ta n c e s .^
S enato r Symington b r o u ^ t  up an in te r e s t in g  p o in t to  Dr. T e l le r
in  th e  form o f a  q u estio n  as to  why Dr. H arold  Brovm, D ire c to r o f
Research and E ng ineering , Department o f  D efense, and who had been
on th e  S ta f f  o f th e  Lawrence R ad ia tio n  L aborato ry  from 1952 th rough
1961 as a s s i s t a n t  to  Dr. T e l le r  a t  L iverm ore, shou ld  be supporting
th e  p re se n t t r e a ty .  S en a to r Symington s ta te d ;
How th e  m ystery to  me i s  how two peop le  who have worked t o ­
g e th e r  and been so c lo se  to g e th e r  in  t h i s  f i e l d  can never th e  
le s s  be so f a r  a p a r t  in  co n c lu s io n s .^
ly  re p ly  Dr. T e l le r  gave a  su c c in c t answer th a t  was c lo s e r  t o  th e
t r u th  th an  he or th e  committee im agined:
There i s  one sim ple answer which I  w i l l  make and th e  com pli­
ca ted  answer which I  w i l l  t r y  to  make.
The sim ple answer i s  . . .1  d o n 't  know.
I  can t r y  t o  answer in  a  more com plicated  way and I  w i l l  
a ttem pt i t ,  b u t I  am guessing  h e re .
We a re  ta lk in g  about qu estio n s  which a re  in te r tw in e d  w ith  
te c h n ic a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  problem s, b u t th e y  a re  in te r tw in e d  
w ith  p o l i t i c a l  and em otional problems as w e ll .
^ i d . ,  p . 765. 
^ Ib id . , p . 772 .
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The q u estio n  who i s  ahead^and who i s  behind  and f o r  th a t  
reason  i s  based on guess.
Dr. T e lle r  had been c a l le d  back to  th e  subcommittee on 
August l 6t h  to  s p e c i f ic a l ly  r e fu te  S e c re ta ry  o f Defense McHamara's 
testim ony  b e fo re  th e  Senate F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee reg a rd in g  
th e  v u ln e r a b i l i ty  o f our Minuteman s i t e s  and th e  q u estio n  o f  b a l l i s t i c  
m is s i le  defense . Dr. T e l le r  r e t r a c te d  h is  s ta tem en t t h a t  i t  was 
g e n e ra lly  assumed th a t  th e  R ussians were ahead o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
on m is s i le  d e fen se . He r e t r a c te d  h is  s ta tem en t due to  th e  o ver­
whelming disagreem ent by h is  co lle ag u es  and ex p erts  in  t h i s  f i e l d .
Dr. H arold  Brown a tta ck e d  Dr. T e l l e r 's  d e p re c ia tio n  o f  in te l l ig e n c e
re p o r ts  because o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  Dr. T e l le r  had n o t seen a l l  th e
2
in te l l ig e n c e  r e p o r ts .  At t h i s  ju n c tu re  Dr. T e l le r ,  by h is  own
adm ission s ta te d ;
I  do n o t happen to  have c lea ra n c e  fo r  in te l l ig e n c e  in fo rm atio n  
and th e re fo re  you should  r e a l i z e  t h a t  w h ile  I  am inform ed 
about th e  g en era l in te l l ig e n c e  e s tim a te , and w h ile  in  my 
te c h n ic a l  d iscu ss io n s  I  have developed some f e e l in g  more o r 
le s s  v a l id  about th e  p robab le  s i tu a t io n ,  I  do n o t have access 
to  th e  d e ta i le d  way in  which th e s e  in te l l ig e n c e  e s tim a te s  have 
been developed.^
S en a to r Symington in d ic a te d  h is  a p p re c ia tio n  th a t  Dr. T e l le r  
had adm itted  t h a t  he  d id  n o t have access  to  c l a s s i f i e d  in fo rm atio n  
and th a t  th e  persons who favored  th e  t r e a ty  d id  have u p - to -d a te
^ Ib id .
% he New York Times (November 22 , I9 6 3 ) . 
P re p a re d n e s s  Subcommittee, op. c i t . ,  p . "jôk.
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in fo rm atio n , i . e . .  D octors Brown, F o s te r  and Bradbury. S en a to r 
Symington asked Dr. T e l le r  i f  he would l i k e  to  have c lea ra n c e  to  
th e  same in fo rm atio n . Dr. T e l le r  in d ic a te d  th a t  he would and i f  
he found any d if fe re n c e s  f o r  a  change in  hi s testim ony  he would do 
so . There i s  no f u r th e r  in fo rm atio n  in  re g a rd  to  t h i s  m a tte r .
R eprise
The rem ainder o f th e  w itn e sse s  c a l le d  b e fo re  th e  Armed 
S e rv ice s  Subcommittee seemed to  have been chosen because o f  t h e i r  
" a n t i - t r e a ty "  b ia s  o r e ls e  to  support th e  ap p aren t h o s t i l i t y  o f 
th e  subcommittee members tow ards th e  Pentagon and S e c re ta ry  o f  
Defense R obert McNamara's p o l i c i e s .^  A dm iral Lewis S tra u s s , w h ile  
no t opposing th e  t r e a t y ,  gave th e  committee la rg e ly  n e g a tiv e  t e s t i ­
mony. The form er members o f  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f ,  Adm irals 
Burke, Radford and G eneral Twining, w h ile  a d m ittin g  th a t  th ey  d id  
no t have c u rre n t in te l l ig e n c e  re p o r ts  o r in fo rm atio n  to  support 
t h e i r  view s, gave n e g a tiv e  te stim o n y  and exp ressed  grave m isgiv ings 
tow ard th e  t r e a ty .
P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee R eport
On September 9 ; 19^3, th e  Senate  Committee on Armed F o rces , 
P rep a re d n ess .In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee, is su e d  i t s  r e p o r t .2 This
"kche New York Times (A ugust, I9 6 3 ).
% ee  Appendix "c" f o r  a  com plete a n a ly s is  o f  advantages and d i s ­
advantages o f  th e  T es t Ban T rea ty .
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r e p o r t  came s ix  days a f t e r  th e  S enate  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee 
is su e d  i t s  fa v o ra b le  re p o r t  on th e  T es t Ban T rea ty . The subcommittee 
had met a t  v a r io u s  tim es f o r  a  t o t a l  o f  n in e te e n  days and tw enty- 
n in e  se ss io n s  and heard  a  t o t a l  o f  n in e te e n  w itn e sse s  to  exp lo re  th e  
m i l i t a r y  and te c h n o lo g ic a l a sp e c ts  o f  any agreem ent to  e i th e r  d isarm  
o r  c u r t a i l  th e  developm ents o f  arms.
The committee concluded th a t  th e  T es t Ban T rea ty  would " r e ­
s u l t  i n  s e r io u s  and perhaps fo rm idab le  m i l i t a r y  and te c h n ic a l  d i s ­
advantages to  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  m i l i t a r y  e s ta b lish m e n t."  The 
committee was n o t convinced th a t  such comparable d isadvan tages would 
r e s u l t  t o  th e  S o v ie t Union. The committee b rushed  a s id e  th e  "im­
p o r ta n t  f a c to r s  . . .such  as fo re ig n  p o lic y , in te r n a t io n a l  a f f a i r s  
and r e la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  n a tio n s "  because "each in d iv id u a l  must reach  
h is  own judgment about th e  wisdom and d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  th e  t r e a ty  on 
th e  b a s is  o f  p e rso n a l ph ilo sophy , p a s t  ex p erien ce , c u r re n t know­
ledge and r e l a t i v e  w eight which he a ss ig n s  to  th e  v a rio u s  f a c to r s  
in v o lv e d ."
The re p o r t  was s igned  by S ena to rs  S tu a r t  Symington, Democrat 
o f M isso u ri; Henry M. Jackson , Democrat o f  W ashington; Strom Thurmond, 
Democrat (who tu rn e d  R epublican th e  n ex t y e a r du ring  th e  P r e s id e n t ia l  
Campaign) from South C aro lin a ; M argaret Chase Sm ith, R epublican from 
Maine; B arry  G oldw ater, R epublican from A rizona and can d id a te  f o r  
P re s id e n t f o r  th e  R epublican P a r ty  and th e  Chairman o f  th e  Subcommittee, 
John S te n n is , Democrat o f  M is s is s ip p i .
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M inority  re p o r ts  were f i l e d  by S enato rs Symington o f 
M issouri and S a l to n s ta l l  o f M assachusetts . S ena to r S a l to n s ta l l ,  
rank ing  R epublican on th e  committee; s a id  th e  conclusions drawn 
by th e  subcommittee were "o verly  a d v e rse ."  Although S en a to r 
Symington signed  th e  re p o r t ;  he s ta te d  th a t  he would v o te  f o r  th e  
t r e a ty .
Summary
In  view o f th e  f a c t  t h a t  S en a to rs  Jackson; R u sse ll and 
Symington had s ta te d  as  e a r ly  as February 21; 1$63 ; t h a t  th ey  
could  n o t no r would support any t r e a ty  th a t  would c u r t a i l  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  Armed Forces o r th e  use o f atomic weapons; i t  was 
s u rp r is in g  t h a t  S en a to r Symington in d ic a te d  th a t  he would vo te  f o r  
th e  t r e a t y .  As we s h a l l  see ; S en a to r Jackson a ls o  vo ted  f o r  th e  
t r e a ty .  A pparently  th e se  two S en a to rs  d id  n o t see  any th ing  in  th e  
t r e a ty  t h a t  would c o n s t i tu te  a  m i l i t a r y  th r e a t  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s .
S enato r S a l to n s ta l l  accompanied th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  to  
Moscow to  s ig n  th e  t r e a t y .  As rank ing  R epublican on th e  Armed S e rv ices  
Committee h is  v o te  was to  be ev en tu a lly  very  im portan t f o r  r a t i f i ­
c a tio n .
Ih e  qu estio n s  by th e  rem ainder o f  th e  S en ato rs  f u l l y  q u a l i f ie d  
as be ing  "m ilita ry -m in d ed ;" i . e . ;  t h e i r  conclusions th a t  th e  m i l i t a iy  
f a c to r s  were more im portan t th a n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  f a c to r s  concei-ning 
fo re ig n  a f f a i r s ; in te r n a t io n a l  r e la t io n s  and r e la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  
n a t io n s .
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S en ato rs  Goldwater and Thunnond a ttem pted  to  d is c r e d i t  th e  
J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  and gave p ra is e  to  th o se  w itn esses  th ey  
ag reed  with(LeMay, T e l le r  and th e  s c i e n t i s t s  from th e  Livermore 
L ab o ra to ry ). They tended  to  g lo ss  over p o l i t i c a l  and id e o lo g ic a l 
dimensions o f fo re ig n  p o lic y  and seemed to  fo rg e t  th a t  th e  m il i ta r y  
i s  b u t one elem ent o f  n a t io n a l  power and i s  b u t th e  means a v a ila b le  
to  th e  c iv i l i a n  ex ecu tiv es  to  ach ieve  th e  m ajor g o a ls  o f  n a t io n a l  
p o lic y .
The subcom m ittee, th en , was a  v e h ic le  f o r  th e  opponents o f 
th e  t r e a ty  to  express t h e i r  views and a ttem p t to  g a in  a  sense o f 
e x p e r tis e  to  back up t h e i r  p re v io u s ly  s ta te d  o p p o s itio n .
CHAPTER YL 
FOEEICN EELATIOHS COMMITTEE
The F ore ign  R e la tio n s  Committee has p layed  an im portan t 
ro le  in  fo re ig n  p o lic y  s in c e  i t s  in c e p tio n  i n  I916.
The committee has e s ta b lis h e d  im portan t subcommittees to  
keep i t  inform ed on v a rio u s  s u b je c ts .  In  a d d it io n  to  subcomm ittees 
th e  f a c t  th a t  S en a to rs  may s i t  on more th an  one committee g ives i t  
g re a te r  competence t o  judge on m a tte rs  concerning fo re ig n  p o lic y .
The membership o f  th e  F o re ign  R e la tio n s  Committee in  I963 
c o n s is te d  o f: S en a to rs  F u lb rig h t(C h a irm an ), Sparkman, Humphrey,
M ansfie ld , Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Sm athers, 
H ickenlooper, A iken, C arlson , W illiam s o f Delaware and Mundt o f  
South Dakota.
S en ato rs  Humphrey and Gore have been id e n t i f i e d  w ith  th e  
id e a  o f disarmament s in c e  1958* l u  1958 S en a to r Gore suggested  
th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  should  abandon i t s  demands f o r  a  comprehensive 
t e s t  ban t r e a ty  and c o n ce n tra te  on a  p a r t i a l  t e s t  ban . In  1959 
Senato r Humphrey proposed a  l im ite d  t e s t  ban to  be accompanied by a  
moratorium on t e s t i n g  i n  th o se  environm ents where c o n tro l  tech n iq u es  
were n o t a t  th a t  tim e adequate .
S en a to r H ickenlooper served  on th e  J o in t  Committee on Atomic 
Energy and th e  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee. S en a to r Symington served  
on th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee and i t s  Subcommittee on P rep ared n ess .
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S en a to rs  Gore and H ickenlooper had served  as co n g re ss io n a l 
a d v ise rs  to  th e  American d e le g a tio n  in  Geneva and th u s  were a b le  
to  b r in g  t h e i r  knowledge to  th e  Coinmittee on F ore ign  A f f a i r s .
The form al h ea rin g s  on th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  opened in  
Room 318; in  th e  Old S enate O ffice  B u ild in g , w ith  th e  f u l l  committee 
in  a tte n d a n c e . In  a d d itio n  to  th e  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee, th e  
Senate Committee on Armed S e rv ice s  and th e  members o f  th e  J o in t  
Committee on Atomic Energy were in v i te d  and were in  a tten d an ce . 
S en a to rs  D irksen , K uchel, Cooper, B ib le , J a v i t s ,  A U o tt and M ille r  
were honored g u e s ts .
The h ea rin g s  l a s te d  from  August 12th  u n t i l  August 2 7 th .
During t h i s  p e rio d  th e  committee q u estio n ed  f o r ty - th r e e  w itn e sse s , 
e leven  o f  whom appeared  b e fo re  bo th  th e  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee 
and th e  S enate  Armed S e rv ices  Subcommittee on P rep a red n ess . The 
testim o n y  o f  th e se  e leven  men was s u b s ta n t ia l ly  th e  same b e fo re  boüi 
com m ittees.
The m i l i t a r y  ' s support o f  th e  t r e a t y  was in c re a se d  w ith  th e  
testim o n y  o f G enera l Shoup o f  th e  M arine Corps, who swore under o a th  
t h a t  he had n o t been p re ssu re d  by th e  a d m in is tra tio n  to  g iv e  p o s i t iv e  
support t o  th e  t r e a t y .  His te stim ony  came in  answer to  a d d i t io n a l  
q u estio n s  by members o f th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee t h a t  th e  J o in t  
C hiefs had abnormal p re s su re  a p p lie d  to  them and th a t  each in d iv id u a l  
C hief o f  S ta f f  had n o t been c o n su lted  p r iv a te ly  by G eneral Maxwell 
T ay lo r.
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The J o in t  C hiefs o f  S t a f f  in s i s t e d  th a t  th e  fo u r safeguards 
s t ip u la te d  b e fo re  th e  P reparedness Subcommittee be adhered  to  fo r  
th e  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty .
G eneral LeMay s ta t e d  in  open se ss io n  th a t  he p robab ly  would no t 
have endorsed th e  t r e a t y  i f  th e  t r e a ty  had n o t a lre a d y  been s ig n ed .
L a te r  S en a to r P u lb r ig h t announced th a t  G eneral LeMay had g iven  more 
s u b s ta n t ia l  support to  th e  t r e a t y  id i i le  t e s t i f y in g  in  ex ecu tiv e  
s e s s io n .^
Edward T e l le r  appeared  b e fo re  bo th  committees and was opposed 
to  th e  t r e a ty ,  h o ld in g  th a t  th e  S o v ie t Union co u ld  n o t be t r u s t e d  to  
keep th e  t r e a t y  and would t e s t  c la n d e s t in e ly . He wanted more t e s t s  
on th e  development o f  an a n t i - b a l l i s t i c  m is s i le  and f e l t  t h a t  th i s  
cou ld  be done d 'fe c tiv e ly  only  i n  th e  atm osphere.
Dr. John F o s te r  a lso  appeared  b e fo re  b o th  com m ittees as 
D ire c to r  o f  th e  Lawrence R ad ia tio n  L aborato ry  a t  L iverm ore, C a l ifo rn ia .
He concluded th a t  from a  s t r i c t l y  te c h n ic a l  m i l i t a r y  p o in t ,  th e  
t r e a ty  had th e  appearances o f  be ing  d isadvan tageous.
Dr. H arold Brown, D ire c to r  o f  Defense R esearch and E ng ineering , 
Department o f  Defense, had been on th e  s t a f f  o f  th e  Lawrence R ad ia tion  
L aboratory  from  1952 througji I961 . He u l t im a te ly  se rv ed  as  th e  head 
o f th e  Liverm ore L aboratory  and as  i t s  D ire c to r  from i960 t h r o u ^  196I.
He had a ls o  served  on th e  American d e leg a tio n  a t  Geneva on th e  Conference 
o f E xperts in  1958- Dr. Brown supported  th e  t r e a t y  and a tta c k e d  Dr. 
T e l l e r ’s d e p re c ia tio n  o f  th e  in te l l ig e n c e  re p o r ts  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s .
"4che Hew York Times (August 20, 1963).
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He s a id  sim ply th a t  Dr. T e l le r  had n o t seen " a l l  th e  f a c t s .
Dr. ITorris E. Bradbury, D ire c to r o f th e  Los Alamos S c ien ­
t i f i c  L aboratory  acknowledged th a t  th e  t r e a ty  had c e r ta in  s c i e n t i f i c  
r i s k s  bu t he f e l t  t h a t  th e y  could  be minimized through  a program o f 
v igorous underground t e s t in g .  The Los Alamos s c i e n t i s t s  were gener­
a l l y  more fav o rab le  to  th e  t r e a ty  th a n  were th o se  from  th e  L iv e r­
more L aborato ry .
Two o f th e  most im portan t a d m in is tra tio n  w itn e sse s , S e c re ta ry  
o f S ta te  Dean Rusk and S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense Robert McMamara, appeared 
only b e fo re  th e  F oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee. Although no o f f i c i a l  
reason  was g iven , i t  may be surm ised th a t  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  f e l t  
t h a t  th e  Armed S erv ices  Committee d id  n o t have p ro p e r ju r i s d ic t io n  
over th e  t r e a ty  and i t  was a  well-known f a c t  by t h i s  tim e th a t  th e  
members o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee had no in te n t io n  o f accep ting  
o r co n sid e rin g  any ban on t e s t in g .
S enato rs  Goldwatey, Thurmond, S te n n is , Jackson and Symington 
had c o n s ta n tly  derided  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense McNamara 
and h is  u se  o f computers in  c o s t-a n a ly s is  o f defense programs. 
S e c re ta ry  McNamara had a lso  f irm ly  re -e s ta b l is h e d  th e  p r in c ip le  o f 
c iv i l i a n  c o n tro l over th e  m il i ta r y .
On August 2hf 1963, S en a to r Thurmond s a id  th a t  th e  S e c re ta ry  
o f  Defense had t r i e d  to  deceive th e  Senate and p ic tu re d  him as a  
"confidence man . . .who u ses  a  d ecep tive  and d e c e i t f u l  b u ild u p  w ith  
an o v erly  s tro n g  im p lic a tio n  to  support th e  t r e a ty ." ^
■*TbM., (August 20, 1963), 
% b id . , (August 2k, I963) .
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I t  may be surm ised th a t  no c o n s tru c tiv e  purpose would be 
served  by th e  appearance o f  S e c re ta ry  McNamara b e fo re  th e  Sub­
committee o f th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee.
S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  Dean Rusk
At th e  opening o f th e  h e a r in g s . S enato r F u lb r ig h t read  th e  
l e t t e r  o f t r a n s m i t ta l  from th e  P re s id e n t which co n ta in ed  te n  co n sid ­
e ra tio n s  th a t  he w ished th e  committee to  keep in  mind during  t h e i r  
d e lib e ra t io n s ;
1 . The t r e a t y  was th e  com plete document. There were no 
a d d it io n a l  agreem ents o r u nderstand ings made a t  Moscow.
2 . The t r e a t y  d id  n o t a ssu re  w orld peace; i t  would i n h ib i t ,  
n o t p ro h ib i t  th e  arms ra c e . I t  would l im i t  n u c lea r t e s t s .
I t  would n o t h a l t  p ro d uction  o r reduce e x is t in g  arms s to c k ­
p i le s  b u t i t  would be a  f i r s t  s te p  tow ard l im it in g  th e  arms 
ra c e .
3 . The t r e a ty  would curb th e  p o l lu t io n  o f  th e  atm osphere from 
n u c lea r f a l l o u t .
. 4 . The t r e a t y  would p ro te c t  our r ig h ts  o f th e  fu tu re  by th e  
w ithdraw al c lau se  and th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  S enate  to  approve 
amendments.
5. No com bination o f  s ig n a tu re s  would e i th e r  imply o r g ra n t 
re c o g n itio n  to  any s ig n a to ry  to  th e  t r e a ty .
6 . Our t e s t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  would be k e p t in  c o n s ta n t s t a t e  o f  
read in ess  th rough  underground t e s t in g ,  f o r  th e  purposes o f  peace 
o r  war.
7 . Our n u c lea r s u p e r io r i ty  was th e  f a c to r  th a t  made th e  t r e a ty  
p o s s ib le , b u t th e re  was no need fo r  a  sense o f  euphoria  w ith  th e  
s ign ing  o f  th e  t r e a ty .
8 . Even th o u ^  th e  S o v ie t Union should  t e s t  c la n d e s tin e ly  
underground, our n u c lea r s u p e r io r i ty  would rem ain due to  th e  
f a c t  th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had reached th e  p o in t o f t o t a l  
r e t a l i a to r y  c a p a c ity .
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9 * The r i s k s  o f  c la n d e s tin e  t e s t in g  were f a r  sm alle r th an  
th e  r is k s  o f  u n lim ite d  t e s t i n g .  The U n ited  S ta te s  had de­
veloped te c h n ic a l  means o f d e te c t io n .
10 . The t r e a ty  was th e  p roduct o f  two a d m in is tra tio n s . I t  
grew out o f th e  i n i t i a l  p ro p o sa ls  o f  th e  Eisenhower admin­
i s t r a t i o n ,  th e  Senate  re s o lu t io n  and th e  p la tfo rm s o f both  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  in  i9 6 0 .
The P re s id e n t ended h is  l e t t e r  w ith  th e  words;
This T rea ty  i s  in  ou r n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .  While experience 
te ac h e s  us t o  be c au tio u s  in  our ex p ec ta tio n s  and ever 
v ig i la n t  in  our p re p a ra t io n s , th e r e  i s  no reaso n  to  oppose 
t h i s  h o p e fu l s te p .  I t  i s  r a r e ly  p o s s ib le  to  recap tu re  
m issed o p p o r tu n itie s  to  ach ieve  a  more secu re  and p e ac e fu l 
w orld . To govern i s  to  choosej and i t  i s  my judgment th a t
th e  U nited  S ta te s  shou ld  move s w if t ly  and approve th e  pending
t r e a ty .
B efore S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  Dean Rusk cou ld  s t a r t  h is  testim ony  
on th e  t r e a ty .  S enato r H ickenlooper c a l le d  f o r  an unprecedented  move 
by re q u e s tin g  th a t  a l l  w itn e sse s  be sworn in  so th a t  t h e i r  testim ony  
would have th e  w eight o f an o a th . S en a to r P u l b r i ^ t  agreed , b u t
no ted  th a t  i t  was h ig h ly  u n u su al, p a r t i c u la r ly  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e
c a l ib e r  o f  w itn ess  to  appear b e fo re  th e  com m ittee. As i t  l a t e r  
t r a n s p ir e d .  S en a to r H ickenlooper was ad h erin g  t o  th e  w ishes o f  th e  
co n se rv a tiv e  S enato rs from th e  Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee who had 
im plied  th roughou t t h a t  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  w itn e sse s , p a r t ic u la r ly  
th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f ,  were e i th e r  ly in g  o r were under heavy 
p re s su re  from th e  a d m in is tra tio n  to  g iv e  only  p o s i t iv e  testim ony . 
S en a to r F u lb r ig h t p laced  a  ten -m in u te  l im i ta t io n  on q u e s tio n s .
h e a r in g s  on E xecu tive  M ., op. c i t . ,  pp . 2 - 4 .
I^bid.
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S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  Dean Eusk e la b o ra te d  p r im a ri ly  th e  te n  
p o in ts  made by P re s id e n t Kennedy in  th e  l e t t e r  o f t r a n s m i t ta l .
The S e c re ta ry  ended h is  s ta tem en t w ith  an e loquen t q u o ta tio n  from 
B ernard Baruch, "We a re  h e re  to  make a  cho ice  between th e  quick 
and th e  d ead ."^
S en a to r R u sse ll  le d  th e  a t ta c k  by q u es tio n in g  why th e re  were 
no m i l i t a r y  men on th e  m ission  t o  Moscow t o  n e g o tia te  th e  t r e a ty  
and fu rth erm o re  w hether th e  Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n  in ten d ed  to  
c o n su lt only c iv i l i a n s  and law yers in  th e  Department o f  Defense on 
m a tte rs  o f  disarm am ent. S e c re ta ry  Rusk p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th e  road 
o f  n e g o tia tio n s  on th e  p a r t i c u la r  t r e a ty  was a  v ery  long  one and 
invo lved  persons o f  a l l  walks o f  l i f e ;  m i l i t a r y  men, c iv i l i a n s ,  and 
s c i e n t i s t s  as w e ll  as laymen and d ip lom ats .
S en a to r R u ss e ll  had made freq u en t re fe re n c e s  to  h is  m a il and 
th e  v iru le n c e  i t  co n ta in ed . I t  should  be p o in te d  ou t t h a t  du ring  
t h i s  p e r io d  under c o n s id e ra tio n , th e  c i v i l  r ig h ts  b i l l  was being  
f o r mula te d ,  th e  "March on W ash in g to n w as  in  p ro g ress  and S e c re ta ry  
McNamara had c a l le d  f o r  an end t o  a l l  d is c r im in a tio n  in  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  
o f Armed S e rv ic e s  p r o je c t s ,  and had th re a te n e d  to  c lo se  Army bases  
t h a t  were n ea r c i t i e s  and towns who d isc r im in a ted  a g a in s t  servicem en.
!Ehe so u th ern  S en a to rs  were u s in g  th e se  h earin g s  f o r  a  n a t io n a l  p l a t ­
form to  a i r  t h e i r  f r u s t r a t io n s  tow ard th e  whole Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n . 
S en a to r Sparkman p ick ed  up a  p o in t  th a t  S en a to r R u sse ll  had made in  
re fe re n c e  to  h is  m a il t h a t  bo th  s id e s , f o r  and a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty ,  
were condemned in  th e  b ro a d e s t term s o f h a tre d . However, S ena to r 
Sparkman had  th r e e  q u estio n s  f o r  S e c re ta ry  Rusk, q u estio n s  which were
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to  be asked  over and o ver ag a in  by th e  co n se rv a tiv e  b lo c  in  th e  
h e a r in g s . The q u estio n s  asked were as  fo llo w s; Can we t r u s t  th e  
R ussians? ; Would we be p rev en ted  from developing atom ic weapons?; 
and Could we use  n u c le a r  weapons in  case  o f war? S e c re ta ry  R usk 's 
answ ers were a  q u a l i f ie d  "yes" to  th e  f i r s t ,  a  "no" to  th e  second 
and a  "yes" to  th e  t h i r d .
S en a to r H ick en lo o p er' s perform ance was a  r a th e r  cu rious one 
b e fo re  th e  com m ittee. He had serv ed  in  th e  p a s t  on th e  F oreign  
R e la tio n s  Committee and i t s  Subcommittee on Disarmament. He had 
a ls o  serv ed  on th e  J o in t  Committee on Atomic Energy, as w e ll as  an 
a d v is e r  to  th e  American d e le g a tio n  in  Geneva on disarm am ent, and 
th e re fo re  shou ld  have been as  w e ll  ad v ised  as  any member o f  Congress 
p re se n t in  th e  h earin g s  on th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .  In  a d d itio n  th e  
P re s id e n t had in v i te d  him  to  go to  Moscow w ith  a  b ip a r t i s a n  group 
o f S e n a to rs , b u t he re fu se d , as d id  a  number o f o th e r  prom inent 
R epublicans. T h e re fo re , i t  came as a  s u rp r is e  when he asked th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te ,  "What does th e  t r e a ty  do? We know f u l ly  what 
i t  d o e s n 't  do, b u t j u s t  what does i t  do?"^ The S e c re ta ry  t r i e d  to  
p o in t ou t t h a t  t h i s  t r e a t y  was b u t a  h o p efu l " f i r s t  s te p "  tow ard 
f u r th e r  agreem ents to  l im i t  th e  arms ra c e . S en a to r H ickenlooper 
in d ic a te d  th a t  he in ten d ed  to  ask  t h a t  a l l  correspondence between 
th e  P re s id e n t and h is  s t a f f  w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union be made p u b lic  
as to  th e  " p o te n t ia l  agreem ents a f t e r  t h i s  t r e a t y  should  be s ig n e d ."
^Ibid., p. 2 9.
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S en a to r S a l to n s ta l l  asked th e  S e c re ta ry  more p la in ly  I f  th e re  
were any s id e  agreem ents o r understand ings made a t  Moscow, "Am I  
c o rre c t in  my u n d ers tan d in g  from what you have s a id  h e re  and what you 
have s a id  in  co n v e rsa tio n , th a t  th e re  a re  no s id e  agreem ents, no 
o th e r  agreem ents o f any k in d , th a t  go a long w ith  t h i s  t r e a ty ? "  
S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  Rusk r e p l ie d ,  " ih a t  i s  c o r re c t ,  s i r . "  To which 
S en a to r S a l to n s ta l l  added, "And you say th a t  under oa th?"  " Y e s ,s ir .
S e c re ta ry  Rusk had to  deny t h i s  same in fe re n c e  from a l l  th e  
members o f  th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee who e i th e r  d id  n o t compre­
hend o r  m erely w ished to  an tagon ize  th e  a d m in is tra t io n 's  w itn e ss . 
S en a to r Morse was n o t r e lu c ta n t  to  defend th e  S e c re ta ry  and a t ta c k  
h is  d e t r a c to r s .  He made th e  fo llow ing  s ta te m e n ts :
I s  i t  n o t t r u e  t h a t  th e  m il i t a r y  e stab lish m en t under our 
C o n s ti tu tio n  has no a u th o r i ty  w hatsoever to  determ ine fo re ig n  
p o licy ?  H e re 's  one S enato r who w ishes th e  reco rd  to  show 
t h a t  I  am g la d  you d id  no t ta k e  a  member o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs 
o f  S ta f f  to  Moscow f o r  . . .we have n o t e s ta b lis h e d  a  m il i ta r y  
government in  t h i s  cou n try , n o t y e t .  I t  i s  a ls o  t r u e ,  i s  i t  
n o t, t h a t  under ou r C o n s ti tu tio n  th e  p o l ic ie s  o f th e  Pentagon 
b u ild in g  s h a l l  he d ire c te d  by c iv i l i a n  command?^
I t  was ev id en t t h a t  th e  te n  p o in ts  made by th e  P re s id e n t had
made no den t in  th e  th in k in g  o f th e  " c o n se rv a tiv e -m ilita ry "  b loc  o f
S en a to rs  from th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee. But S e c re ta ry  Rusk was
p rep ared  fo r  S en a to r G oldw ater's  q u estio n  as to  w hether th e  t r e a ty
p ro h ib i te d  th e  u se  o f  and development o f  t a c t i c a l  n u c lea r weapons.
S e c re ta ry  Rusk produced a  w r i t te n  op in ion  by th e  A tto rney  G eneral w ith
th e  answ er, "no ."
^Ibid., p. 35-
^Ibid., pp. 5 6 - 5 8 .
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S en a to r M ille r  was n o t a  member o f  th e  com m ittee, b u t asked 
S enato r C u rtis  to  p re se n t two q u estio n s  to  S e c re ta ry  Rusk. Senato r 
M ille r  wanted a  re s e rv a tio n  to  th e  t r e a ty  th a t  would keep th e  t r e a ty  
from becoming e f f e c t iv e  u n t i l  th e  S o v ie t Union p a id  h e r  deb t to  th e  
U nited  N ations. S e c re ta ry  Rusk p o in te d  ou t th a t  such a  re s e rv a tio n  
would n o t be accep ted  by th e  S o v ie t Union and would have th e  e f f e c t  
o f k i l l i n g  th e  t r e a ty .  Furtherm ore, i t  would p la c e  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
in  th e  em barrassing s i tu a t io n  th a t  i t  found i t s e l f  in  a f t e r  World War I  
■when th e  Congress o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  f a i l e d  to  jo in  th e  League o f 
N ations a f t e r  having been th e  o r ig in a to r  o f  th e  id e a . The second 
q u estio n  concerned Mr. M i l le r ’s concern about th e  •w ill to  win in  
th e  ’’co ld  war. "
S ena to r F u lb r ig h t ■was th e  l a s t  person  to  make remarks and 
he used th e  committee as a  p la tfo rm  fo r  h is  own p a r t i c u la r  ph ilosophy . 
The S enato r had accompanied th e  d e le g a tio n  to  Moscow and th e  e n t i r e  
committee had seen th e  d r a f t  as e a r ly  as June and had  f o r  a l l  p r a c t i ­
c a l  reasons endorsed th e  t r e a ty  befo rehand .
The S enato r s t a r t e d  out by p o in tin g  out to  S en a to rs  Mundt and 
H ickenlooper th a t  th e  S o v ie t Union ■was n o t th e  only  n a tio n  to  b reak  
t r e a t i e s  when i t  was in  h e r  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .  With th e  con firm ation  
o f  S e c re ta ry  Rusk i t  ■was in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  had a ls o  
broken t r e a t i e s  ■when i t  was u s e f u l  f o r  h e r  pu rposes.
He p o in te d  ou t t h a t  even though th e  Russians m i ^ t  be g iven  a 
b re a th in g  s p e l l  from th e  arms ra c e  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  could  w e ll 
u se  th e  same tim e to  our o'wn advantage because ”we cannot a f fo rd  
in d e f in i te ly  to  outspend th e  R ussians in  th e  f i e l d  o f  armaments -without
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su f fe r in g  a  se r io u s  d e te r io ra t io n  in  our r e l a t i v e  f i e ld s  o f h e a l th ,  
ed u ca tio n , p o v erty  and urban decay ."
Ifhe "hawkish" S ena to rs  from th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee d id  
n o t q u estio n  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  Rusk f o r  any le n g th  o f tim e due to  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  were h e a r in g  testim ony  w ith  Dr. T e l le r  th e  same 
day in  th e  Subcommittee on P reparedness.
At th e  end o f  th e  day. S en a to r Aiken p re d ic te d  th a t  th e  
t r e a ty  would be r a t i f i e d  by a  m argin o f  fo u r  to  one. However, 
th e  members o f  th e  Senate Armed S e rv ices  Committee and th e  Atomic 
Energy Commission expressed  grave doubts and re s e rv a tio n s  in  s p i te  
o f th e  e x c e lle n t testim ony  by th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S t a t e .
Robert S . McNamara
A fte r  S e c re ta ry  o f Defense Robert S . McNamara was sworn in ,
he im m ediately gave a  rundown on th e  n u c le a r  s u p e r io r i ty  o f  th e
U nited  S ta te s  v is - a - v is  th e  S o v ie t Union;
E a r l i e r  t h i s  y e a r I  was a b le  to  r e p o r t  to  th e  Senate  Armed 
S erv ices  Committee t h a t — allow ing  f o r  lo s se s  from an i n i t i a l  
eneny a t ta c k  and a t t r i t i o n  en rou te  to  t a r g e t ,  we c a lc u la te  
th a t  our fo rc e s  today  cou ld  s t i l l  d e s tro y  th e  S o v ie t Union 
w ithou t any h e lp  from th e  deployed t a c t i c a l  a i r  u n i t s  o r  c a r r i e r  
ta s k  fo rc e s  o r  Thor o r J u p i te r  IRBM's.
. . . I n  th e  p a s t  tw en ty -fo u r months a lone  th e re  have been:
A 100 p e rc en t in c re a se  in  th e  number o f n u c le a r  war heads in  
th e  s t r a te g ic  a l e r t  f o r c e s .&
~Hche New York Times (August 12, 1963).
^Committee on F o re ig n  R e la tio n s , op. c i t . ,  p . 98*
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A 60 p e rcen t in c re a s e  in  th e  t a c t i c a l  n u c le a r  fo rce s  deployed 
in  W estern Europe.
A 45 p e rc en t in c re a se  in  th e  number o f combat ready Arngr 
d iv is io n s .
A 30 p e rc en t in c re a se  in  th e  number o f  t a c t i c a l  a i r  squadrons.
A 60 p e rc en t in c re a s e  in  a i r l i f t  c a p a b i l i ty .
A 100 p e rc en t in c re a se  in  sh ip  c o n s tru c tio n  and conversion  to  
modernize th e  f l e e t .
A 200 p e rcen t in c re a se  in  th e  s p e c ia l  fo rc e s  t r a in e d  to  d e a l 
■with coun terin su rgency  t h r e a t s .
The S e c re ta ry  o f Defense was n o t concerned -with th e  o ver­
a l l  s u p e r io r i ty  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s .  However, th e re  were fo u r 
a re a s  t h a t  he ■wished to  c a l l  a t t e n t io n  to ;  ( l ) v e r y  la r g e - y ie ld  weapons; 
(2) m is s i le  s i t e  survivabili^fcyj (3) a n t i - b a l l i s t i c  m is s i le  defense; 
and (4 ) m is s i le  p e n e t r a b i l i ty .
Very L arge-Y ie ld  Weapons
Although th e  S o v ie t Union had t e s t e d  a  s ix ty  megaton dev ice 
and could  p -obab ly  go as  h igh  as 100 m egatons, th ey  d id  no t have a  
m is s i le  th a t  cou ld  d e l iv e r  such a  ■warhead to  th e  c o n tin e n ta l  U n ited  
S t a t e s .
The U nited  S ta te s  s t r a te g y  ■was aimed a t  m i l i t a r y  s i t e s  and 
■we cou ld , ■with underground t e s t i n g ,  develop s o p h is t ic a te d  weapons 
t h a t  would f u l f i l l  ou r m issio n .
llbid.
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M iss ile  S i te  S u rv iv a b i l i ty
Kie m is s i le  fo rc e  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  -was deployed in  such 
a  fa sh io n  th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  cou ld  s u s ta in  a  " f i r s t  s t r ik e "  
and s t i l l  r e t a in  much o f  th e  o r ig in a l  s t r ik in g  fo rc e .
The S e c re ta ry  s ta t e d  th a t  "we can say w ith  a ssu ran ce  . . . 
t h a t  even a f t e r  a  S o v ie t s t r i k e ,  th e  t o t a l  su rv iv in g  U n ited  S ta te s  
s t r a te g i c  n u c le a r  fo rc e  w i l l  be la rg e  enough to  d e s tro y  th e  enemy.
A n t i -B a l l i s t ic -M is s i le  System
W ithout f u r th e r  t e s t in g  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  now has th e  cap­
a b i l i t y  to  weaponize a  v a r ie ty  o f  p o s s ib le  ABM w arheads.
Regarding AM ra d a r  b lack o u t and communications b la ck o u t, 
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  p o sse ssed  th e  f a c i l i t i e s  and c a p a b i l i t i e s  to  design  
around any e x is t in g  u n c e r ta in t ie s .
Any problems th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had a t  t h a t  tim e r e la te d  
to  re a c t io n  speed, m is s i le  perform ance, t r a f f i c  h an d lin g  c a p a c ity  and 
th e  c a p a c ity  fo r  decoy d is c r im in a tio n  were a l l  f a c to r s  th a t  were no t 
r e la te d  to  th e  l im ite d  t e s t  t r e a ty .^
P e n e tra tio n  C ap a b ility
I t  was on ly  in  t h i s  a re a  o f  p e n e tra tio n  o f  enemy a n t i - b a l l i s t i c - 
m is s i le  system s th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  could  n o t be c e r ta in .
^ I b id . , pp. 102-103.
^ I b id . , pp . 103-104.
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We could t e s t  th e  v u ln e r a b i l i ty  as to  r a d ia t io n  underground, 
b u t ve could n o t f u l l y  t e s t  th e  v u ln e r a b i l i ty  o f  th e  b a l l i s t i c -  
m is s i le  varhead  to  k i l l  by b l a s t .
Under th e  t r e a ty  we cou ld  n o t t e s t  o r confirm  th e  r e s is ta n c e  
o f new, hard-w arhead d e sig n s . But th e  S e c re ta ry  in d ic a te d  th a t  i t  
was h is  b e l i e f ,  based  on c u rre n t in te l l ig e n c e  r e p o r ts ,  th a t  th e  
S o v ie t Union had n o t exp lored  th e  b u ln e r a b i l i ty  o f  r e -e n try  v e h ic le s  
t o  b l a s t s .^
way o f summary o r  conclusions from th e  S e c re ta r y 's  opening
remarks :
. . . I f  t e s t in g  con tinued  in d e f in i te ly  w ith o u t l im i t  as to  
th e  t e s t  environment o r s iz e  o f y ie ld ,  th e  most l i k e ly  u l t i ­
mate r e s u l t s  would be te c h n ic a l  p a r i ty  between th e  U nited  
S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union. . . .Except f o r  th e  v e ry -h ig h - 
y ie ld  weapons where we have no g re a t  i n t e r e s t .  . .u n lim ite d  
underground t e s t in g  by bo th  s id e s  would a ls o  ten d  to  p ro ­
duce te c h n o lo g ic a l p a r t i t y .  But, by l im it in g  S o v ie t t e s t in g  
to  th e  underground environm ent, where t e s t in g  i s  more d i f f i ­
c u l t  and more expensive and uhere  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  has had 
s u b s ta n t ia l ly  more experience , we can a t  l e a s t  r e ta r d  S o v ie t 
p ro g ress  and pro long  th e  d u ra tio n  o f  our te c h n o lo g ic a l su p er­
i o r i t y .  . . .This p ro lo n g a tio n  o f  our te c h n o lo g ic a l s u p e r io r i ty  
w i l l  be a  p r in c ip a l  d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t  o f  th e  t r e a ty  on 
th e  fu tu re  m il i ta r y  b a lan ce . I  b e lie v e  i t  to  be a  s ig n i f ic a n t  
one.
The q u estio n in g  o f S e c re ta ry  McNamara by th e  members o f th e  
Armed S e rv ices  Committee was a  very  c a re fu l ly  o rc h e s tra te d  p e r fo r ­
mance. S en a to r F u l b r i ^ t  had p u t a  ten -m inu te  l im i t  on th e  tim e each 
in d iv id u a l S en a to r would have f o r  q u e s tio n s . S en a to rs  R u sse ll , S te n n is , 
G oldw ater, Thurmond, Young and Lausche asked q u estio n s  t h a t  overlapped
^ b i d . , pp . 104- 10$. 
^ Ib id . , p . 10$.
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each o th e r  and each one asked them in  such a  way th a t  th e re  were h u i l t -  
in  re sp o n ses . They fre q u e n tly  demanded a  "yes" o r "no ."
They in s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f  were n o t t e l l i n g  
th e  a b so lu te  t r u t h .  In  s c i e n t i f i c  m a tte rs  th ey  d is reg ard ed  a l l  
testim ony  except th a t  o f  Dr. Edward T e l le r ,  even a f t e r  he adm itted  
th a t  he d id  n o t have a l l  th e  c u rre n t in te l l ig e n c e  in fo rm atio n .
Regarding "Plowshare" Mr. McNamara in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  ban 
would n o t in h ib i t  th e  development o f te c h n ic a l  in s trum en ts  to  b u i ld  
a  c an a l b u t under t h i s  t r e a ty  we could  n o t use atom ic energy fo r  
ex p lo siv e  means to  d ig  an a c tu a l  c an a l.
Some au th o rs  have in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  h earin g s  were something 
le s s  th an  a  c o lle g e  debate  on p o in ts .  However, in  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  
p re se n t a tta c k s  on th e  " m il i ta r y - in d u s t r ia l "  complex, th e  exchange 
o f p o in te d  remarks between S enators F u lb r ig h t and H ickenlooper has 
p e r tin a n c e :
HICKENLOOPER:. . .W ith reg a rd  to  th e  ed u ca tio n a l system  in  
R ussia  and th e  U nited  S ta te s  and o th e r p lace s  in  th e  w orld, 
does your exam ination show th a t  in  a n c ie n t Cathay, w ith  a l l  
i t s  refinem en ts  and ed u ca tio n , th a t  th e  sch o la rs  were ab le  to  
s tan d  a t  th e  g a tes  o f t h e i r  c i t i e s  and ward o f f  G é n o is  Khan 
when h is  hordes came through?
MCNAMARA:. . .1  b e lie v e  I  re ad  th e  same books you d id  and th e  
answer i s  t h a t  th e y  d id  n o t, b u t I  am no t c e r ta in  t h a t  Cathay" 
would have la s te d  any lo n g er and I  th in k  t h a t  i s  th e  t e s t .
HICKENMOPER:. . .Do you th in k  th e  Greek c iv i l i z a t io n  which was 
very  h igh  indeed  was a b le  by pedagog ica l f i a t  t o  ward o f f  th e  
hordes t h a t  came from th e  E ast and conquered i t ?  Inotherw ords 
wasn’t  i t  th e  p h y s ic a l s tre n g th  th a t  was n ecessa ry  to  ward 
o f f  th e se  th in g s  th a t  would have saved them?
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MCHAMAEA:. . .1  th in k  b o th  o f us would, ag ree  t h a t  p h y s ic a l and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  s tre n g th  a re  re q u ire d  and as  a  m a tte r  o f  a c t  in  
th e  p re se n t day, w ith  th e  complex weapons system s th a t  we a re  
dpending upon as a  fo u n d a tio n  f o r  our m i l i t a r y  s tre n g th , i n ­
t e l l e c t u a l  s tre n g th  i s  an a b so lu te  requ irem ent f o r  m i l i ta r y  
s tre n g th , and we need an expansion o f th e  e d u c a tio n a l system  
fo r  t h a t  reaso n  as w e ll as o th e r .
ECCKENIOOPER:. . .B u t, e d u ca tio n a l s t r e m th  a lone  c a n 't  
command th e  sun to  s tan d  s t i l l ,  can i t ?
A fte r  th e  u s u a l p ro to c o l o f  th an k in g  th e  w itn ess  and h i s  resp o n se .
Chairman F u lb r ig h t in te rv e n e d  in  th e  d ia logue w ith :
. . .1  would rem ind th e  S en a to r th a t  th e  r e a l  dow nfall o f 
Greece was th a t  fo o l i s h  m i l i t a r y  e x p ed itio n  a g a in s t  Syracuse 
r a th e r  th an  any hordes from th e  E a s t, I  th in k ,  i f  I  remember 
th e  h is to ry  c o r r e c t ly .
S en a to r H ickenlooper had been one o f S e c re ta ry  McNamara's 
most c o n s is te n t  c r i t i c s  over h is  h an d lin g  o f  defense  c o n tra c ts ,  
p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  TFX award and d e c is io n  to  b u i ld .  In  a d d it io n . 
S en a to r H ickenlooper had lo n g  and c lo se  p e rso n a l t i e s  w ith  Dr.
Edward T e lle r^  and id e o lo g ic a l ly  f e l l  in to  l i n e  w ith  S en a to rs  Jackson , 
" th e  S en a to r from B oeing," and C arl Mundt
~*T b id . ,  p . 123.
2
I b id .
O
Norman Moss, Men Nho P lay  God (New Y orktH arper & Row, I968) .Mr. 
Moss has w r i t te n  a  h ig h ly  in fo rm a tiv e  a lb e i t  j o u r n a l i s t i c  work. His 
s ty le  comes from th e  f a c t  t h a t  he was a  fo m e r  r e p o r te r  f o r  R eu ters ,
The R ep o rte r, The Sunday Times o f  London and th e  S a tu rday  Review. His 
c h ap te r  The S c ie n t i s t  i s  a  p a r t i c u la r ly  c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is  o f  Dr. 
T e l l e r 's  p e rs o n a li ty  and h is  c o n f l i c t  w ith in  th e  atom ic community o f 
s c i e n t i s t s .  His a n a ly s is  in  p a r t  s u b s ta n t ia te s  remarks madeto t h i s  au th o r 
by h is  form er s tu d en t and a s s o c ia te  from Los Alamos to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  
Dr. T e l le r  was o f  a  s in g u la r  mind and would n o t h e s i t a t e  a t  any th ing  to  ' 
ach ieve  a  g o a l even to  d i s to r t io n  o f  f a c t s .  In te rv ie w  w ith  H arold Agnew 
o f Los Alamos, P h y s ic is t .
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E ith e r  by p lann ing  o r "happenstance" th e  Atomic Energy Commission 
d e to n a ted  a  n u c le a r  dev ice  w ith  an in te rm e d ia te -y ie ld  underground 
in  Nevada on th e  opening day o f  th e  S enate F o re ign  R e la tio n s  C om m ittee's 
h e a r in g s . This was alm ost t o  und ersco re  th e  p o in t  o f  S e c re ta r ie s  
Rusk and McNamara and Glenn T. Seaborg, th a t  th e  adm in istra tion  i n ­
ten d ed  t o  do a l l  th a t  i t  cou ld  to  m ain ta in  American re a d in e s s , i n ­
c lu d in g  in c re a s in g  th e  underground t e s t i n g  program .
At th e  end o f  S e c re ta ry  McNamara's te s tim o n y , th e  New York Times 
re p o r te d  in  h e ad lin e s  t h a t  th e  S enate  Fo reign  R e la tio n s  Committee was 
g e n e ra lly  v e ry  p le a se d  w ith  S e c re ta ry  McNamara's te s tim o n y , w ith  
p a r t i c u l a r  p r a is e  coming from S en a to r E vere t D irksen , R epublican 
from I l l i n o i s .  The members o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee and th e  
Atomic Energy Commission "ex p ressed  doubts and r e s e r v a t io n s ."  S en a to rs  
Thurmond and Goldwater s a id  t h a t  th%r were n o t im pressed . One im portan t 
c o n v e rt, however, was S en a to r H ickenlooper, idio gave grudging  support 
and fa v o ra b le  p ra is e  to  th e  d a y 's  h e a r in g s .
The M ili ta ry
A lth o u ^  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  had t e s t i f i e d  th e  day b e ­
fo r e ,  on August lU th , b e fo re  th e  S enate  Committee on Armed Forces 
P repardedness Subcommittee, th e y  appeared  th e  n ex t day b e fo re  th e  
S enate  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee. The testim ony  o f  th e  J o in t  C hiefs 
was th e  same as i t  had been th e  day e a r l i e r .  However, th e  r e a l  purpose 
o f  S en a to r H ick en lo o p er' s in s is te n c e  t h a t  a l l  w itn e sse s  be p u t under 
o a th  became ap p aren t w ith  th e  "q u estio n in g "  o f  G enera l Maxwell T ay lo r.
G eneral T ay lo r was reg ard ed  as a  "Kennedy man" a lth o u g h  th e  G eneral i s  
a  r e g i s t e r e d  R epub lican . G en era l T ay lo r had been  b rough t back ou t o f
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re tire m e n t to  head th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S t a f f  and make an in v e s t i ­
g a tio n  o f th e  "Bay o f  P ig s"  f ia s c o .  G eneral T ay lo r had wellknown 
views reg a rd in g  th e  r o le  o f a  S e c re ta iy  o f Defense and a lso  th a t  o f 
a  le a d e r  o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f :
A S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense needs a  s tro n g  chairm an to  d i r e c t  th e  
works o f  th e  C h ie fs , to  keep t h e i r  noses to  th e  g rin d s to n e , 
and to  e x tr a c t  from them tim e ly  ad v ice  and recommendations.
. . .p re fe ra b ly  o f a  k in d  which can be  accep ted  and approved 
w ith o u t em barrassm ent. . . .Thus, th e  chairm an has become a  
s o r t  o f  p a r ty  whip, charged w ith  conveying th e  o f f i c i a l  l in e  
to  th e  C hiefs in  th e  hope and e x p ec ta tio n  t h a t  th ey  w i l l  be 
guided th e re b y  in  t h e i r  a c t io n s .^
S en a to r R u sse ll  was th e  c h ie f  q u e s tio n e r  and he le d  o f f  w ith
h is  now fa m il ia r :
When were th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  b r o u ^ t  in to  c o n su lta tio n  
on t h i s  t r e a t y  f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e? Had you been co n su lted  from 
tim e to  tim e during  th e  course  o f  th e  n e g o tia tio n s?  We h ea r 
a  g re a t  d e a l in  t h i s  day and tim e about p re s su re s  th a t  a re  
b r o u ^ t  to  b e a r  on th e  J o in t  C hiefs to  cause them to  su rre n d e r 
p u re ly  m i l i t a iy  views to  what m ight be c a l le d  p o l i t i c a l  co n sid ­
e ra t io n s  o f  one k in d  o r an o th e r; w hether th e y  a re  in  th e  n a t io n a l  
i n t e r e s t  o r n o t i s  n o t im portan t f o r  th e  purposes o f  t h i s  
q u e s tio n . But have any un u su a l p re s su re s  been brought to  b e a r 
on you o r on any o th e r  member o f  th e  J o in t  C h ie fs , t o  your know­
led g e , in  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f t h i s  t r e a ty ? ^
G eneral T ay lo r once ag a in  re p l ie d ;
Wo, s i r ;  d e f in i te ly  n o t . 3
■Sfexwell D. T ay lo r, The U n certa in  Trumpet (New York: H arper & 
Row, n .d . ) ,  pp . 109-111.
^Committee on F o re ig n  R e la tio n s , op. c i t . ,  pp . 280-281 .
^Ibid.
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S enato rs F u lb r ig h t and Humphrey came to  G eneral T a y lo r ' s de­
fen se  by th e  p a rliam en ta ry  dev ice  o f  ask ing  him qu estio n s  th a t  would 
a llo w  him to  defend h is  honor and in te g r i ty .  Through S enato r Humphrey's 
q u estio n s  i t  was brought ou t th a t  th e  J o in t  C hiefs had been co nsu lted  
and made recommendations to  th e  P re s id e n t and th e  Committee o f  P r in ­
c ip le s  on p o in ts  r e la t in g  to  th e  f i n a l  t r e a ty .  A lth o u ^  th e re  was 
no m i l i t a iy  man p h y s ic a l ly  p re se n t w ith  Ambassador Harriman in  
Moscow, th e re  was a  re p re s e n ta t iv e  o f  th e  Department o f Defense and 
th e  Ambassador rece iv ed  h i s  in s tru c t io n s  d i r e c t ly  from th e  P re s id e n t,
•who in  tu rn  was adv ised  by th e  J o in t  C hiefs and members o f h is  admin­
i s t r a t i o n .  G eneral T ay lo r -was p r iv y  to  a l l  cab les  from Moscow and 
he in  tu rn  inform ed th e  o th e r  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  as to  t h e i r  co n ten t 
and th e  p ro g ress  o f n e g o tia t io n s . A lth o u ^  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  
cou ld  have o b jec ted  and had th e  r ig h t  to  in te rv e n e , th ey  saw noth ing  
to  o b je c t to  a t  any tim e and gave f u l l  acco rd  to  th e  t r e a ty  b e fo re  i t  
■was i n i t i a l e d . ^
The fo llow ing  day th e  rem ainder o f th e  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  appeared 
and answered th e  co n se rv a tiv e  b lo c 's  q u estio n  -with a  unanimous,"Ho, 
s i r . "  S en a to r K uchel, R epublican o f C a l ifo rn ia , in d ic a te d  th a t  he 
had re c e iv e d  an "abnormal" amount o f m ail from so u th ern  C a lifo rn ia  
in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  were opposed to  th e  t r e a ty  
b u t t h a t  th ey  had been brainw ashed. The answers S en a to r K uchel r e ­
ceived  from th e  C hiefs should  have s ile n c e d  th e  o p p o s itio n  on t h i s  one 
p o s i t io n ;
^Ibid. , pp. 297.
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GEMRAL LEMAÏ:. . .a s  to  th e  b ra inw ash ing . I  would re s e n t 
very  much any a ttem pt to  p u t p re s su re  on me to  come up w ith  
an answer e i th e r  way on t h i s  t r e a t y .  . . .1  say  ag a in  th a t  
th e re  has been no p re s su re  a p p lie d  to  me in  t h i s  m a tte r .
GEEBRAl WHEELER:. . .1 , to o , would re s e n t  any p re s su re  being  
p u t upon me. . . .1  th in k  G enera l LeMay i s  c o rre c t in  say ing  
th a t  each o f us p robab ly  a sse sse d  th e  v a rio u s  r i s k s  and th e  
v a rio u s  advantages w ith  a  s l ig h t ly  d i f f e r e n t  w eigh t.
AIMIEAL MCDONALD:. . .1  have n o th in g  to  add to  what G eneral 
LeMay and G eneral W heeler have s ta t e d  o th e r  th a n  to  say fo r  
m yself th a t  no p re s su re  w hatsoever was p u t on me.
GENERAL SHOUP:. . .1  ag ree  w ith  t h a t  s ta tem en t. . . .1  was 
c a l le d  f o r  by th e  Commander-in-Chief and th e  S e c re ta ry  o f 
Defense in  person  and in  p r iv a te  and I  presume th a t  i f  p re s ­
su re  was be ing  used I  would have found o u t .^
Edward T e l le r
Dr. T e l l e r 's  appearance b e fo re  th e  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee 
has been c a l le d  a  " to u r de fo rce "  in  defending h is  o p p o sitio n  to  th e  
t r e a t y .  His p o s i t io n  was b a s ic a l ly  th e  same as he had g iven  b e fo re  
th e  Armed S erv ices  Subcommittee b u t he  warned th e  S en a to rs , " I f  you 
r a t i f y  t h i s  t r e a ty  you w i l l  have g iven  away th e  fu tu re  s a fe ty  o f our 
co un try , and in c re a se d  th e  danger o f  w ar."
By August 22, 1963, th e  committee had worked i t s  way through 
n e a r ly  a l l  th e  m i l i t a r y  and s c i e n t i f i c  community and on th a t  day 
th ey  h eard  from Dr. W illa rd  Libby and A dm iral Lewis L. S tra u s s .
While Dr. Libby endorsed th e  t r e a ty .  A dm iral S tra u s s , a l t h o u ^  he 
d id  n o t oppose th e  t r e a ty ,  gave e s s e n t ia l ly  n e g a tiv e  te stim o n y .
^ Ibid ., pp. 354-356.
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l a t e  a fte rn o o n  on August 22, I 963 , i t  seemed th a t  th e  
c i r c l e  had tu rn e d  f u l l  w ith  th e  appearance o f H arold  E. S ta ssen , 
accompanied by h is  daughter K ath leen . Mr. S ta sse n  had been P re s ­
id e n t E isenhow er's f i r s t  appo in tee  in  charge o f  disarm am ent. Mr. 
S ta ssen  supported  th e  t r e a ty  and c a l le d  f o r  f u l l  " b ip a r tis a n "  support 
because th e  t r e a ty  re q u ire d , in  th e  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  above a l l  
e ls e ,  in  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f hum anity, overwhelming and b ip a r t is a n  
su p p o rt.
Prom t h i s  p o in t on th e  committee heard  from  in d iv id u a ls  who 
w ished to  be heard  on th e  su b je c t, b e fo re  th e  committee pu b lish ed  
i t s  f in d in g s . One o f  theramost im portan t in d iv id u a ls  who was r e ­
sp o n sib le  fo r  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  and much o f th e  adv ice  reg ard in g  
tim ing  o f  P re s id e n t Kennedy’s June 10th  speech was Horman Cousins, 
E d ito r  o f th e  S aturday  Beview.
Mr. Cousins had an o p p o rtu n ity  to  spend th r e e  hours w ith  
P rem ier Khrushchev in  December o f I 962 and s ix  hours in  A p r il  o f 
1963 . In  h is  co n v ersa tio n s  w ith  th e  R ussian  le a d e r  i t  became 
ev id en t t h a t  Khrushchev t i e d  h is  p o l i t i c a l  fu tu re  to  th e  t e s t  ban 
t r e a ty ,  hoping th a t  he cou ld  p o in t to  th e  t r e a t y  as a  p o s i t iv e  ga in  
from th e  m is s i le  c o n fro n ta tio n  w ith  th e  U nited  S ta te s  in  I 962,  fo r  
which he was under severe  c r i t ic i s m  from th e  Communist Chinese. 
Furtherm ore, th e re  was tro u b le  w ith  th e  R ussian  econony and Khiushchev 
d id  n o t want to  lo s e  th e  m a te r ia l  g a in s  in  housing  p r o je c ts ,  power 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  o r dams. P re s id e n t K ennedy's June 10 th  speech was 
th e  opening o f  a  door th a t  th e  R ussians though t was c lo sed  to  them.
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Mr. Cousins in d ic a te d  th a t  p r im a ri ly  Mr. Khrushchev, in  p re s s in g
f o r  a  n o n m ilita ry  showdown was n o t fo rego ing  h is  aim s, b u t recogn ized
th a t  n u c le a r  war was n o t a  r e a l i s t i c  e n te r p r is e .  Cousins added th a t :
. . . I t  seems to  me Zcbusin& \ th a t  Khrushchev had t i e d  h is  
p o l i t i c a l  fu tu re  to  some u n d ers tan d in g  w ith  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
which would make i t  p o s s ib le  to  c a l l  o f f  o r a t  l e a s t  reduce 
th e  dangers o f  war and f r e e  him f o r  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  Chinese 
Communists. He made th a t  ch o ice . That cho ice  was c le a r .
P ro fe sso r  M arsha ll Darrow Shulman o f th e  F le tc h e r  School o f
Law and Diplomacy backed up Mr. C ousins ' co n ten tio n s  t h a t  Prem ier
Khrushchev had c le a r ly  p laced  h is  p o l i t i c a l  fu tu r e  w ith  th a t  o f
th e  U n ited  S ta te s :
. . .1  hope th a t  in  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  t h i s  t r e a ty  t h a t  
we would b rin g  to  b e a r th e  view o f our lo n g -te rm  in t e r e s t s  
in  r e l a t io n  to  th e  S o v ie t Union; th a t  i s  to  say , i t  seems to  
me im portan t t h a t  we always have p re s e n t in  ou r minds in  
d ec id in g  upon immediate measures to  u n d e rta k e , what th e  
d ir e c t io n  i s  we a re  t r y in g  t o  move in  in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  
S o v ie t Union, and i f  th e  d i r e c t io n  i s  to  b r in g  them a long  to  
th e  p o in t where we can m oderate some o f  th e  h azard s  o f  t h i s  
c o n fro n ta tio n , and perhaps over a  v e ry  long  p e r io d  o f  tim e 
m oderate th e  fo rc e  o f  t h e i r  p o lic y  d i r e c t io n  t h a t  makes i t  
p o s s ib le  to  l iv e  a t  a  low er l e v e l  o f te n s io n , t h a t  t h i s  
should  be done, and th a t  m easures th a t  we ta k e  to  p ro te c t  
our s e c u r i ty  in  th e  sh o r t- te rm  should  n o t be v io la t iv e  o f  
our long -term  i n t e r e s t s .
As a  c o n tra s t  to  Mr. Cousins and Dr. Shulman, th e  committee 
a ls o  h ea rd  from  Mr. R obert E. Bauman, N a tio n a l Chairman, Young 
Americans f o r  Freedom, I n c . ,  a  n a t io n a l  c o n se rv a tiv e  you th  o rg a n i­
z a tio n  w ith  more th an  25,000  members in  c o lle g e s , h ig h  schools and
^ Ib id . , pp. 792-794.
^Ibid., p. 8lO.
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communities a l l  over th e  U nited  S ta te s .  The Y.A.F. was opposed 
to  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f th e  t r e a ty  by th e  U n ited  S ta te s  S e n a te .^
To back up h is  p o s i t io n ,  Mr. Bauman quoted Theodore R oosevelt, 
b u t f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  purposes he cou ld  have been quo ting  th e  
members o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  P reparedness Subcommittee: "Weak­
ness always in v i te s  a t ta c k .  P reparedness u s u a liy  p rev en ts  i t .
Mr. Bauman made th e  u n fo r tu n a te  m istake  o f l i s t i n g  as opposed t o  
th e  t r e a ty  Dr. E rn est 0 . Lawrence, in  a d d itio n  to  Dr. Edward T e l le r .  
S en a to r F u lb r ig h t inform ed Mr. Bauman th a t  Dr. Lawrence had been 
dead f o r  about fo u r years  and th e  S en a to r wondered a loud  where 
Mr. Bauman o b ta in ed  h is  sou rce .
Of th e  rem aining p o tp o u rr i o f w itn e sse s , su p p o rt came from 
A rthu r H. Dean, Ambassador to  th e  E igh teen  N ation  Disarmament Con­
fe re n ce ; John J .  McCloy, a d v ise r  to  P re s id e n ts  Eisenhower and 
Kennedy and a r c h i te c t  o f th e  Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency; 
Hans Bethe and Dr. H erbert York; P ro fe sso rs  I .  R abi, Linus C. 
P au lin g , Edward M. P u rce l and Dr. George B. K istiakow sky. Dr.
Robert S trausz-H upe, D ire c to r  o f  th e  F o re ig n  P o lic y  Research 
I n s t i t u t e ,  U n iv e rs ity  o f P ennsy lvan ia  gave ap p ro v a l o f  th e  t r e a ty ,  
b u t only  a f t e r  th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union had s e t t l e d  
a l l  p o l i t i c a l  qu estio n s  co n fro n tin g  th e  two in  a re as  such as Cuba, 
Laos, Vietnam, and B e r lin . S ena to r Humphrey asked Dr. Hupe i f  he
^ Ib id . , p . 712 .
2lb id .
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d id  n o t c le a r ly  u n d ers tan d  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  message th a t  t h i s  
t r e a ty  was b u t a  f i r s t  " te n a tiv e "  s te p  tow ard re d u c tio n  o f te n s io n s  
so th a t  o th e r p o l i t i c a l  qu estio n s  cou ld  th en  be co n sid ered . A dd it­
io n a l ly ,  Dr. Hupe was concerned th a t  th e  Senate make i t  c le a r  by 
way o f a  "sense o f  th e  Senate" re s o lu t io n  o r amendment t o  th e  t r e a ty  
t h a t  s ig n a tu re s  in  co n ce rt w ith  o th e r n a tio n s  d id  n o t c o n s t i tu te  
"de fa c to "  o r "de ju re "  re c o g n itio n  o f  E ast Germany o r Red China.
The Report
On September 3 rd , th e  Committee on F o re ign  R e la tio n s  f i l e d  
i t s  r e p o r t .  Zhe Comnittee approved th e  t r e a ty  by a  v o te  o f s ix ­
te e n  to  one w ith  S en a to r R u sse ll  B. Long, Democrat o f  L ou isiana  
d is s e n tin g . B efore ad op ting  th e  f i n a l  re p o r t ,  which in  i t s e l f  
i s  an e x c e lle n t summation o f  th e  arguments f o r  and a g a in s t  th e  
t r e a ty ,  th e  committee: ( l )  r e je c te d  by a  v o te  o f  te n  to  seven th e  
H ickenlooper motion t h a t  co p ies  o f  a l l  t r e a ty  correspondence be­
tween th e  p r in c ip le s  o f th e  t r e a ty  be handed over to  th e  Committee; 
(2 ) r e je c te d  by a  v o te  o f e leven  to  f iv e  th e  motion by S enato r 
C a rl 14xndt t o  d e lay  th e  v o te  u n t i l  p r in te d  cop ies  o f th e  testim ony  
a lre a d y  h eard  were made a v a ila b le ;  and (3) r e je c te d  S en a to r 
L ausche 's  motion to  delay  th e  v o te  u n t i l  a  jo in t  d isc u ss io n  could  
be h e ld  between th e  Armed Forces Committee and th e  J o in t  Atomic 
Energy Commission by a  v o te  o f eleven  to  f iv e .
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Although th e se  th re e  S enato rs  signed  th e  r e p o r t ,  th ey  
were in -th e -m ain  a l l  c r i t i c a l  th roughout th e  h ea rin g s  and 
"o rc h e s tra te d "  t h e i r  q u estio n s  very  c lo se ly  w ith  th e  "hawks" 
from th e  co n se rv a tiv e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee. They announced 
t h a t  even though th ey  were s ig n in g  th e  re p o r t  th e y  re se rv ed  th e  
r ig h t  to  change t h e i r  minds a f t e r  th ey  had a  chance t o  review  
th e  p o r tio n  o f th e  h e a rin g s  o f th e  Senate P reparedness Subcommittee 
which were " c lo se d ." ^
The H ickenlooper demand f o r  th e  correspondence was met by 
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  Rusk tdio o ffe re d  to  show i t  to  th e  Foreign  
R e la tio n s  Committee. S en a to r Aiken s a id  th a t  th e  committee r e ­
je c te d  i t  because th e y  d id  n o t want th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f pass in g  
2judgment on i t .
S ena to r Mundt in d ic a te d  th a t  ap p roval o f th e  t r e a ty  by 
th e  F oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee d id  no t mean th a t  th e  Senate 
would n o t a t ta c h  re s e rv a tio n s  t o  th e  t r e a ty .
Both S en a to rs  were very  i n f l u e n t i a l  w ith in  th e  Republican 
P a r ty  and th e  co n se rv a tiv e  Southern  b lo c  o f Dem ocrats. T heir 
a t t i tu d e s  in d ic a te d  f u r th e r  tro u b le  f o r  th e  t r e a ty  i n  th e  S ena te .
The c lo se  co o p era tio n  between Chairman F u lb r ig h t and th e  
a d m in is tra tio n  gave a  s u p e r f ic ia l  p ic tu re  th a t  th e  t r e a ty  would 
have no tro u b le  o b ta in in g  th e  S e n a te 's  con sen t.
Newsweek (September I 963) .
% he New York Times (August 31, 19^3 )
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P re s id e n t Kennedy and h is  s t a f f  had been c a re fu l  to  answer 
o r a n t ic ip a te  th e  o b je c tio n s  o f th e  " c o n se rv a tiv e -c o a litio n "  in  
th e  Senate  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y .  While th e  F oreign  R e la tio n s  
Committee was th e  forum used to  answer th e  c o a l i t io n ,  i t  i s  i n ­
escapable  to  n o te  t h a t  th e  committee d id  n o t f u l l y  r e a l iz e  th e  
ro le  o f Congress to  in v e s t ig a te  t o  inform  i t s e l f ,  b u t a t  tim es 
took  on th e  appearance o f a  propaganda machine and debating  
s o c ie ty .^
^Meg G re n fie ld , "Ping Pong on th e  Potom ac," R eporter 
(Septem ber, I 963) .
CHAPTER V II 
ADVICE AM) COIdBENT
A r t ic le  I I ,  S ec tio n  2 , o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  C o n s ti tu tio n  
g ives th e  P re s id e n t power, by and w ith  th e  adv ice  and consen t o f 
th e  S en a te , to  make t r e a t i e s ,  p rov ided  tw o -th ird s  o f  th e  S ena to rs  
p re s e n t concur. The P re s id e n t may n o t r a t i f y  a  t r e a t y  u n t i l  th e  
S enate  g ives i t s  endorsem ent.
The S enate  has o th e r  a l t e r n a t iv e s  th an  m erely a ccep tin g  
o r  r e je c t in g  a  t r e a t y .  R ese rv a tio n s  may be added to  a  t r e a t y .
Such re s e rv a tio n s  most g e n e ra lly  le a d  to  re n e g o tia t io n s  and, as 
in  th e  case  o f  th e  T rea ty  o f  V e r s a i l le s ,  may le a d  to  r e je c t io n .
The S enate  may a ls o  approve r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  t r e a t y  w ith  
an "understand ing" o f  i t s  i n t e n t .  These "u n derstand ings"  a re  
f re q u e n tly  accep ted  by th e  Committee on F o re ig n  A f fa ir s  and, as 
such, do n o t have th e  damaging e f f e c t  o f amendments o r  r e s e rv a tio n s .
There i s  an ex ecu tiv e  dev ice  a v a i la b le  to  th e  P re s id e n t o f  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  implement o r , in  some in s ta n c e s , t o  "g e t a -  
rcund" a  re b e l l io u s  S en a te . T his dev ice  i s  th e  E xecu tive  Agreement. 
There a re  th re e  ty p es  o f E xecu tive  Agreem ents; th o se  which a re  
used  to  implement a u th o r i ty  g iv en  to  th e  E xecu tive  by th e  l e g i s ­
l a t i v e  b ranch; th o se  which a re  e n te red  in to  and th e n  l a t e r  approved 
by r e s o lu t io n  by a  sim ple m a jo r ity  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch when 
i t  appears t h a t  th e  tw o -th ird s  v o te  w i l l  n o t be forthcom ing from
lh2
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th e  S enate; and th o se  vh ich  re q u ire  no l e g i s l a t i v e  a c tio n  o r 
app rova l and •which have been used  to  conclude a rm is tic e  a g re e ­
m ents, agreem ents to  commit tro o p s  o f th e  U nited  S ta te s  in  
support o f our fo re ig n  p o lic y , and agreem ents -with th e  heads o f 
o th e r  n a t io n s . The "hot l in e "  -was an example o f  th e  l a t t e r  exec­
u t iv e  agreem ent. U n fo rtu n a te ly , th e  involvem ent in  K orea, th e  
Middle E a s t, and Vietnam a re  o th e r  exam ples.
In  th e  h is to r y  o f th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ' a c tio n s  on t r e a t i e s ,  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  Senate  has a c te d  on 1,357* They have approved, 
■without re s e rv a tio n s  o r  u n d e rs tan d in g s , ^44. Two hundred f i f t y -  
two t r e a t i e s  have passed  ■vTlth re s e rv a tio n s  o r u n d ers tan d in g s  and 
133 t r e a t i e s  have been r e je c te d  o u t r ig h t .^
Sena te  Debate
P re s id e n t Kennedy subm itted  th e  t r e a ty  to  th e  Senate f o r
i t s  adv ice  and consen t to  r a t i f i c a t i o n  on August 8 , I 963:
This t r e a ty  i s  in  our n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .  W hile experience  
te ach es  us to  be cau tio u s  in  our ex p ec ta tio n s  and ever 
v ig i l a n t  in  our p re p a ra t io n s , th e re  i s  no reaso n  to  oppose 
t h i s  h o p efu l s te p .  I t  i s  r a r e ly  p o s s ib le  to  re c a p tu re  
m issed o p p o r tu n itie s  to  ach ieve  a  more secu re  and p e a c e fu l 
w orld . To govern i s  to  choose, and i t  i s  my judgment th a t  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  shou ld  move s 'w if tly  to  make th e  most o f  
th e  p re se n t o p p o rtu n ity  and approve th e  pending t r e a t y . ^
^C ongressional Q u arte rly  (August 2 , I 963) .
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  p .  14558.
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O fficaJ-ly , th e  S ena te  took  up forma], debate  on th e  
t r e a ty  on September 9 th , and th e  debate  l a s t e d  u n t i l  September 
2 4 th . However, as e a r ly  as August 6 th  S en a to r E obertson , o f 
V irg in ia , made a  p a r t i c u la r ly  v i r u le n t  a t ta c k  on th e  t r e a ty .
Members o f  th e  Armed S e rv ice  Committee con tinued  t h e i r  a t ta c k  
up t o  and in c lu d in g  th e  fo rm al d eb a te . S en a to r Goldwater was 
th e  most v o ca l o f  th e  group during  th e  p re -d e b a te  in te r im . He 
used  th e  f lo o r  o f th e  Senate  as  an  ex ten s io n  o f  th e  h earin g s  
be ing  h e ld  by th e  Preparedness Subcommittee o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  
Committee. S en a to r Thurmond, w h ile  r e f r a in in g  from speaking 
e x te n s iv e ly  during  t h i s  p e r io d , in s e r te d  voluminous cop ies o f 
co n se rv a tiv e  newspaper e d i to r i a l s ,  s ta tem en ts  by r ig h t  wing 
jo u r n a l i s t s ,  and propaganda from th e  John B irch  S o c ie ty . S enato r 
Thurmond i s  l i s t e d  by th e  Young Americans f o r  Freedom on t h e i r  
C ongressional A dvisory Board. He l a t e r  r e g is te r e d  as  a  E epubllcan 
on September l6 ,  1964, in  support o f th e  Goldwater campaign. 
Democratic S en a to rs  Jackson and S ten n is  made minor c o n tr ib u tio n s  
to  th e  p re -d e b a te  co lloquy .
The t r e a ty  was defended during  th i s  p e r io d  by S ena to r 
Humphrey o f M innesota. S en a to r Goldwater had used  th e  Senate  to  
sound ou t h is  f e a r s  o f th e  t r e a ty  w ithou t any m ajor o p p o s itio n  
from  th e  a d m in is tra tio n . However, on August 19 th , S en a to r Humphrey 
ob ta in ed  th e  f lo o r  f o r  th e  purpose o f  answ ering th e  S en a to r from 
A rizona:
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I  r i s e  to  p r o te s t  th e  strawmen t h a t  a re  s e t  up day a f t e r  
day fo r  someone to  knock down and say " l  have proved ray 
p o in t ."  . . .1  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  S e n a to r 's  speech p re se n ts  
a  co n stan t a t t i t u d e  o f  doubt and su sp ic io n . I  do n o t be­
l ie v e  t h a t  i t  makes a  c o n s tru c tiv e  c o n tr ib u tio n  to  a  
th o u g h tfu l d isc u ss io n  o f  th e  a ll- im p o r ta n t  t r e a ty  t h a t  i s  
b e fo re  u s .
There a re  s e v e ra l  reasons why S en a to r Goldwater had been 
allow ed t o  pursue h is  d e ro g a to iy  o ra to ry  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y .  The 
month o f  August was a  very  t r y in g  tim e f o r  Congress and th e  C hief 
E xecu tive . On August 9 th , th e  P re s id e n t and Mrs. K ennedy's in fa n t  
son d ied . On August 10 th , S en a to r K efauver d ie d . The P eace fu l 
March on W ashington clim axed on August 2 8 th . S e c re ta ry  o f Defense 
McNamara had is su e d  h is  decree  reg a rd in g  "o ff-b a se  d isc r im in a tio n "  
in  c i t i e s  and towns n e a r m il i t a r y  bases and, because o f t h i s ,  th e  
Southern  b lo c  o f S en ato rs  was as busy condemning th e  S e c re ta ry  as 
th ey  were th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty .
On August 3 1 s t , two im portan t even ts gave th e  a d m in is tra tio n  
hopes f o r  th e  t r e a t y .  S en a to r Bourke H ickenlooper, rank ing  Re­
p u b lican  on th e  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee and Atomic Energy 
Commission, announced h is  support f o r  th e  t r e a t y .  The G allup P o l l  
showed t h a t  63 p e rc en t fav o red  th e  t r e a ty  to  I 7 p e rc en t opposed. 
F i f ty - e ig h t  p e rc en t o f  a l l  R epublicans were in  fa v o r to  6 7  p e rc en t 
Democrats. More s u rp r is in g  was th e  f ig u re  th a t  52 p e rc en t o f  a l l  
th o se  id e n t i f ie d  as being  Goldwater su p p o rte rs  favored  th e  t r e a t y . ^
^ I b i d . ,  p .  1 5 2 8 9 .
p
American I n s t i t u t e  o f  P u b lic  O pinion.
Ikô
Ih e  f in a l  v o te  on th e  t r e a ty  re p re se n te d  a  " b ip a r tis a n "  
v o te  le d  by S enato r Evere t  D irhsen , Republican o f I l l i n o i s ,  and 
S enato rs  Bourke H ickenlooper o f Iowa and Mundt o f North D akota.^
At th e  beginn ing  o f th e  se s s io n , S enato r D irksen in s e r te d  
in to  th e  Record a l l  o f  h is  p u b lic  sta tem en ts  re g a rd in g  any t e s t  
ban t r e a ty  and p o lic y  s ta tem en ts  o f  th e  Republican P a rty  which 
in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e re  might be a  number o f  amendments and r e s e r ­
v a tio n s  from th e  R epublican P a r ty . Although th e  S en a to r d id  not 
g iv e  h is  approval a t  t h i s  tim e , th e re  was some reason  to  th in k  
th a t  i t  would be forthcom ing. S en a to r D irksen re a c te d  q u ite  
s tro n g ly  in  fav o r o f th e  m otion to  commit th e  t r e a t y  to  th e  Senate 
F o re ign  R ela tio n s  Committee. I n  th e  m otion to  commit. S enato r 
Sparkman made no te  th a t  S en a to r R u sse ll had asked t h a t  th e  Armed 
S e rv ice s  Committee be allow ed to  s i t  s e p a ra te ly  to  h e a r w itn esses  
on th e  t r e a ty .
The Armed S e rv ices  Committee would serve  on ly  in  an ad ­
v is o ry  c a p a c ity , because ju r i s d ic t io n  o f co u rse , i s  s o le ly  
in  th e  Committee on F o re ign  R e la tio n s .
S en a to r A lb e rt Gore o f  Tennessee to ld  t h i s  w r i te r  th a t  he 
though t S en a to r H ickenlooper had more in flu en c e  on S en a to r D irksen 
in  su p p o rtin g  th e  t r e a ty  th an  v ic e -v e r sa . Of a l l  th e  R epublicans, 
S en a to r H ickenlooper would have had more in fo rm atio n  and e x p e r tis e  
th an  anyone, w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f  S enato rs Gore and Humphrey, r e ­
gard in g  disarm am ent. The speeches o f Senato r H ickenlooper and Mundt
^A. Krock, Tlie New York Times (August 20, 1963) .
2C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  p . IÀ558.
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a re  p a r t i c u la r ly  in te r e s t in g  f o r  t h e i r  concern over th e  r o le  o f 
th e  Senate  to  g iv e  "adv ice" to  th e  P re s id e n t re g a rd in g  th e  sub­
s tan c e  o f fo re ig n  p o lic y .
P ro fe sso rs  O rabb,^ D ahl,^  and Snyder^ in d ic a te  th a t  g e n e ra lly  
th e  ro le  o f  th e  Senate in  treaty-m aJd.ng has d e c lin ed  to  th e  p o in t 
o f a  mere fo rm a li ty . Hovever, as  we s h a l l  see  in  th e  r o le  o f  th e  
E x ecu tive , th e  Senate  in  t h i s  case  was ex trem ely  in s tru m e n ta l and 
w ell-in fo rm ed  on th e  m e rits  o f  th e  t r e a ty .
The S enate  debate  was d iv id ed  in to  roughly  th r e e  d i s t i n c t  
g ro u p s: ( l ) t h e  proponents o f th e  t r e a ty  headed by S en a to rs  M ansfie ld , 
P u lb r ig h t and Humphrey (2) th e  opponents o f th e  t r e a t y  le d  by 
S en ato rs  G oldw ater, S te n n is , Thurmond, R u ss e ll ,  and Tower and 
supported  by th e  "co n se rv a tiv e - c o a l i t io n " ^  and (3 ) a  b ip a r t i s a n  
group o f R epublicans and Democrats o f  b o th  c o n se rv a tiv e  and l i b e r a l  
id e o lo g ie s .
^Crabb, op. c i t .
^Robert A. Dahl, Congress and F o re ign  P o lic y  (New York: W.
¥ .  N orton & C o., I n c . ,  1993).
^R ichard  C. Snyder and Edgar S . E u rn is s , American F o re ign  
P o lic y : F orm ula tion , P r in c ip le s ,  Programs (New York: R in eh art & Co., 1954).
4D efined in  Supra, C hapter I I .  S en a to rs  sco rin g  h igh  on th e  
C ongressional Q u arte rly  sco reboard  a re :  Southern  D em ocrats:S tenn is, 
M is s is s ip p i;  M cClellan, A rkansas; R u sse ll , G eorgia; E a s tla n d , M iss­
i s s ip p i ;  Ryrd, V irg in ia ; Jo rd an , N orth C aro lin a ; E rv in , South Caro­
l i n a .  R epublicans: Thurmond; H ickenlooper; Young; Jo rdan ; A l lo t t ;
Mundt; W illiam s; G oldw ater. N orthem Dem ocrats:Cannon, Nevada;
West V irg in ia ; B ib le , Nevada; Lausche, Ohio; A nderson, New Mexico; 
Symington, M isso u ri.
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Proponents 
S en a to r P u lb r ig h t
S en a to r P u lb r ig h t ,  as Chairman o f th e  pow erful Senate  
Committee on P oreign  R e la tio n s , le d  th e  form al defense  o f  th e  
L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  and pushed f o r  i t s  adop tion  w ithou t 
any re s e rv a tio n s  o r amendments. While app rova l o f  th e  t r e a ty  
would re q u ire  tw o -th ird s  vo te  by th e  S en a te , amendments and 
re s e rv a tio n s  would re q u ire  a  sim ple m a jo rity . Such amendments 
would have th e  e f f e c t  o f  k i l l i n g  th e  t r e a t y .  Any a d d itio n s  to  
th e  body o r  s p i r i t  o f  th e  t r e a ty  would re q u ire  re n e g o tia t io n s  
w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union and England. In  a d d itio n , over f i f t y  o th e r  
n a tio n s  had sig n ed  th e  t r e a ty  a t  th e  tim e o f th e  S e n a te 's  c o n s id ­
e r a t io n .  More im p o rtan t, t h i s  was an in stru m en t o f  American 
fo re ig n  p o lic y , i n i t i a t e d  and n e g o tia te d  by our d ip lom ats .
When S en a to r P u lb r ig h t opened debate on September 9 th , he 
asked c e r ta in  fundam ental qu estio n s  about th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f a  
t r e a t y .  Would th e  t r e a t y  be com patib le w ith  th e  m il i t a r y  s e c u r i ty  
of th e  U n ited  S ta te s?  Did th e  t r e a ty  advance th e  purposes o f 
American P o re ig n  P o licy ?^
S en a to r P u l b r i ^ t  concluded th a t  th e  t r e a ty  was b o th  " sa fe "  
and "w ise ."  The t r e a ty ,  fu rth erm o re , was b u t a  te n a t iv e  and p r e ­
cau tio n a ry  " f i r s t  s tep "  tow ards s t a b i l i t y  and m oderation and i t  would 
in  some sm all measure m itig a te  th e  fe a rs  and su sp ic io n s  o f th e  co ld
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp. l6$2$-l6^4^.
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war and perhaps le ad  to  o th e r a re a s  o f accommodation. This 
use o f th e  term "o th e r a re as  o f accommodation" had le d  th e  
opponents o f th e  t r e a ty  to  conclude th a t  th e re  were o th er 
s e c re t  agreem ents made a t  Moscow and they  co n cen tra ted  a g re a t 
deal o f th e i r  a t ta c k s  on th is  id ea .
As a form er p ro fe s so r , th e  Senator p o in ted  out a funda­
m ental f a c t  o f power p o l i t i c s ;  th e re  a re  a re as  of m utual con­
sensus th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  and the S ov ie t Union might both  
p r o f i t  by. P r im a rily , a r e s p i te  in  th e  co ld  war ten sio n s  could 
produce a p e rio d  o f d e te n te  whereby each n a tio n  could work on 
dom estic problem s.
Senator P u lb r ig h t noted th a t  th e re  were good reasons fo r  
th e  S ov ie t Union w anting a r e la x a t io n  o f te n s io n s  a t  th i s  tim e: 
( l ) th e  S ino -S ov ie t d isp u te  was prim ary in  th e i r  c o n s id e ra tio n s .
A t e s t  ban would help  th e  R ussians immeasurably in  th e i r  id e o lo g ic a l 
d isp u te  w ith  th e  Red Chinese who had b e ra te d  the S ov ie t Union fo r  
i t s  a c tio n s  a f t e r  th e  m is s i le  c r i s i s  in  1962. The Soviet Union had 
p ic tu re d  i t s e l f  as a model o f r e s t r a i n t  and i t s  main propaganda 
p o s i t io n  was "peace" and " re a so n a b len e ss ."  (2) com petitive  co­
e x is te n c e  had f a i l e d  and th e  R ussians were having d i f f i c u l t i e s  a t  
home in  a g r ic u l tu re .  The d i f f i c u l t i e s  were caused by the  demands 
o f th e  R ussian  people fo r  more and b e t te r  foods and "sof t "  goods 
fo r  consumption. The S o v ie ts  were a ls o  having d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  
th e i r  s a t e l l i t e s  in  E a s te rn  Europe because o f th e  obvious d iffe re n c e  
between th e  economic recovery  between East and West Germany. A ll 
o f th e se  f a c to r s  c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  o v e r - a l l  d e s ire  o f th e  S ov ie t
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Union f o r  a  p e rio d  o f p e a c e fu l d e te n te  w ith  th e  W est.
S en a to r F u lh r ig h t concluded h is  i n i t i a l  re p o r t  by r e ­
marking t h a t :  "A g e n e ra tio n  ago we were speaking o f  making th e  
w orld s a fe  fo r  Democracy. Having f a i l e d ,  we must now seek ways 
o f  making th e  w orld reaso n ab ly  s a fe  f o r  th e  co n tin u in g  c o n te s t 
between th o se  who fav o r Democracy and th o se  who oppose i t .
S en a to r P u lb r ig h t, as f lo o r  le a d e r  f o r  th e  t r e a ty ,  was 
c a l le d  upon to  answer alm ost every  opposing S e n a to r. He proved 
to  be a  sp len d id  p a rlia m e n ta r ia n  in  p a t ie n t ly  ex p la in in g  th e  
p rocedures o f "advice and consen t"  t o  th e  S en a to rs  o f th e  "con- 
s e r v a t iv e - c o a l i t io n ," p a r t i c u la r ly  S en a to rs  Mundt and H ickenlooper.
Both S enato rs  q u estioned  when th e  p rocess o f  "adv ice" was 
s t a r t e d  and why S en a to r P u lb r ig h t  d id  n o t seek  th e  "advice" o f  
th e  S en a to rs  b e fo re  th e  t r e a t y  was r a t i f i e d  by over f i f t y  n a tio n s  
and i n i t i a l e d  by th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  o r  co n sidered  by th e  
P o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee. More p ro p e rly , th e  two S ena to rs  were 
wondering why th e  E xecu tive  b ranch  had n o t sought e i th e r  a  "sense 
o f th e  S enate" o r  a  r e s o lu t io n  o f  th e  S enate  in d ic a t in g  th e  S e n a te ’s 
d e s ir e  fo r  any t r e a t y .  W hile th e  course d e s ire d  by th e  co n se rv a tiv e  
S enato rs  might have been d e s ir a b le ,  and even p o s s ib le , during  th e  
19th  C entu iy , such an approach would be cumbersome, tim e-consum ing, 
and would b rin g  about a  c e r ta in  p a ra ly s is  and in d e c is io n . One 
m ight s e r io u s ly  q u estio n  S en a to r H ickenlooper on t h i s  f a c t  s in c e
^ i d .
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he had p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  n e g o tia tio n s  in  Geneva. S u re ly , 
th e  S enato r understood  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  m ight, one day, 
a c tu a l ly  come up w ith  a  form ula f o r  l im i ta t io n s  on atom ic 
t e s t in g .
S enato r Eobertson o f V irg in ia  a tta c k e d  S en a to r P u lb r ig h t
p e rso n a lly  f o r  "p lay ing  down" th e  testim ony  o f  th e  m i l i t a r y .
S enato r P u lb r ig h t p o in te d  ou t t h a t  h is  committee had  h eard  th e
J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  and a l l  concerned m i l i t a r y  who had c u rre n t
in te l l ig e n c e  in fo rm atio n . He f u r th e r  took  th i s  o p p o rtu n ity  to
a t ta c k  th e  encroachment o f  th e  Armed S e iv ic e s  Committee on th e
P oreign  R e la tio n s  Com m ittee's ju r i s d ic t io n :
. . . I t  i s  most unusual f o r  a  subcommittee o f th e  Armed 
S e rv ices  Committee to  ta k e  up a  t r e a t y  and h o ld  h earin g s  
on i t .  I  know o f  no p reced en t -vdiatever in  th e  h is to r y  
o f th e  S enate  . . . f o r  a  subcommittee o f a n o th e r committee 
to  presume to  ta k e  up a  t r e a ty  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e . . . .
We took  th e  testim ony  o f  a l l  th e  Im portan t and a c c re d ite d  
o f f i c i a l s  o f th e  m il i t a r y  . . .we d id  n o t b e l ie v e  i t  
a p p ro p ria te  o r n ecessa ry  to  ta k e  th e  te stim o n y  o f  form er 
m il i ta r y  men who now have no r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  th e  s e c u r i ty  
o f t h i s  coun try .
H ubert H. Humphrey
More th a n  anyone e ls e .  S en a to r H ubert H. Humphrey deserves 
c r e d i t  fo r  th e  L im ited  l e s t  Ban T rea ty  between th e  U nited  S ta te s  
and th e  S o v ie t Union.
^Ibid., p. 17059-
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From th e  very  o u ts e t  o f n e g o tia tio n s  in  Geneva in  1958 and 
1959, Senator Humphrey, as Chairman of the  Senate Foreign  R e la tio n s  
Subcommittee on Disarmament, had always c a l le d  fo r  th e  U nited S ta te s  
to  sep a ra te  a t e s t  ban from th e  o th e r measures o f disarmament and 
e n te r  in to  n e g o tia tio n s  on a t e s t  ban o n ly .^
During the  Senate debate . Senator Humphrey was c a l le d  upon 
tim e and tim e ag a in  to  r e fu te  Senator Goldwater and seemed de­
l ig h te d  to  match w its  w ith  th e  Senate from A rizona.
Senator Humphrey's p o s it io n  supported  th a t  o f the  P re s id e n t 
and th e  Foreign  R e la tio n s  Committee. E a r l i e r  in  August he had 
o b jec ted  to  th e  "strawmen" th a t  Senator Goldwater and h is  co n se rv a tiv e  
m ilita ry -m in d ed  f r ie n d s  from th e  Armed S erv ices  Committee continued  
to  s e t  up.
In  h is  speech o f September 10th , he a tta c k e d  th e  o th e r o b je c tio n s  
th a t  the  Armed S erv ices  Committee had; "While some m i l i t a r y  and te c h n ic a l 
ex p e rts  exp ressed  doubts about th e  t r e a ty ,  those  s c i e n t i s t s ,  govern­
m ental o f f i c i a l s  and m i l i t a r y  o f f ic e r s  sup p o rtin g  th e  t r e a ty  were 
those  w ith  access  to  the  l a t e s t  and most comprehensive in te l l ig e n c e
2
and s c i e n t i f i c  d a ta  on which to  reach  th e  most balanced  co n c lu s io n s ."  
Furtherm ore, s in ce  Dr. Edward T e lle r  had d e p re c ia te d  th e  a r t  o f th e  U nited 
S ta te s  in te l l ig e n c e  g a th erin g  s e r v ic e ,th e  f a c ts  g iven in  s e c re t  h earin g s
^Humphrey In te rv iew , January  1, 1970.
2
C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp. 16612-16635,
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in d ic a te d  th a t  our in te l l ig e n c e  s e rv ic e  had proved "very  r e ­
l i a b l e .
On September 23rd, one day b e fo re  th e  form al v o te ,
S en a to r Humphrey c a te g o r ic a l ly  den ied  each a l le g a t io n  a g a in s t  
th e  t r e a ty :
Argument: The t r e a t y  m i ^ t  l im i t  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  P re s ­
id e n t  to  u se  n u c le a r  weapons in  tim e o f  w ar.
Answer: L egal op in ions o f  th e  le g a l  a d v ise r  to  th e
Department o f  S ta te  and th e  G enera l Counsel o f  th e  
Department o f Defense concluded t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  cannot 
be so in te r p r e te d .
Argument: A ccession to  th e  t r e a ty  w i l l  in v o lv e  re c o g n itio n
o f  E as t Germany.
Answer: The op in io n  o f  th e  l e g a l  a d v ise r  o f  th e  S e c re ta ry
o f  S ta te  i s  th a t  re c o g n itio n  i s  n o t in v o lv ed . A r t ic le  I I I  
o f  th e  t r e a ty  p ro v id es  f o r  a cc e ss io n  p ro ced u res .
Argument: The t r e a t y  may c o n f l ic t  w ith  U .S. commitments
to  our a l l i e s  fo r  d e fen siv e  pu rp o ses.
Answer: The t r e a t y  w i l l  n o t a f f e c t  any e x is t in g  commit­
ments f o r  d e fen siv e  purposes w ith  a l l i e s  o f  th e  U nited  
S t a t e s .
Argument: The t r e a ty  w i l l  i n h i b i t  th e  U .S. Plow share p ro ­
gram fo r  p e a c e fu l u se  o f  n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s .
Answer: According to  Dr. Seaborg, p re s e n tly  proposed
Plow share p ro je c ts  can .be  conducted underground.
Argument: Uhat e f f e c t  would a  a c c id e n ta l  v io la t io n  o f  th e
t r e a ty  th rough  "a l i t t l e  v en tin g "  have on th e  tr e a ty ?
In  th e  in te rv ie w  w ith  th e  V ice P re s id e n t, he in d ic a te d  th a t  
i t  was t h r o u ^  P ro je c t  YELk t h a t  th e  P re s id e n t and h im se lf  were a b le  
to  e v e n tu a lly  overwhelm any o p p o s itio n  from th e  R epublicans D irksen , 
Mundt, and H ickenlooper to  th e  t r e a t y .  The s c i e n t i f i c  community was 
overwhelmin g ly  in  fav o r o f  t h i s  t r e a t y  and th e  w eight o f  t h i s  t e s t i ­
mony; b e fo re  th e  S enate  and th e  p e rsu a s iv e  powers o f  th e  P re s id e n t 
enabled th e  U .S . to  combine a  p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n  w ith  a  s c i e n t i f i c  
and te c h n o lo g ic a l break through  in to  an im portan t " f i r s t  s t e p ."
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Answer: A sm all a c c id e n ta l  b reach  would n o t ab roga te
th e  t r e a ty .
Argument: I s  th e  d e f in i t io n  o f an underground t e s t
s u f f ic ie n t?
Answer: Yes.
Argument: The t r e a t y  co n ta in s  no assu rance  th a t  amendments
w i l l  be s u b je c t t o  th e  adv ice  and consent o f th e  Senate 
p r io r  to  t h e i r  e n te r in g  in to  e f f e c t .
Answer: The t r e a ty  makes c le a r  p ro v is io n  f o r  U .S. r a t i ­
f i c a t io n  o f amendments to  th e  t r e a ty  which under th e  C o n sti­
tu t io n  cannot be o b ta in ed  w ith o u t th e  adv ice  and consent 
o f  th e  S en a te .
Argument: The preanft»le o f th e  t r e a ty  commits th e  U nited
S ta te s  to  ev en tu a l n u c le a r  disarmam ent.
Answer: No pream ble to  any document ever committed any­
one to  an y th in g . At m ost, a  pream ble su g g e s ts . . . .
Argument: A t r e a ty  may have been made c o n tin g e n t upon
some u n d isc lo sed  agreem ent w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union.
Answer: The P re s id e n t o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  has given
a b so lu te  assu ran ces  th a t  i s  n o t th e  case .
Argument: In  th e  even t o f  a  v io la t io n ,  th e  U nited  S ta te s
would be p rev en ted  from te s t in g  under th e  t r e a t y 's  term s 
f o r  th e  90-day p e rio d  s p e c if ie d  i n  th e  t r e a t y 's  w ithdraw al 
c la u se .
Answer: I n  th e  even t o f  v io la t io n  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  may
im m ediately d e c la r e ^ i t s e l f  no lo n g e r bound by th e  t r e a ty  
and resume t e s t in g .
S en a to r Humphrey a ls o  answered p o in t- fo r -p o in t  th e  "q u es tio n s"  o f
th e  " r ig h t  wing" and "m ilita ry -m inded" S enato rs  as to  w hether
R ussians cou ld  be t r u s te d  and what th e y  were g e t t in g  out o f  th e
t r e a t y .  A s t a t e  o f  eu p horia  might e x i s t  a llow ing  th e  American
^ I b id . , p . 17803.
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people to  drop t h e i r  guard a g a in s t  R ussian d u p l ic i ty .  Under
a  heading "Arguments R e la tin g  to  th e  R a t i f ic a t io n  P ro c e ss ,"
th e  q u estio n s  were answered as to  whose w itn esses  were more
com petent, th o se  o f th e  P reparedness Subcommittee o r o f th e
P o reig n  R ela tio n s  Committee.
More im portan t were th e  qu estio n s  reg a rd in g  th e  "M ilita ry
and S c ie n t i f ic  C onsidera tions :"
F i r s t :  The J o in t  Chiefs o f  S ta f f  were n o t adeq u a te ly
co n su lted  in  th e  development o f  p o lic y  r e l a t in g  to  th e  
t r e a ty .
Answer: G eneral T ay lor as C hief o f  S ta f f  p a r t ic ip a te d  in
th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  t r e a t y  as  a  member o f  th e  Committee 
o f  P r in c ip le s  t ra n s m itt in g  th e  w ishes o f  th e  J o in t  C h iefs, 
i . e . ,  th e  w ithdraw al c la u se .
Second: C landestine  t e s t s  a re  a  se r io u s  r i s k .
Answer: The S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  S o v ie t
Union could  n o t t e s t  w ith o u t in c u rr in g  h igh  c o s ts  and h igh  
r i s k  o f  d e te c tio n . Dr. Brown and th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f 
S ta f f  concurred .
T h ird : C ooperation among Communist c o u n tr ie s  e n ta i l s  a
h igh  p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  su c c e ss fu l ch ea tin g .
Answer: Tbe w ithdraw al c lau se  p erm its  th e  U n ited  S ta te s
to  resume t e s t in g  i f  exp losions anywhere in  th e  w orld a re  
deemed to  th re a te n  th e  c o u n try 's  s e c u r i ty .
F o u rth : The t r e a ty  would invo lve  a  s e r io u s  r i s k  f o r  th e
continued  c a p a b i l i ty  o f U nited  S ta te s  m is s i le s  and t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  to  p e n e tra te  th e  S o v ie t de fen siv e  system .
Answer: I t  i s  e a s ie r  to  r e ly  on an o ffe n s iv e  th an  on a
d efensive  weapons system .
F i f th :  The t r e a ty  would s e r io u s ly  a f f e c t  our development
o f an e f f e c t iv e  a n t i - b a l l i s t i c - m i s s i l e  system .
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Answer; The S o v ie t-U n ited  S ta te s  AMB development e f f o r t s  
in  re so lv in g  th e  problems o f an e f f e c t iv e  ABM system  a re  
comparable in  magnitude and su ccess; t h a t  th e  fu tu re  U .S. 
development w i l l  be concerned c h ie f ly  w ith  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
la rg e ly  u n re la te d  to  th e  r e l a t iv e ly  sim ple n u c le a r  com­
ponent o f th e  system .
S ix th : The S o v ie t Union may have b e s te d  us in  developing
an e f f e c t iv e  co un ter fo rce  th re a te n in g  th e  s u rv iv a l o f 
our se c o n d -s tr ik e  c a p a b i l i ty .
Answer: The v a r ie ty  and d is p e r s a l  o f our lan d , sea , and
a irb o rn e  se c o n d -s tr ik e  fo rc e , in c lu d in g , in  th e  n ear fu tu r e ,  
a irb o rn e  command and c o n tro l p o s ts , p lu s  th e  extreme h a rd ­
ening o f th e  lan d -based  p o r tio n  o f th a t  fo rce  based  on our 
own experience  as to  i t s  v u ln e r a b i l i ty  from t e s t s  conducted 
in  th e  p a s t ,  p rov ide  s tro n g  assu ran ce  th a t  th e  s t r a te g i c -  
m is s i le  fo rc e  i s  designed to  su rv iv e  and i t  w i l l  su rv iv e .
Seventh: The S o v ie t Union may have b e s te d  u s in  developing
knowledge o f  th e  e f f e c ts  o f  h ig h - a l t i tu d e  n u c le a r  weapons 
t e s t s .
Answer: Consensus concerning th e  e f f e c ts  o f  n u c le a r  b la s t s
on communications ra d a r  and on n u c le a r  weapons i s  t h a t  th e  
S o v ie t and U nited  S ta te s  experience  i s  roughly  th e  same.
E ighth : I r r e s p e c t iv e  o f our n a tio n s  w i l l  power, th e  c o n d itio n
o f  our n u c le a r  la b o ra to r ie s  w i l l  d e te r io ra te  as th e  r e s u l t  o f  
th e  t e s t  ban .
Answer: During th e  th re e  y e a r m oratorium , la b o ra to ry  p e r ­
sonnel grew by some 50 p e rc e n t.
N inth: I r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  our r ig h t  o f immediate resum ption
o f t e s t in g  in  th e  face  o f any v io la t io n  o f  th e  t r e a ty ,  we 
may be l e f t  beh ind  because o f th e  g a in s  o b ta in ed  by th e  
R ussians in  th e  t e s t s  v io la t in g  th e  t r e a ty .
Answer: The S e c re ta ry  of Defense and o th e r  m i l i ta r y  w itn esses
have denied  th a t  any a b so lu te  advantage could  be co n fe rred  on 
th e  S o v ie ts  sim ply from one s e r ie s  o f t e s t s . ^
^ i d . ,  pp. 178011-17805.
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While S en a to r Humphrey had seem ingly knocked down
"strawman, " h is  reasons f o r  su p p o rtin g  th e  t r e a ty  were no t
so c o n c re te . He supported  th e  t r e a ty  because:
I t  in h ib i t s  th e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  n u c le a r  weapons. I t  
reduces th e  chance o f w ar. I t  m inim izes th e  sp read  o f 
r a d io a c tiv e  f a l l o u t .  I t  weakens th e  u n i ty  o f  th e  Commun­
i s t  b lo c . I t  enhances th e  p ro sp e c ts  f o r  an e ra  o f  peace­
f u l  c o e x is te n c e . Ih e  t r e a t y  s tre n g th e n s  our p o s tu re  as 
a  proponent o f peace w ith o u t weakening our s e c u r i ty .
S en a to r M ansfie ld
S en a to r M ansfie ld  has been d e p ic ted  as b e in g  uncom fortable 
w ith  power and h is  Democratic co lleag u es  have c h a ra c te r iz e d  him 
as "a n ic e  guy and everybody loves him. . .b u t he i s n ' t  a  le a d e r ." ^  
To f u r th e r  im pair th e  m a jo rity  le a d e r 's  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  was h is  
lo n g -s tan d in g  d i s l ik e  and la c k  o f ra p p o r t w ith  th e  Whip, S ena to r 
Long o f  L o u is ian a .^
More im p o rtan tly  S en a to r M ansfie ld  has always been s o l i c ­
i to u s  o f th e  m in o rity  p a r ty 's  members and  r ig h ts  so t h a t  he could  
count on them f o r  su b s ta n tiv e  support on m ajor i s s u e s .  He and 
S en a to r D irksen , M inority  L eader, were p ic tu re d  a s  having  a  
p a r t i c u la r  p e rso n a l ra p p o rt w ith  each o th e r .
~4 rb id . , p .  16612 and Appendix "B ."
p
E an d a ll B. R ip ley , Power in  th e  Senate  (Hew York: S t .  
M artins P re s s , I 969) ,  pp . 90-96.
3
I b id . ,  quoted in  W ashington P o s t(Septem ber 29; I 966) . 
"M ansfield was a p p a lle d  when Long, having  dined w e ll  b u t n o t 
w ise ly , had to  be c a r r ie d  ou t o f  th e  chamber, f lu s h - fa c e d  by 
th re e  o f h is  brawny c o lle a g u e s . . . . "
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W hile S en a to r M ansfie ld  d id  n o t ta k e  a  la rg e  p a r t  in  th e
d eb ate , he d id  express th e  views o f  h is  geographic a re a  where
f e a r s  o f  ra d io a c tiv e  f a l l o u t  were g r e a te s t .  He p ro te s te d  S enato r
H ick en lo o p er' s s ta tem en t th a t  in  c e r ta in  a re a s  o f l i f e ,  i . e . ,
f i s h e r i e s  and exp erim en ta l la b o r a to r ie s ,  a  l i t t l e  r a d ia t io n  might
even prove to  be b e n e f ic ia l .  I n  a d d it io n , accord ing  to  S en a to r
H icken looper’s s t a t i s t i c s ,  a  v e ry  sm all number o f  Americans would
be harmed by ra d io a c tiv e  f a l l o u t .  S en a to r M ansfie ld  n o ted  th a t
" i t  would n o t be v ery  w e ll t o  t e l l  t h a t  to  th e  s p e c i f ic  Americans
who w i l l  s u f f e r  th e  consequences.
W hile th e  a n t i - r a d io a c t iv e  f a l l o u t  p o s i t io n  was supported
by W estern S en ato rs  such as Church and McGee, none was more
e lo q u en t o r  em otional th a n  S en a to r Weuberger in  her speech on
September l 6t h .  She p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th e  P re s id e n t and th e
ex ecu tiv e  departm ent had been p ro p e rly  cau tio u s  in  d e lin e a tin g
th e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y 's  s ig n if ic a n c e :
I t  i s  n o t a  b lu e p r in t  f o r  disarm am ent. I t  i n  no way ob­
v ia te s  th e  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  m ain ta in in g  a  s u p e r io r  m i l i ta r y  
s t r u c tu r e .  I t  may o r  may n o t e f f e c t  any lo n g -range  dimuni­
t io n  o f in te r n a t io n a l  te n s io n . Y et, i f  th e  on ly  ta n g ib le  
b e n e f i t  to  be d e riv e d  from  th e  t e s t  ban would be th e  
capping o f  fu tu re  atm ospheric  p o l lu t io n ,  i t  w i l l  s t i l l  be 
a  m ajor achievem ent in  th e  h is to r y  o f  human a f f a i r s .  I f  
th e re  i s  a  "m others' v o te "  on th e  n u c lea r t e s t  ban, th en  
i t  i s  a  v o te  c a s t  f o r  th e  g e n e tic  fu tu re  o f  mankind. 2
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  p . 16328.
^ I b i d . ,  p .  1 7 1 0 9 .
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Hae prim ary  g o a l o f th e  proponents o f  th e  t r e a ty  was to  p o in t 
out th a t  t h i s  was b u t a  h o p efu l " f i r s t  s t e p ."  I t  was more a  psycho­
lo g ic a l  p lo y  r a th e r  th an  a  co n cre te  move tow ard disarm am ent. I h e i r  
debate  r e f le c te d  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  A p r i l  10 th  speech c a l l in g  upon 
Americans to  "re-exam ine our a t t i t u d e s "  tow ard th e  S o v ie t Union and 
th e  P r e s id e n t 's  l e t t e r  o f  t r a n s m i t ta l  to  th e  S en a te . At one p o in t. 
S en a to r Humphrey s a id  t h a t  th e  t r e a ty  would n o t cu re  " a r t h r i t i s "  b u t 
i t  was a  h o p e fu l s te p  tow ard a  p e r io d  o f re la x e d  te n s io n s  w ith  th e  
S o v ie t U nion. U h ile  o th e r  members o f  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  p o in ted  
o u t what th e  t r e a ty  would n o t do, i t  was a ls o  c a r e fu l ly  p o in te d  
ou t t h a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  p o ssessed  n u c le a r  s u p e r io r i ty  over th e  
S o v ie t Union and even in  a re a s  where th ey  m ight conceivab ly  ca tch
2
up w ith  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  th e  r i s k s  invo lved  would be " l iv e a b le ."
The main s tre n g th  o f  th e  proponents o f  th e  L im ited  T es t Ban
T rea ty  came from l i b e r a l  Democrats from th e  N o rth ea ste rn  i n d u s t r i a l
s t a t e s ,  th e  m oderate Democrats from th e  Border s t a t e s ,  and lo y a l
Democrats from  th e  M idwestern s t a t e s .
C e r ta in ly , P re s id e n t Kennedy was c o r re c t  when he expressed
th e  fe a r s  t h a t  th e r e  m ight be s u f f i c i e n t  s tre n g th  among S ou thern
Democrats and c o n se rv a tiv e  R epublicans to  b lock  o r im pair th e  f i n a l
3
r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .
1
Supra, C hapter I I .
M cNam ara's te stim o n y . S up ra , C hapter V. 
^Sorenson, op. c i t . ,  p . 737.
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O pposition
Œhe o p p o sitio n  to  th e  t r e a ty  came from th e  members o f 
th e  Armed Forces Committee headed by S enato r R u sse ll o f G eorgia. 
S en a to r R u sse ll i s  a  man o f  co n s id e ra b le  power and in f lu e n c e  in  
th e  Senate  because o f h is  long s e n io r i ty .  S ena to r ŒJhurmond was 
th e  most p e r s i s te n t  c h a llen g e r to  th e  su p p o rte rs  o f th e  t r e a ty .  
S enato r Goldwater was th e  r a l ly in g  p o in t fo r  th e  Republican and 
id e o lo g ic a l  co n se rv a tiv es  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  S en a te .^
The S enators who e v en tu a lly  vo ted  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty ^ ,  
w ith  th e  excep tion  o f  S enato r Sm ith, came from th e  West, Midwest, 
and South . In  sum, th ey  may be c a l le d  p o l i t i c a l  co n se rv a tiv es  
based  upon ideo logy  and v o tin g  re c o rd s . Of a  t o t a l  o f n in e teen  
vo tes  a g a in s t th e  t r e a ty ,  seven, in c lu d in g  R u sse ll, S te n n is , both  
Ryrds, Thurmond, Goldwater and Mrs. Sm ith, a re  a l l  members o f th e  
Armed S erv ices  Committee and had s igned  th e  P reparedness I n v e s t i ­
g a tin g  Report which s t r e s s e d  th e  m i l i t a r y  d isadvan tages o f th e  
t r e a t y .  The n in e  o th e r  members o f  th e  Armed S erv ices  Committee, 
in c lu d in g  Symington, Jackson, E rv in , Cannon, Young, Inouye, Case,
^W altz, op. c i t .
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Rennet, R epublican o f  Utah; Ryrd, Democrat o f V irg in ia ;
Ryrd, Democrat o f West V irg in ia ; C u r t is ,  R epublican o f  Nebraska; 
E as tlan d , Democrat o f  M iss is s ip p i;  G oldwater, R epublican o f  A r i­
zona; Jo rdan , R epublican o f Idaho; Lausche, Democrat o f  Ohio; Long, 
Democrat o f  L ouisiana; M cClellan, Democrat o f A rkansas; Mechem, Re­
p u b lican  o f  New Mexico; R o b e rtso n ,,Democrat o f  V irg in ia ; R u sse ll, 
Democrat o f  G eorgia; Simpson, R epublican o f  %roming; Sm ith, Repub­
l ic a n  o f Maine; S te n n is , Democrat o f  M iss is s ip p i;  Talmadge, Democrat 
o f G eorgia; Thurmond, Democrat o f  South C aro lina ; Tower, R epublican 
o f  Texas.
l6 l
S a l to n s ta l l  and B e a ll, ev en tu a lly  abandoned th e  n eg a tiv e  p o s i t io n  
o f  th e  chairman and vo ted  fo r  th e  t r e a ty .^
B arry Goldwater
S enato r Barry Goldwater was c le a r ly  running  f o r  th e  honor 
o f  re p re se n tin g  th e  R epublican P a r ty  in  th e  P r e s id e n t ia l  campaign 
o f  196U during  th e  debate  on th e  L im ited T es t Ban T rea ty . The 
Washington S ta r  p o in te d  out in  an e d i t o r i a l  on September 7, 1963, 
t h a t  th e  S en a to r had re se rv e d  f i f ty -o n e  rooms o f th e  Mark Hopkins 
H o te l in  San F ran c isco  f o r  a  p e rio d  co in c id in g  w ith  th e  R epublican 
Convention.
S en a to r M ille r  made freq u en t a l lu s io n s  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  
th e  t r e a ty  could be a  f a c to r  in  th e  1964 p r e s id e n t i a l  campaign 
and endorsed S en a to r G oldw ater' s cand idacy .^
By th e  tim e o f th e  Senate  deb a te , i t  was ev id en t t o  most 
o f  th e  n a t io n 's  le a d in g  newspapers th a t  th e  S ena te , in  a l l  l i k e ­
lih o o d , would r a t i : ^  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .
S en a to r Goldwater had a  reco rd  o f  su p p o rtin g  h is  p a r ty  
a long p a r ty  l in e s ,  b u t he fre q u e n tly  d iv e r te d  h is  d ire c t io n  to  
th e  f a r  r ig h t  and became in tr a n s ig e n t  -vdien h is  f a r  r ig h t  ideo logy  
was concerned o r a f f e c te d .3 As a  r e t i r e d  A ir  Force man and
^C ongressional Q u arte rly  (September 27; I 963) .
^The New York Times (September 15, I 963) .
^C ongressional Q uarterly :Supplem ent on B ariy  Goldwater (1964)
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id e o lo g ic a l  le a d e r  o f  th e  f a r  r ig h t  wing o f  h is  p a r ty ,  he i n ­
s i s t e d  on opposing th e  t r e a t y ,  even a f t e r  th e  R epublican M inority  
Leader D irksen came ou t i n  fa v o r  o f  i t .
In  th e  p e r io d  p r io r  to  th e  a c tu a l  S enate  d eb a te . S en a to r 
Goldwater l a i d  th e  fo u n d a tio n  f o r  th e  re se rv a tio n s  t h a t  he ev en tu ­
a l l y  would o f f e r  to  th e  t r e a ty .
During th e  p e rio d  from August 8t h  u n t i l  th e  f i n a l  v o te  on 
September 23rd , th e  S en a to r f i r s t  announced th a t  he would v o te  
f o r  th e  t r e a ty  w ith  c e r ta in  re s e rv a t io n s .  Soon a f te rw a rd s , he 
r e s ta te d  h is  p o s i t io n  as be in g  one th a t  would depend upon th e  
accep tance  o f  h is  re s e rv a tio n  to  th e  t r e a t y  c a l l in g  on th e  R ussians 
to  p u l l  t h e i r  rem aining tro o p s  and arms o u t o f  Cuba. A f te r  S en a to r 
G oldwater o ffe re d  th i s  amendment, he adm itted  t h a t ,  even i f  h is  
amendment was accep ted  by th e  S en a te , he would no t v o te  f o r  f i n a l  
passage o f th e  t r e a ty .  demanding th a t  th e  S o v ie t Union w ith ­
draw i t s  tro o p s  and m a te r ia ls  from  Cuba, th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would 
be making th e  S o v ie t Union "pay a  p r i c e ."  The S en a to r e v id e n tly  
f a i l e d  to  ta k e  n o te  t h a t  th e  l im ite d  t r e a t y  was an American i n ­
strum ent and was n e g o tia te d  a t  American i n i t i a t i v e .  In  sum, th e  
S enato r was w il l in g  to  u se  th e  Cuban s i tu a t io n  and th e  L im ited  
T est Ban T rea ty  as a  p a r t i s a n  campaign is s u e  in  196k . S enato r 
Goldwater e v id e n tly  was su re  t h a t  th e  S o v ie ts  would p robab ly  
b reak  th e  t r e a t y  by open o r c la n d e s tin e  t e s t i n g  in  v io la t io n  o f  
th e  t r e a t y .^
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp . 17191-17205»
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S en a to r Goldwater had  c o n s ta n tly  com plained th a t  th e  
E xecu tive  m erely wanted th e  S e n a te 's  "consen t" r a th e r  th an  i t s  
" a d v ic e ."  F u r th e r , he s a id  t h a t  h is  proposed re s e rv a tio n  d id  
no t in v o lv e  th e  t e x tu a l  c o n tra c t  o f  th e  t r e a ty ,  b u t " ju s t  th e  
tim e o f  i t s  r a t i f i c a t i o n , "  and th e re fo re  would n o t have to  be r e ­
n e g o tia te d  by th e  h igh  c o n tr a c tu r a l  powers.
S en a to r D irksen c a l le d  h is  re s e rv a tio n  "ungermane" and a 
co n fess io n  o f  weakness. S en a to r Humphrey c a l le d  th e  re s e rv a tio n  
" p a r t is a n  m is c h ie f ,"  a  theme p ick ed  up by a  m a jo rity  o f  th e  
n a t io n 's  new spapers.^
S en a to r J a v i t s ,  long  a  proponent o f  th e  S o v ie t w ithdraw al 
from Cuba, p ro te s te d  a g a in s t  th e  re s e rv a t io n  and asked  S en a to r 
Goldw ater to  w ithdraw  h is  r e s e rv a t io n .  E v en tu a lly  th e  re s e rv a tio n
p
was d e fe a te d  by a  v o te  o f  seven teen  to  s e v e n ty - f iv e .^
^ î a l e i ^  (u .c . )  Hews and O bserverfSeptem ber 12, I 963) ; The 
Boston H erald  (S eptem beF '^T '^^SsT F 'S îîcago Sun-TimesC8 eptem ber 9 , 
1963) ;  P i t t s b u r g  P o s t-G a z e tte (Septem ber 7, I 963)J D e tro i t  F ree  
P re ss (Septem ber 7, 19^3)î D e c a tu r ( i l l . ) H era ld fSeptember 7; I 963) ; 
Fairm ont (W.Va.) Times (S eptem ber.9; I 963) j  W ashington S ta r (September
7, 1963) j L i t t l e  Rock A rkansas G a ze tté ÇSeptember J, 19^3); L i t t l e  
Rock Democrat ( S ep t ember 8 , 1963) ;  Hew York H e r^ d  T r ib u t^ CSept ember
8 , 1963) ;  W ashington D.C. P o s t(September 7, 19^3) ; Hew York Times 
(September 9 aad 12, I 963) j  Hew York PO st(September 15, 1963); S t .  
Louis P o s t-D isp a tch (Septem ber 9 , 1963) ;  D ^ o in e s  R e g is te r (September 
7, 1 9 6 3 ) ;  The Denver P o s t(Septem ber 8 , 19^3 )  ; H a rtfo rd  "rîmes (Sep­
tem ber 9) 1 9 6 3 C ongressional Record i n s e r t s .
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See Appendix "C" f o r  v o tin g  a n a ly s is .
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S en a to rs  (Thurmond, and S ten n is
S en a to rs  S te n n is  and Thurmond were th e  most v o c a lly  
a c t iv e  o f  th e  opponents o f  th e  L im ited  T es t Ban T rea ty  on th e  
f lo o r  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  S en a te . Eveiy S en a to r speaking f o r  
th e  t r e a t y  was ch a llen g ed  by one o r th e  o th e r .  I f  su p p o rt fo r  
t h e i r  p o s i t io n  came from unexpected so u rces , as w e ll as t h a t  from 
expected  so u rces , th e n  t h a t  S en a to r cou ld  expect c o n g ra tu la tio n s  
on th o u g h tfu l independence o f mind and judgm ent.
I n  r e fu t in g  th e  proponents o f  th e  t r e a ty ,  th e  two S enato rs  
accep ted  th e  p o s it io n s  o f  Edward T e l le r  and G eneral Power, bo th  
o f  whom appeared  b e fo re  th e  P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee 
o f  th e  S ena te  Armed F o rces Committee. Dr. T e l le r  was p a r t i c u la r ly  
w o rried  about th e  e f f e c t s  r e s u l t in g  from n u c le a r  b l a s t s  on our 
ra d a r  and com m unications. He had  argued t h a t  th e  100 megaton 
b l a s t  by th e  S o v ie t Union had g iven  them advantages t h a t  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s  d id  no t have. Furtherm ore, only  by con tin u ed  t e s t i n g  cou ld  
we g a in  knowledge o f  weapons' e f f e c t s  in  th e  atm osphere.
G eneral Power was w o rried  t h a t  th e  t r e a ty ,  by a llo w in g  th e  
S o v ie t Union to  t e s t  underground and develop lo w -y ie ld  t a c t i c a l  
weapons, would g iv e  th e  S o v ie t Union a  n e t  g a in .
Both T e l le r  and Power ag reed  th a t  th e  development o f  an 
ABM system  would n o t be impeded by th e  t e s t in g  underground b u t 
th e y  were concerned th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  would n o t be a b le  to  
t e s t  f i r e  th e  weapons.
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S en a to r njhiarmond; who l a t e r  became a  Republican and 
supported  S en a to r G oldwater, openly espoused "rig h t-w in g "  
id e o lo g ie s  and was re sp o n s ib le  f o r  in s e r t in g  in to  th e  Record 
evidences o f p u b lic  support f o r  h is  p o s i t io n  a g a in s t th e  t r e a t y .^  
S en a to r Thurmond com pletely  r e je c te d  P re s id e n t Kennedy's 
su g g estio n  th a t  Americans should  re-exam ine o ld  a t t i tu d e s  and 
tim e-w orn c l ic h e s .
On September 11, 1963, S en a to r Thurmond s ta te d  t h a t  th e  
only  way peace had been m ain tained  was th e  " s ig n if ic a n t  im balance 
o f power in  fav o r o f th e  U nited  S ta te s  v is - a - v is  th e  S o v ie t U nion." 
Furtherm ore, th e  U n ited  S ta te s  s u p e r io r i ty  depended upon th e  in ­
v u ln e r a b i l i ty  o f th e  se c o n d -s tr ik e  fo rc e  which would have to  s u r ­
v iv e  an i n i t i a l  f i r s t - s t r i k e  by th e  enemy. Any c u rta ilm e n t on 
atm ospheric t e s t in g  would g re a t ly  h in d e r th a t  a b i l i t y  o f th e  U nited  
S ta te s  t o  defend i t s e l f .
G enera lly  th e  s ty l iz e d  language o f  th e  S en a to rs  i s  s t i f l i n g ,  
b u t du ring  th e  occasion  o f th e  debate  th e re  were many S en a to rs  
w il l in g  to  speak p la in ly  to  S en a to r Thurmond.
S en a to r Morse s a id  th a t  he was concerned about th e  m il i t a r y  
bu ildup  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s :
I  r e f e r  to  th e  bu ildup  o f what I  co n sid e r dangerous i n ­
flu en ce  o f  th e  m i l i t a iy  on American fo re ig n  p o lic y . There 
have been im p lic a tio n s  o f  i t  i n  th e  p re se n t d eb a te . . . 
th e re  have been S enato rs who seem to  be o f  th e  o p in io n  th a t  
th e  judgments o f th e  m il i t a r y  should  be s u b s ti tu e d  f o r  th o se
N a t io n a l  Review; D allas Morning News: U .S. News & World R eport; 
The Manion Forum:Colum bia..(S .C .) S ta te ;  K noxville  J o u rn a l;Los Angeles 
Times; Freedom P re s s ; and h is  own weekly n e w s le tte r  to  h is  co n s titu en c y . 
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o f American c iv i l i a n  o f f i c i a l s  in  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  
American p u b lic  p o lic y . . . .1  say from th e  f lo o r  o f 
th e  Senate today  to  th e  American peop le , keep y o u rse lv es  
on guard a g a in s t  th e  power o f th e  m il i t a r y .  Keep your­
se lv e s  on guard a g a in s t  th e  growing and dangerous power 
o f American m il i ta r y  minds over p u b lic  p o lic y , f o r  i t  i s  
im portan t i n  a  democracy to  keep th e  m i l i t a r y  always in  
i t s  p la c e ; and i t s  p la ce  i s  su b o rd in a te  to  our c iv i l i a n  
le a d e rs .  I t s  p la ce  i s  to  c a rry  out p o lic y  determ ined 
by o u r^ c iv il ia n  le a d e rs ,  and no t determ ined by m il i ta r y  
minds.
S enato r C lark  was more p o s i t iv e  in  h is  id e n t i f i c a t io n ;
I f  one looks a t  th e  names o f S enators who a re  opposed to  
t h i s  t r e a ty  or to  be d o u b tfu l about i t ,  th e  con clu sio n  i s  
i r r e s i s t i b l e  th a t  th e  overwhelming m a jo rity  o f  them come 
from th e  most co n se rv a tiv e  members o f  t h i s  body. S e v e ra l 
o f  them a re  G enerals in  th e  Armed F o rces . . . .S e v e ra l 
more a re  rank ing  members o f th e  Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee, 
where, day in  and day o u t, th e  demands o f  th e  m i l i t a r y  fo r  
more and b ig g e r arms a re  h ea rd . . . . I t  i s  perhaps n o t to o  
much to  say th a t  th e  o p p o s itio n  to  th e  t r e a t y  . . . r e p re ­
sen ts  th e  h a rd  co re— th e  low w ater mark, i f  we w i l l —  
o f th e  Senate  e s ta b lish m e n t. . . .1  honor them f o r  t h e i r  
s in c e r i ty  and t h e i r  d e d ic a tio n  to  th e  cause o f our coun try , 
b u t I  p rofoundly  d isag ree  w ith  t h e i r  conclusions about 
th e  t r e a ty .  I t  may be th a t  one day we s h a l l  have a  t r e a ty  
c a l l in g  fo r  com plete disarmament which th e  S en a to r from 
South C aro lin a  so f e a r s .  . . .With th a t  e lim in a tio n , r a d ic a l  
as i t  may seem, might even come th e  a b o l i t io n  o f  th e  Senate 
Armed S e rv ices  Committee and i t s  P reparedness Subcommittee.
I t  was p o in ted  out by S en a to r C lark th a t  S en ato rs  Thurmond, 
S ten n is  and Goldwater had made g re a t  p o in ts  about " s e c re t"  t e s t i ­
mony from th e  m i l i t a iy  b e fo re  th e  Preparedness Subcommittee. He 
p o in ted  out th a t  t h i s  same in fo rm atio n  was a v a ila b le  t o  th e  F oreign  
R e la tio n s  Committee who approved th e  t r e a ty  by s ix te e n  to  one. The
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp. 17387- I 739O. 
^ I b i d . , p . 17093.
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same in fo rm atio n  was a v a i la b le  to  th e  P re s id e n t, th e  C hief o f 
th e  CIA, th e  S e c re ta ry  o f Defense and each member o f  th e  J o in t  
C hiefs o f  S ta f f ,  each and every  one o f which recommended th e  
Senate  approve th e  t r e a t y .  " I t  i s  f r ig h te n in g  even to  contem­
p la te  what would happen to  th e  p o s i t io n  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
a l l  over th e  world i f  we were to  re p u d ia te  th e  a c t io n  o f our 
P re s id e n t and Commander-in-Chief and every  one o f h is  p r in c ip a l  
a d v ise rs  a f t e r  n ine ty -tw o  o th e r  n a tio n s  had r a t i f i e d  th e  t r e a ty ." ^  
S en a to r Sm athers, a  fe llo w  S o u th ern er, was l e s s  c h a r i ta b le  
w ith  th e  S en a to r:
I t  i s  obvious t h a t  th e  minds o f men who long have been 
in t th e  m i l i t a r y  s e rv ic e — and I  pay t r i b u t e  t o  th e  ab le  
S en a to r from South C aro lin a , who i s  a  d is t in g u is h e d  
Major G eneral in  th e  U .S . Army R eserve—a re  o r ie n te d  
a long  m il i ta r y  l i n e s .  So i t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them 
to  see th e  ; o l i t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and th e  id e o lo g ic a l  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f ach iev in g  peace . . . .A lthough we weigh 
th e  testim ony  o f m il i ta r y  men, I  b e lie v e  i t  sometimes more 
im portan t to  weigh th e  testim o n y  o f th e  s c i e n t i s t  and o th e rs  
because t h e i r  c a re e rs  a re  n o t so d i r e c t ly  a f fe c te d  by our 
d e c is io n s . . . .But I  b e lie v e  we should  c o n s id e r th e  views 
o f o th e r  w itn esses  to o , should  weigh aÿL th e  evidence and 
th e n  should  a r r iv e  a t  our co n c lu s io n s .
S en a to r R ichard  R u sse ll
Three days b e fo re  th e  p u b lic a tio n  o f th e  P reparedness In ­
v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee R eport on September 9’th , S en a to r R u sse ll,
^ Ib id .
^Ibid., p. 17102.'
168
along  w ith  S en a to r S te n n is , announced t h a t  th ey  would v o te  
a g a in s t  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f th e  t r e a t y .
They reasoned  th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would be "mouse- 
tra p p e d ” by th e  t r e a ty  and ( to  th e  co n tra ry ^  th e  t r e a ty  was 
n o t a  "hopefu l f i r s t  s tep "  b u t a  " d i r e c t  s tep "  tow ard u n i l a t e r a l  
disarm am ent. Furtherm ore, th e  S en a to r from G eorgia was a f r a id  
th a t  a  sense o f  "euphoria" would s e t t l e  over th e  American people  
and would a llow  th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  make f u r th e r  concessions in  
" o n -s i te "  in s p e c tio n s .
The only  a d d itio n  to  th e  t r e a t y  t h a t  was a llow ed by th e  
Senate  was an amendment to  th e  Pream ble to  th e  t r e a t y  by S en a to r 
R u ss e ll .  The amendment r e a s s e r te d  th e  S e n a te ’s c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
p e ro g a tiv e  to  pass on a l l  amendments to  th e  t r e a t y .
S en a to r R u sse ll  i s  co n sid e red  by most Congressmen to  be a  
f i r s t  c la s s  p a r lia m e n ta r ia n  and a  s t r i c t  in t e r p r e te r  o f  th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n .  He c e r ta in ly  knew t h a t  th e  P re s id e n t cou ld  n o t a l t e r  
th e  body o f  any t r e a ty  w ith o u t th e  consen t o f  th e  S en a te . How­
ev er, i t  appeared  t h a t  S en a to r R u sse ll  was more a f r a id  o f any 
ex ecu tiv e  agreem ent t h a t  m ight "de fa c to "  a l t e r  th e  t r e a ty  w ithou t 
su b m ittin g  such agreem ents to  th e  S en a te .
S ince th e  amendment touched  only  upon th e  r e s o lu t io n  o f 
r a t i f i c a t i o n  and d id  n o t touch  th e  su b s ta n tiv e  is s u e s  i t  would 
n o t mean t h a t  th e  t r e a ty  would have to  be re -n e g o tia te d . The 
amendment was accep ted  by S en a to r P u lb r ig h t and D irksen and i t  
passed  by a  r o l l c a l l  v o te  o f sev en ty -n in e  to  n in e . V oting a g a in s t
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th e  amendment were S en a to rs : Douglas, H a rt, J a v i t s ,  McCarthy, 
McNamara, Morse, Moss, N euherger and P e l l .  S en a to rs  Hyrd. o f 
V irg in ia , Lausche, Long and Hruska a b s ta in e d  from  v o tin g .
John Tower
S en a to r Tower o f  Texas i s  a  se lf -p ro c la im e d  co n se rv a tiv e  
and a rd en t su p p o rte r  o f  th e  " c o n s e rv a tiv e -c o a li t io n ."  The Con­
g re s s io n a l  Q u a rte rly  g iv es  S en a to r Tower a  r a t in g  o f  j8  p e rcen t 
in  su p p o rtin g  th e  "c o n se rv a tiv e - c o a l i t io n "  to  0 p e rc e n t f o r  th e  
o p p o s itio n  in  th e  88t h  Congress.
S en a to r Tower d id  n o t p a r t i c ip a te  in  th e  q u es tio n in g  o f 
th e  w itn esses  b e fo re  th e  F o re ign  D e la tio n s  Committee o r  th e  P re ­
paredness I n v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee. On September 19 th , S ena to r 
Tower proposed two amendments t h a t  o f fe re d  th e  most s e r io u s  th r e a t  
to  th e  t r e a t y .
The f i r s t  was a  re s e rv a tio n  p ro v id in g  th a t  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  r a t i f i c a t i o n  shou ld  be co n tin g en t upon f u l l  payment by 
th e  S o v ie t Union o f a l l  a r r e a r s  f o r  peace and s e c u r i ty  o p e ra tio n s  
o f  th e  U n ited  N atio n s. The second c a l le d  f o r  a  r e tu rn  by th e  
o r ig in a l  p a r t i e s  to  p o s i t io n s  t h a t  would demand adequate  "on­
s i t e "  in sp e c tio n s  to  d e te c t  any v io la t io n s .
The f i r s t  amendment was d e fe a te d  by eleven  to  e ig h ty -tw o . 
The second one was d e fe a te d  by a  v o te  o f  s ix te e n  to  s e v e n ty -s ix .^
^ e e  Appendix "D" f o r  v o tin g  re c o rd .
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R eprise
I t  appears t h a t  th e  o p p o s itio n  to  th e  t r e a ty ,  la ck in g  any 
f irm  support from th e  p u b lic  except from th e  r ig h t  wing^ o r  any 
s u b s ta n tiv e  support from th e  members o f th e  S en a te , a ttem p ted  to  
k i l l  th e  t r e a ty  by means o f  amendments and r e s e rv a t io n s .  In  th e  
f i n a l  a n a ly s is  th e  opponents were jo in e d  by th e  id e o lo g ic a l  con­
s e rv a tiv e s  from th e  West, Southwest and Southern S en a to rs  who had 
enough d isappoin tm ents w ith  th e  Kennedy a d m in is tr a t io n 's  r a c i a l  
and m i l i t a r y  p o l ic ie s .
B ip a r tis a n  Support
The L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  o f  I 963 would n ev er have been 
r a t i f i e d  w ith o u t th e  support o f  th e  Republicans in  th e  88th  Congress.
The b ip a r t i s a n  e f f o r t s  o f  th e  88 th  Congress, however, would 
m erely im ply " b ip a r tis a n "  v o tin g  on a  measure in v o lv in g  n a tio n a l  
s e c u r i ty .  The P re s id e n t and h is  le a d e rs^  fo llow ed th e  more im­
p o r ta n t a sp e c ts  o f  " b ip a r tis a n s h ip "  th an  d id  any o f  th e  Republican 
members o f  th e  88 th  Congress o r  th e  Southern Democrats.
I t  would be d i f f i c u l t  i n  any s i tu a t io n  to  o b ta in  complete 
" b ip a r tis a n "  support from Congress, p r im a rily  due to  th e  very  
n a tu re  o f Congress. We have a lre ad y  seen th e  c o n f l ic t in g  j u r i s ­
d ic t io n  among s tan d in g  com m ittees, b u t more im p o rtan tly , we have
^ e e  Humphrey in te rv ie w . Appendix "B". 
% ee  Chapter V III .
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a ls o  seen  th e  weaknesses o f  p a r ty  d is c ip l in e .^
The weaknesses were a lso  d isp lay ed  idien in  v o tin g  f o r  th e  
f i n a l  t r e a ty  n in e  members o f th e  Armed S erv ices  Committee approved 
r a t i f i c a t i o n  a f t e r  having signed  th e  n e g a tiv e  P reparedness Sub­
committee R ep o rt.^  One member o f  th e  F o re ign  R e la tio n s  Committee 
vo ted  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty  a f t e r  s ig n in g  th e  fav o rab le  re p o r t  to  
th e  Senate  from th a t  com m ittee.
Vice P re s id e n t Humphrey in  an in te rv ie w  s ta t e d  th a t  th e  
reasons th e r e  was " b ip a r tis a n "  v o tin g  was due to  th e  overwhelming 
s c i e n t i f i c  and te c h n o lo g ic a l evidence t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  in  no way 
th re a te n e d  th e  s e c u r i ty  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  and o p p o s itio n  to  i t  
would have been mere "o b s tru c tio n ism ."
S enato r E vere t D irksen
S h o rtly  a f t e r  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  l e t t e r  o f t r a n s m i t ta l  o f
th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  was re a d  on August 8 , I 963 , recommending
passage o f th e  t r e a ty .  S enato r D irksen o b ta in ed  th e  f lo o r  and
en te red  in to  th e  Record th e  h is to r y  o f h is  n eg a tiv e  p o s i t io n  on
p a s t  n e g o tia tio n s  t h a t  were conducted in  Geneva;
March 22, I 962: We a re  ta k in g  a  d e sp e ra te  r i s k  in  s ig n in g  
a  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  even i f  i t  co n ta in ed  our p ro p o sa ls  fo r  
o n - s i te  in sp e c tio n s .
^ u p r a , G oldw ater's  v o tin g  re c o rd . 
^See v o tin g . Appendix "D".
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August 8 , 1962: The g r e a te s t  s in g le  d e te r r e n t  to  war t o ­
day i s  our n u c le a r  s u p e r io r i ty .  . . . I f  our n e g o tia to rs  
shou ld  t r y  to  c o n tr iv e  a  n u c le a r  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  by exec­
u t iv e  agreement a t  Geneva in s te a d  o f  a  t r e a t y  which would 
re q u ire  Senate  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  th e re  would be r e a l  t ro u b le .
F ebruary 28, 1963: . . . r e p o r ts  from Geneva in d ic a te  th a t  
th e  Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n  i s  co n sid e rin g  low ering  th e  
number o f  o n - s i te  in sp e c tio n s  to  seven o r f iv e .  . . .This 
has become an e x e rc ise  n o t in  n e g o tia tio n  b u t in  giveaway.
June 13, 1963: P re s id e n t Kennedy's p ro p o sa l to  reexamine
our a t t i tu d e s  tow ard th e  S o v ie t Union i s  a  trium ph f o r  
th e  accommodators in  h is  a d m in is tra tio n . . . .The P re s id e n t 
t e l l s  us t h a t  c o n s tru c tiv e  changes w ith in  th e  Communist 
b loc  might b r in g  w ith in  reach  s o lu tio n s  which now seem 
beyond u s . What c o n s tru c tiv e  changes? The B e r lin  Wall? 
Vietnam? Laos? M iss ile s  in  Cuba?
A fte r  t h i s  p re lim in a ry  s ta tem en t. S en a to r D irksen had l i t t l e  
to  say p u b lic ly  u n t i l  September 11, I 963, # ie n  he d e liv e re d  one 
o f h is  more c o lo r fu l  speeches. He was d ep ic ted  by th e  New York Times 
as "arms outthrow n, h a i r  in  d is a r ra y "  to  a  l a r g e r  th a n  u su a l g a l le ry  
and membership o f th e  S en a te . In  o rd e r to  ex p la in  h i s  ab ru p t ab o u t- 
fa ce  and change o f mind in  announcing h is  support f o r  th e  t r e a t y  he
sa id :
I  s a id  to  my peo p le , I  s a id  to  th e  coun try  p u b lic ly  and I  
s a id  to  th e  p re s s  in  th e  g a l le ry  t h a t  I  would ta k e  a  h a rd  
look a t  th e  t r e a ty .  I  s a id  I  would be d i l ig e n t  in  ex­
amining i t s  eveiy  im p lic a tio n , and th a t  th e re  would be 
only one s tan d a rd  by which to  come to  a  v o te  and th a t  would 
be: what i s  b e s t  f o r  th e  p re s e n t and fo r  th e  fu tu r e  o f  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  o f  America.
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp . 14558- 1I+96O.
^ Ib id . j  p . 16788.
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Kie S en a to r from I l l i n o i s  to o k  n o te  t h a t  th e  P repard - 
ness Subcommittee had r e l i e d  p r im a r i ly  on Dr. Edward T e l le r  and 
G eneral Powers f o r  t h e i r  c o n c lu s io n s . He p o in te d  ou t t h a t  
s c i e n t i s t s  w ith  as  much e x p e r t is e ,  and w ith  u p - to -d a te  in f o r ­
m ation, approved th e  t r e a ty .  The J o in t  C hiefs o f  S t a f f  had 
a ls o  approved th e  t r e a ty .
S en a to r D irksen had b re a k fa s t  w ith  P re s id e n t Kennedy,
S en a to r Humphrey, S e c re ta ry  McNamara on September 9> 19^3•
At t h i s  b re a k fa s t  th e  P re s id e n t p re se n te d  S en a to r D irksen  w ith  
an overwhelming abundance o f  ev idence th a t  our in te l l ig e n c e  
g a th e r in g  ap p ara tu s  th rough  P r o je c t  ‘VELA made " o n -s i te "  in sp e c tio n s  
unnecessary  excep t underground. Furtherm ore, th e  s c i e n t i f i c  
community w ith  re c e n t access to  in fo rm atio n  was overwhelmingly 
f o r  th e  t r e a t y .^
A fterw ards th e  S en a to r announced to  th e  p re s s  th a t  he had 
been fav o ra b ly  im pressed and fu rtherm ore  he was opposed to  any 
a ttem p ts  by th e  S enate  t o  amend o r  a t ta c h  re s e rv a tio n s  to  th e
p
t r e a t y .
To h e lp  S en a to r D irksen w ith  h is  more co n se rv a tiv e  p a r ty  
members. P re s id e n t Kennedy w rote a  l e t t e r  which th e  S en a to r i n t r o ­
duced from th e  F lo o r . The P re s id e n t gave unequ ivoca l a ssu rances
^Humphrey in te rv ie w . Appendix "B".
^The New York Times (Septem ber 10, I 963) .
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t o  th e  members o f  th e  S en a te , to  th e  e n t i r e  Congress and to  
th e  cou n try  th a t :
1 . The underground te s t in g  program vou ld  be "v ig o ro u sly  
and d i l ig e n t ly  c a r r ie d  fo rw ard ."
2 . That th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would m ain ta in  i t s  re a d in e ss  
to  t e s t  in  th e  p ro h ib i te d  environm ents, and t h a t  i t  would " re ­
sume atm ospheric  t e s t i n g  ' f o r th w ith ' i f  th e  S o v ie t Union v io la te d  
th e  t r e a t y . "
3 . That th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would m ain ta in  f a c i l i t i e s  to  
d e te c t  n u c le a r  weapons t e s t s  and would be expanded and improved 
as  re q u ire d .
4 . That th e  t r e a t y  in  no way l im ite d  th e  " a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  
Commander-in-Chief to  use  n u c le a r  weapons f o r  th e  defense  o f th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  o r i t s  a l l i e s . "
5 . That i f  th e  I s la n d  o f  Cuba should  be used  to  circum vent 
o r  n u l l i f y  th e  T re a ty , th e  U n ited  S ta te s  would ta k e  a l l  n ecessa ry  
a c tio n  i n  resp o n se .
6 . That th e  t r e a ty  in  no way changed th e  s ta tu s  o f  E ast 
Germany.
7 . That th e  government would "m ain tain  s tro n g  weapons 
la b o ra to r ie s  in  a  vi.gorous program o f  weapons developm ent," and 
th a t  i t  would "m ain tain  s t r a te g i c  fo rc e s  f u l l y  in s u r in g  th a t  t h i s  
N ation w i l l  co n tin u e  to  be in  a  p o s i t io n  to  d e s tro y  any ag g re sso r, 
even a f t e r  abso rb ing  a  f i r s t  s t r i k e  by a  s u rp r is e  a t t a c k . "
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8 . And th e  n a tio n  would con tinue  to  pursue th e  develop­
ment o f n u c le a r  ex p lo siv es  f o r  p e a c e fu l purposes underground and 
when developments made p o s s ib le  c o n s tru c tiv e  u ses  f o r  p e a c e fu l 
sh o ts  in  th e  atm osphere, th e  U nited  S ta te s  would seek i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  agreem ents to  perm it t h i s . ^
The P re s id e n t a lso  gave assu rances th a t  any amendments 
to  th e  t r e a ty  would be subm itted  to  th e  Senate f o r  i t s  ap p ro v a l.
The f i n a l  a s s u r ranee came from th e  R epublican P la tfo rm  o f 
i 960 which s ta te d ;
We a re  s im ila r ly  ready to  n e g o tia te  and to  i n s t i t u t e  r e a l i s t i c  
methods and safeguards fo r  disarmament, and f o r  suspension  
o f n u c lea r  t e s t s .  We advocate  e a r ly  agreem ent by a l l  
n a tio n s  to  fo reg o  n u c le a r  t e s t s  in  th e  atm osphere and 
th e  suspension  o f  o th e r  t e s t s  as v e r i f i c a t io n  tech n iques 
p e rm it. We support th e  P re s id e n t in  any q u es tio n  o f  r e ­
sum ption o f underground n u c lea r exp losion  t e s t i n g .^
S en a to r D irksen in d ic a te d  th a t  he d id  n o t ta k e  p a r ty  p la tfo rm s
l ig h t ly :
I t  i s  no campaign o ra to ry  in  my book when one ' s p a r ty  
goes to  th e  coun try  and asks th e  country  to  g iv e  to  i t  
th e  d ire c t io n  o f th e  a f f a i r s  o f th e  co u n try . That i s  
e i th e r  a  covenant o r  i t  i s  n o t .  I f  i t  i s  a  covenant, 
i t  i s  made to  be  k e p t.3
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp. 16T90-16T91*
^ I b id . , p . 16790 .
3 lb id .
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R eferrin g  to  th e  " f i r s t  s tep "  philosophy  as a  p o s s ib le  
s te p  tow ard n u c le a r  d e te n te , th e  S enato r s a id  th a t  one o f h is  
age th in k s  about h is  d e s tin y  a  l i t t l e .  T here fo re , he d id  no t 
want i t  w r i t te n  on h is  tom bstone, "He knew what happened a t  
H iroshim a, b u t he d id  n o t ta k e  a  f i r s t  s te p ."  He s a id ,  " I 
support th e  t r e a ty ;  and I  w i l l  v o te  f o r  ap p rova l o f th e  t r e a ty  
w ith  no re s e rv a tio n s  w h atsoever."^
In  s p i te  o f  h is  p r o te s ts  to  th e  c o n tra ry , t h i s  was a  
r a d ic a l  change as in d ic a te d  by h is  p re lim in a ry  s ta tem en ts  o f 
August 9 th . He l a t e r  a t t r ib u te d  t h i s  r a d ic a l  change in  p o s it io n  
to  a  change o f  mind based  on h a rd  f a c ts  and th a t  to  do o therw ise  
would re p re se n t "bU nd o b s tru c tio n ism .
S enato r D irksen confirm ed th e  n o tio n  o f  p r io r  co n su l­
t a t io n  by th e  P re s id e n t in  t h a t  he had seen a  "therm ofax" copy 
o f th e  t r e a ty  p r io r  to  i t s  be ing  i n i t i a l e d  and he had made 
su g gestions t h a t  were in c o rp o ra te d  in  th e  f i n a l  d r a f t . 3
The endorsement by S en a to r D irksen a ssu red  a t  l e a s t  
" b ip a r t is a n  v o tin g "  support fo r  th e  t r e a ty  from most members 
o f th e  R epublican P a r ty .
S ena to rs  H ickenlooper and Mundt
Two o f th e  most pow erfu l members o f th e  "co n se rv a tiv e - 
c o a l i t io n "  from th e  R epublican P a r ty  a re  S en a to rs  Mundt and
^ Ib id .
p
CBS Documentary on th e  Death o f S en a to r D irksen , September,
1969 .
^C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  p . 17788.
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H ickenlooper.
As p re v io u s ly  no ted . S enato r H ickenlooper vas a  member 
o f  th e  F oreign  R e la tio n s  Committee and th e  Committee on Atomic 
Energy. S enato r Mundt a lso  served  on th e se  two com m ittees.
S en a to r H ickenlooper, on September 20 th , c a l le d  th e  
t r e a ty  a  rem arkable document. I t  was rem arkable f o r  th e  q u estio n ­
a b le  hopes i t  may have a roused  in  t h i s  coun try  and th e  r e s t  o f  
th e  w orld. The r e s t  o f  h is  speech was devoted to  h is  p e rso n a l 
philosophy o f th e  ro le  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch  should  p la y  in  
fo re ig n  p o lic y  making. In  h is  op in ion  th e  two branches were co- 
equals in  th e  a c t  o f making a  t r e a ty .  He p o in te d  ou t th a t  one 
tim e in  our h is to r y  th e  P re s id e n t sought th e  "adv ice" o f th e  
Senate b e fo re  n e g o tia tin g  a  t r e a ty .  The example he c i t e d  was 
th e  1923 Senate  r e s o lu t io n  e s ta b lis h in g  th e  G enera l Claims Co­
mmission. Out o f  th e  1923 r e s o lu t io n  came a  t r e a t y  to  which 
th e  Senate gave i t s  consent in  1927- The t r e a t y  was s igned  
e ig h t months l a t e r .  S en a to r H ickenlooper in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  
P re s id e n t "has no power to  make t r e a t i e s  p r io r  to  Senate a c tio n  
and i t  would th e re fo re  fo llo w  th a t  he has no power to  b in d  us in  
advance o f  a u th o r iz a t io n  by th e  S e n a te ."^  The P re s id e n t had no t 
sought th e  "adv ice" o f th e  S enate , b u t m erely i t s  "co n sen t."
^ Ib id ., p . 17649.
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On September 23, 1963, S en a to r Mundt gave h is  prim ary 
speech and in d ic a te d  t h a t  he to o  would v o te  fo r  th e  t r e a ty ,  b u t 
he jo in ed  S ena to r H ickenlooper in  re s e n tin g  th e  p ro cesses  by 
which th e  t r e a ty  was n e g o tia te d  and th e  a d m in is t r a t io n 's  reasons 
f o r  su p p o rtin g  th e  t r e a ty .  He ended h is  speech w ith  a  w arning 
to  th e  E xecu tive  t h a t  th e re  were o th e r  S en a to rs  who a ls o  re se n te d  
t h i s  a c tio n  and th e  p rocedures o f  t r e a ty  making in  g e n e ra l.
S enato r M ansfie ld  answered th e  two co n se rv a tiv e  members 
o f  th e  Senate  w ith  a  p o in t - fo r -p o in t  o u t l in e  in d ic a t in g  th e  
d a te s  and persons invo lved  when th e  E xecu tive  branch  co n su lted  
w ith  th e  Senate  in  committee seek ing  th e  adv ice  o f  th e  Senate 
committees re g a rd in g  th e  l im ite d  t e s t  ban t r e a t y . ^
The f i n a l  v o te  o f  e ig h ty  to  n in e te e n  fav o rin g  th e  t r e a ty  
was re p re s e n ta t iv e  o f  " b ip a r t is a n  v o tin g  sup p o rt"  fo r  th e  t r e a ty  
by S en a to rs  D irksen , H ickenlooper and Mundt.
S enato r D irk se n 's  support was an a b o u t-face  from p re ­
v io u s ly  s ta te d  p a r ty  p o s i t io n s .^  The support o f  S ena to rs  H ickenlooper 
and Mundt must be co n sid ered  as  prim e examples o f  U n ited  S ta te s  
S en ato rs  abandoning id e o lo g ic a l  p o s i t io n s  in  fav o r o f th e  
" n a tio n a l in t e r e s t "  o f t h e i r  c o u n tiy . I t  was ev id en t from t h e i r  
speeches t h a t  t h i s  was n o t an easy  ta s k .  S en a to r Mundt, in  f a c t .
^ u p r a ,  C hapter I I I .  
% u p ra , C hapter V II.
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vo ted  f o r  S en a to rs  Goldwater and Tow er's amendments th a t  would 
have k i l l e d  th e  t r e a ty .
Mr. Humphrey in d ic a te d  t h a t  b o th  S en a to rs , a lthough  o f 
th e  most co n se rv a tiv e  o f p e rsu a s io n s , had l i s te n e d  v ery  c a re ­
f u l ly  to  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  testim ony  g iven  b e fo re  th e  F o re ig n  Re­
la t io n s  Committee and had come away im pressed th a t  th e  t r e a ty  
was n o t a  danger to  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  and th a t  th e  t r e a t y  might 
be a  h o p efu l f i r s t  s te p  tow ard a  p o l i t i c a l  b reak through  in  th e  
co ld  war.
CHAPTER VIII
EXECUTIVE SUPPORTS
The L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  o f  1963 has been d ep ic ted  
as  P re s id e n t Kennedy's g r e a te s t  achievem ent during  th e  sh o r t p e rio d  
o f  h is  P re s id e n c y .1
P ro fe sso r  W altz^ in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t had "ran  scared" 
during  th e  n e g o tia tio n s  and in  f a c t  had "overso ld" th e  n eg a tiv e  a sp ec ts  
o f th e  t r e a ty ,  r a th e r  th an  em phasizing th e  p o s i t iv e  a s p e c ts . The only 
p o s i t iv e  a sp e c ts  v e re  co n ta ined  in  th e  phrase  "a  h o p e fu l f i r s t  s te p ."  
Only h is to r y  could t e l l  i f  th e re  were to  be any p o s i t iv e  ga in s from 
th e  t r e a ty .
The P re s id e n t had in d ic a te d  to  h is  c lo se  co n fid an ts  th a t  he 
would have g la d ly  g iven up any hope o f be ing  re -e le c te d  in  1$64, i f  
he cou ld  b u t g e t t h i s  t r e a ty  fo r  p e a c e .3
The P re s id e n t had reason  to  b e lie v e  th a t  i t  would ta k e  e x tra ­
o rd in a ry  measures to  ga in  th e  support o f  th e  S enate . He was p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  a f r a id  t h a t  th e  " c o n se rv a tiv e -c o a litio n "  o f co n se rv a tiv e  
Democrats and Republicans would be a b le  to  b lock  th e  t r e a t y .  Of th e  
n in e te en  v o te s  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty ,  te n  o f th e  Democrats were found in  
th e  South and one from th e  M idwest.^
4 rh is  view was expressed  a t  d i f f e r e n t  tim es in  p e rso n a l in te rv iew s 
w ith  Maxwell T ay lo r, A drian F is h e r , A lb e rt Gore and H ubert Humphrey.
S /a l t z ,  op. c i t .
^Sorenson, op. c i t . ,  pp . 719-7^0*
^The Democrats were; % -rd (V irg in ia) ; Dyrd(W« V irg in ia )  ; E astland ;
Long; M cClellan; Robertson; R u sse ll; S te n n is ; Talmadge; Thurmond; and 
Tower. Lausche o f  Ohio was th e  lone M idw esterner to  vo te  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty .
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I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say why any S ena to r v o tes  on any g iven 
to p ic ,  b u t in  th e  case o f th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  th e  dom estic 
p o l i t i c s  o f th e  Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n  may have had a  g re a t impact 
on some o f th e  Southern S en a to rs .
The push f o r  a  C iv il  R i ^ t s  b i l l  had clim axed on August 28th , 
w ith  th e  p e ac e fu l march on W ashington by c i t iz e n s  o f  a l l  r a c e s ,  de­
nom inations and s o c ia l  backgrounds. The S e c re ta ry  o f Defense had 
in f u r ia te d  th e  members o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee by in s i s t in g  
on c iv i l i a n  c o n tro l  over th e  m i l i t a r y .  S e c re ta iy  McNamara, in  
a d d itio n  to  a s s e r t in g  c o n tro l over th e  m il i t a r y ,  had a ls o  p laced  
o rd e rs  th a t  would s e r io u s ly  a f f e c t  any c i t y  o r s e c tio n  o f  th e  country  
t h a t  d isc r im in a ted  a g a in s t members o f  th e  Armed S e rv ices  o f  th e  U nited  
S ta te s .
Of th e  e ig h t Republicans v o tin g  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty ,  a l l  b u t 
one came from th e  newly co n se rv a tiv e  W estern s t a t e s . ^ In  a d d itio n  
to  S ena to rs  Mundt and H ickenlooper, many o th e r  S en a to rs  who a re  
norm ally  c l a s s i f i e d  as be ing  more co n se rv a tiv e  th an  l i b e r a l  voted  
f o r  th e  t r e a ty .^
Correspondent Max F ren k e l o f th e  New York Times in  h is  column 
"Advice and Consent" on September 25t h ,  sp ecu la ted  th a t  th e  U nited
1
C u rtis  o f Nebraska, Jordan  o f  Idaho, Mechem o f  New Mexico, 
Simpson o f Wyoming, B ennett o f  U tah and Goldwater o f A rizona. Mrs. 
Smith o f Maine was th e  lone N orthern  R epublican.
2
S enato rs  A llo t  and Dominick o f  Colorado, W illiam s o f Delaware, 
Thomas Dodd o f  C onnecticu t and Jackson o f W ashington.
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S ta te s  Senate  was "haunted by th e  memory o f th e  World War I  f ig h t  
over th e  League o f N a tio n s ."  James Eeston o f th e  same New York Times 
e d it io n  re in fo rc e d  t h i s  id e a  th a t  th e  Senate had "never q u ite  f o r ­
g o tte n  about i t s  v o te  a g a in s t  th e  League o f  N a tio n s .
P r e s id e n t ia l  P ressu res
Mr. F ran k e l in d ic a te d  t h a t  P re s id e n t Kennedy was th e  c h ie f  
a r c h i te c t  o f  th e  v ic to ry  f o r  th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty . Not on ly  
was P re s id e n t Kennedy su c c e ss fu l w ith  th e  Senate b u t he even "p e r­
suaded th e  R ussians to  n e g o tia te  w ith  one eye on th e  S en a te .
The P re s id e n t a lso  sought and rece iv ed  a  p e c u lia r  endorse­
ment by P re s id e n t Eisenhower. P re s id e n t Eisenhower recommended th a t  
th e  fo u r safeguards o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f  should  be im ple­
mented. He a lso  suggested  a  c u rio u s ly  worded p h rase  th a t  was tak en  
as meaning a  re s e rv a tio n  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty .  P re s id e n t Eisenhower 
s a id  th a t  " in  th e  event o f  any armed ag g ress io n  endangering a  v i t a l  
i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  t h i s  n a tio n  would be th e  so ld  judge o f 
th e  k in d  o f weaponry and equipment i t  would employ as w e ll as th e  
tim in g  o f t h e i r  u s e ."3
"kche New York Times (Septem ber 25, 19^3).
^ Ib id .
h e a r in g s  on E xecutive M. , op. c i t . ,  pp . 846-891.
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L a te r  S en a to r D irksen in d ic a te d  th a t  P re s id e n t Eisenhower 
d id  n o t have in  mind any form al re s e rv a t io n  th a t  would a l t e r  o r 
hamper th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  t r e a t y  by th e  S e n a te .^
Appeals f o r  P u b lic  Support
When th e  P re s id e n t speaks to  th e  n a tio n  by way o f ra d io  
b ro a d c a s ts , t e l e c a s t s ,  speeches to  o rg an ized  groups, and h is  p re ss  
co n fe ren ces, he commands th e  a t t e n t io n  o f most o f  th e  a t t e n t iv e  
p u b lic .  Ey th e s e  in s tru m en ts  th e  P re s id e n t can g en era te  p u b lic  
support f o r  h is  program and m o tiv a te  h is  c o n s titu en c y , which i s  
n a t io n a l ,  to  p la c e  p re s su re  on in d iv id u a l  Congressmen.
The g e n e ra l p u b lic , when i t  i s  co n fro n ted  w ith  m a tte rs  con­
cern in g  m i l i t a r y ,  s c i e n t i f i c  and te c h n o lo g ic a l a f f a i r s ,  looks to  
th e  a d m in is tra tio n  f o r  a  d e f in i t io n  o f  p o l ic y .^  I n  tim es o f  c r i s i s
■5
th e  p u b lic  w i l l  support th e  P re s id e n t and no t h is  c r i t i c s .
During th e  debate  on th e  L im ited  T e s t Ban T rea ty  P re s id e n t 
Kennedy c a l le d  to g e th e r  s e v e ra l  groups o f  c i t iz e n s  to  sup p o rt him 
and th e  t r e a t y .  The most a c t iv e  and in f l u e n t i a l  was th e  "C itiz en s  
Committee fo r  a  N uclear T es t Ban T rea ty "  and i t s  membership re a d
C ongressional Record, op. c i t . ,  pp . 16788- I 679I .
^Eugêpe J .  R osi, "Mass and A tte n tiv e  Opinion on N uclear
Weapons T es t and F a l lo u t ,  19$4-1$63," P u b lic  O pinion Q u a rte r ly ,XXIX 
(Summer, 1965) ,  pp . 280-297.
3
When P re s id e n t Kennedy s e n t a d d i t io n a l  tro o p s  to  B e r lin  in  
1961 and c a l le d  up a d d i t io n a l  r e s e rv e s , h is  p o p u la r ity  was n o t e f fe c te d  
a t  a l l .  A f te r  th e  Bay o f  P igs in v a s io n  h is  p o p u la r i ty  reached  i t s  peak
a t  83 p e rc e n t over an average o f  JO p e rc e n t w hile  in  o f f ic e .  American
I n s t i t u t e  o f  P u b lic  O pinion. R e lease , (December 5, I 962) .
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l i k e  a  "Who's Who" o f  every  conceivab le  segment o f  American 
S o c ie ty .^
The P re s id e n t never f a i l e d  t o  m ention th e  T es t Ban T rea ty  
in  h is-w eek ly  p re s s  conferences and speeches around th e  n a t io n .^
The H a rr is  P o l l  k ep t c lo se  ta b s  on th e  p u b lic  op in ion  concern ing  
th e  T est Ban T re a ty .^
Throughout th e  h ea rin g s  in  committee and th e  debate  in  th e  
S en a te , in d iv id u a l  S en a to rs  complained o r  m entioned th e  in o rd in a te  
amount o f  m ail th e y  were re c e iv in g  on th e  t r e a t y .
Mrs. Smith in d ic a te d  th a t  h e r  m ail was amnning alm ost e ig h t 
t o  one a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty ,  b u t when th e  m ail was broken down to  h e r  
home s t a t e  th e  m ail was two to  one in  fav o r o f  th e  t r e a ty .
S ena to r Aiken re p o rte d  th a t  th e re  was an o rgan ized  m a il 
campaign a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y  w ith  over 80 p e rc en t o f  th e  m a il coming 
from Texas and C a l ifo rn ia . His own c o n s titu en c y  supported  th e  t r e a ty  
overw helm ingly.
A ccording to  S en a to rs  Gore and Humphrey, in  t h e i r  p e rso n a l 
co n v ersa tio n s  w ith  t h i s  w r i te r ,  such m a il i s  d is re g a rd ed  when th e  
a c tu a l  v o te  comes on any m a tte r . G enera lly  speeches a re  made t o  
p la c a te  any o f  t h e i r  own c o n s titu en c y  who might have th e  same
S o re n so n , op. c i t . ,  p . 739*
2
Documents on Disarmament, I 963 , op. c i t .
% ee Appendix "E" f o r  th e  op in ions on th e  t e s t  ban f o r  two 
months o f  t h i s  tim e .
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o p in ion  as th e  o rgan ized  m a ile rs . The S en ato rs  can th en  t e l l  t h e i r  
co n s titu en cy  th a t  in  view o f th e  overwhelming evidence fo r  th e  
t r e a ty  and n a t io n a l  support th ey  vo ted  f o r  th e  t r e a ty .
R esu lts
On September 13 th , th e  b i t s  and p ie ce s  began to  f a l l  t o ­
g e th e r . S u rp r is in g ly  enough th e  f i r s t  person  to  change h is  p o s i t io n  
from o p p o s itio n  to  app rova l was S en a to r Henry Jackson of W ashington. 
A f te r  announcing to  th e  P re s id e n t t h a t  he could  n o t support any 
t r e a t y  th a t  l im ite d  th e  Armed Forces o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  and 
a tta c k in g  th e  t r e a ty  a t  every p o in t announced t h a t  he would v o te  
f o r  th e  t r e a ty .  The New York Times in d ic a te d  th a t  i t  was th e  most 
"cu rio u s"  speech s in ce  G eneral LeMay's q u a l i f ie d  approval o f th e  
t r e a ty .  S en a to r Thurmond was re p o r te d  as wondering i f  th e  S en a to r 
was f o r  o r a g a in s t th e  t r e a ty  because th e  speech th a t  S ena to r 
Jackson made was very  h o s t i l e  tow ards th e  t r e a t y .^
S enato r E rv in  was th e  f i r s t  o f th e  Southern  co n se rv a tiv e s  to  
in d ic a te  t h a t  he was f o r  th e  t r e a ty  on September 19 th .
S enato r Hurska, co n se rv a tiv e  R epublican o f Nebraska gave h is  
ap p roval on th e  same day as  S en a to r E iv in .
S ena to r H ickenlooper vo iced  h is  q u a l i f ie d  app rova l on September 
20 th  and S en a to r Mundt on September 23rd.
^ /h i l e  S en a to r Jackson was on th e  campus o f Mankato S ta te  
C ollege f o r  a  speech on th e  " m i l i ta r y - in d u s t r ia l  complex" he was 
"marshmellowed" by th e  s tu d en ts  who opposed h is  ro le  as  th e  "Senator 
from B oeing." The S ena to r c an c e lled  h is  scheduled  in te rv ie w  w ith  
t h i s  w r i te r  a f t e r  he was asked why he had changed h is  p o s i t io n .
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A nalysis o f Voting
On September 2^, 19^3, James Eeston s a id  t h a t  o f  th e  125 
speeches made concerning th e  L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty , S enato r 
Heniy Jack so n 's  e a r ly  accep tance had th e  e f f e c t  o f  q u ie tin g  th e  
doubts o f o th e r  S e n a to rs . Furtherm ore, th e  Senate  -was n o t p re ­
pared  to  say t h a t  i t  would n o t tak e  an o th er chance f o r  peace, 
th a t  i t  would defy  th e  hopes o f  i t s  a l l i e s  and th e  recommendations 
o f th e  P re s id e n t and v o te  i t s  doubts and f e a r s .
John D. M orris o f  th e  New York Times s a id  t h a t  "few Southern 
Congressmen a c tu a l ly  d is l ik e d  P re s id e n t Kennedy b u t th e  ra c e  is su e  
was an em otional is su e  a t  home and many would have t o  oppose th e  
a d m in is tra tio n  fo r  no o th e r  re a so n ."^
One must be cau tio u s  in  a t t r ib u t in g  m otives to  o th e r  men's 
a c tio n s  bu t th e  fo llow ing  can be observed:
1 . Of th e  seven members o f  th e  P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  
Subcommittee o f th e  Armed S erv ices  Committee, fo u r  (S en a to rs  S te n n is , 
Thurmond, Goldwater and Smith) vo ted  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y .  Two h i ^ l y  
re sp e c ta b le  members o f th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee, S en a to r R ichard 
B. R u sse ll and H arry P . % rd , vo ted  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y .
2 . The P reparedness In v e s t ig a t in g  Subcommittee had  th re e  
members v o tin g  f o r  th e  t r e a ty .  S ena to r S a l to n s ta l l  had been a 
member o f  th e  " b ip a r t is a n "  group o f  S enato rs accep tin g  P re s id e n t 
Kennedy's b id  to  accompany S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  Dean Rusk to  Moscow
"\che New York Times (September 25, 19^3) •
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f o r  th e  s ig n in g  o f  th e  t r e a ty .  Ehe "yea" v o te  o f  S enato r S a l to n s ta l l  
was no t t o t a l l y  unexpected . S en a to r Symington in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  
t r e a ty  was n o t a  g re a t  r i s k  to  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  and th e re fo re  
supported  th e  t r e a ty .  S en a to r Jac k so n 's  v o te  was p o s i t iv e  b u t r e ­
mains a  m ystery why he changed h is  mind from n eg a tiv e  to  p o s i t iv e .
3- Of th e  rem aining v o te s  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty  th e  m a jo rity  
o f them came from th e  co n se rv a tiv e  s tro n g h o ld s  in  th e  South and W est.
4 . S ena to r Goldwater became th e  R epublican nominee in  1964 
w ith  h is  s tro n g e s t support coming from S enato r Thurmond; who sw itched 
p a r t ie s  from  th e  Democratic P a r ty  to  th e  Republican P a rty .
5 . N early  a l l  o f th e  Southern  Democrats e i th e r  openly supported  
S en a to r Goldwater du ring  th e  e le c t io n  o r s tay ed  a t  home on e le c t io n  day.
CHAPTER IX 
C0HCHJ8I0ES
The c e n t r a l  h y p o th esis  o f  t h i s  d is s e r ta t io n  vas th a t  th e  
L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  o f  I 963 re p re se n te d  a  " b ip a r tis a n "  e f f o r t  
by th e  Kennedy a d m in is tra tio n .
B ip a r tis a n sh ip  vas d e fin ed  a s :
1 . P r io r  c o n su lta tio n  v i th  members o f  Congress in  th e  i n i t i a l  
s tag e s  o f p o lic y  fo rm u la tio n .
2 . C ooperation v i t h  p a r ty  le a d e rs  in  Congress.
3 . B ip a r tis a n  v o tin g .
4 . Appeals to  p u b lic  op in ion  c a lc u la te d  to  g en e ra te  Congress­
io n a l  su p p o rt.
5 . Appointment o f  m in o rity  members to  re sp o n s ib le  p o lic y  
making r o le s .
P re s id e n t Kennedy appo in ted  many h ig h ly  q u a l i f ie d  R epublicans 
to  h is  a d m in is tra tio n . The most im portan t appointm ents v e re  John J .
MeCloy as h is  a d v is e r  on s c i e n t i f i c  and te c h n o lo g ic a l m a tte rs  and 
R obert S . McHamara as S e c re ta ry  o f  D efense.^
Mr. McCloy vas in s tru m e n ta l in  th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms 
C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency. The Arms C ontro l and Disarmament 
Agency vas fough t by th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee, p a r t i c u la r ly  Sen­
a to r s  G o ldvater and Thurmond. Through th e  e f f o r t s  o f  th e  Arms C o n tro l
1
Supra, C hapter I I I .
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and Disarmament Agency th e  U n ited  S ta te s  was a b le  to  ta b le  a  com plete
d r a f t  o f a  t r e a t y  a t  Geneva. The t r e a ty  re p re se n te d , fo r  th e  f i r s t
tim e , th e  im if ie d  th in k in g  o f th e  v a s t  m i l i ta r y  s c i e n t i f i c  and p o l i t i c a l
re so u rce s  o f th e  U nited  S ta te s .^
The appointm ent o f  G eneral Maxwell T ay lo r, a  R epublican, as
Chairman o f  th e  J o in t  C hiefs o f  S ta f f  was e f f e c t iv e  in  b r in g in g  a -
bou t th e  support o f th e  m i l i t a r y .  The testim ony  o f th e  J o in t  C hiefs
o f S ta f f  g en e ra ted  a  g re a t  d e a l o f  confidence in  th e  t r e a t y  th a t
2
would have been la ck in g  w ithou t t h e i r  su p p o rt.
The P re s id e n t ,  w ith  h is  eye on h i s t o r i c a l  p reced en t, appo in ted  
a  " b ip a r t is a n "  group o f S enato rs  to  accompany S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  Dean 
Rusk to  Moscow. O r ig in a lly  he asked  S en a to rs  D irksen and H ickenlooper 
to  go w ith  S e c re ta ry  Rusk, b u t th e y  re fu se d , contending th a t  i t  would 
g ive  th e  appearance o f  p r io r  app roval o f th e  t r e a ty  b e fo re  i t  was de­
b a ted  in  th e  S en a te . S en a to r S a l to n s ta l l ,  s e n io r  member o f  th e  Re­
p u b lican  p a r ty  and a  member o f th e  Armed S e rv ices  Committee d id  
accompany S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  Rusk to  Moscow.
O pposition
P re s id e n t Kennedy expected  to  re c e iv e  s tro n g  o p p o s itio n  from 
th e  " c o n s e rv a tiv e -c o a li t io n "  o f Democratic and R epublican Sera t o r s .
He had a  Democratic c o n tro lle d  Congress, b u t due to  th e  s e n io r i ty
^Supra, C hapter IV. 
2Ibid.
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system  most im portan t committees were ch a ired  by Southern  S en a to rs .
The Armed S e rv ice s  Committee was i r r i t a t e d  by h is  S e c re ta ry  o f De­
fen se  and had  opposed th e  e stab lish m en t o f  th e  Arms C o n tro l and D is­
armament Agency. I t  was from th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Committee th a t  th e
1g r e a te s t  th r e a t  and n e g a tiv e  v o te s  a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty  came.
In  o rd e r to  overcome th e  o p p o s itio n  from  th e  Armed S e rv ices  
Subcommittee and th e  c o n se rv a tiv e  members o f b o th  p a r t i e s  th e  P re s ­
id e n t  was very  c a r e fu l  to  co n su lt w ith  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  committees
2
concern ing  th e  p ro g ress  o f  n e g o tia tio n s  a t  Geneva. He sought th e  
adv ice  o f th e  F o re ig n  R e la tio n s  Committee and showed a  therm ofax 
copy o f  th e  t r e a ty  to  S en a to r D irksen , m in o rity  le a d e r  o f th e  S en a te .^
I t  i s  n o t to o  s u rp r is in g  th a t  th e  Armed S e rv ice s  Subcommittee 
opposed th e  t r e a ty .  I t  was p o in te d  ou t by members o f  th e  Senate  th a t  
th e  committee was composed o f  men who, th rough  t h e i r  long i d e n t i f i ­
c a tio n  w ith  th e  m il i t a r y ,  had developed a  " m il i ta ry  frame o f mind.
The m i l i t a r y  frame o f mind i s  d e p ic ted  by P ro fe sso r  C e c il V. Crabb 
as one re ly in g  on m i l i t a iy  f a c to r s  over p o l i t i c a l  f a c to r s  in  fo re ig n  
p o lic y  and "a p re d ic ta b le  re a d in ess  to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  n a t io n 's  m il i ta r y  
defenses a re  in ad eq u a te , i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f th e  c u rre n t m i l i t a r y  defense
^ u p r a , C hapter V.
2
Supra, C hapter IV.
% u p ra , C hapter V II.
4
S upra, C hapter VI and V II.
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spending. . .and a  tem p ta tio n  to  reduce complex d ip lom atic  is su e s  
in to  c o n te s ts  o f  power and fo rc e .
In  a d d itio n  to  co n su ltin g  w ith  th e  a p p ro p ria te  committees 
p r io r  to  th e  n e g o tia tio n  o f th e  t r e a ty .  P re s id e n t Kennedy co n su lted  
w ith  keymmembers o f th e  Senate on an in fo rm al b a s i s .  This concept 
o f "coopera tion  w ith  p a r ty  le a d e rs "  i s  e sp e c ia l ly  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  any 
re s e a rc h e r . The problem  a r is e s  because th e  methods used a re  p e r ­
so n al and c o n f id e n t ia l  between th e  Congressman and th e  P re s id e n t.
This a sp ec t o f  " b ip a r tis a n sh ip "  can occur a t  alm ost any tim e , any 
p la ce  and any manner. In  th e  in s ta n c e  o f  th e  t r e a ty  under consid ­
e ra t io n ,  th e  re se a rc h e r  was fo r tu n a te  to  be ab le  to  in te rv ie w  Mr. 
H ubert H. Humphrey. Mr. Humphrey in d ic a te d  th a t  i t  was a t  b reak ­
f a s t  w ith  S en a to r D irksen th a t  P re s id e n t Kennedy was ab le  to  con­
v ince  th e  m in o rity  le a d e r , "w ith an oveivhelm ing amount o f  s c i e n t i f i c
evidence" t h a t  th e  t r e a ty  posed no th r e a t  to  U nited  S ta te s  s u p e r io r i ty
2
or n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .
I t  may be debated w hether o r n o t appeals to  p u b lic  opin ion  
to  g en e ra te  C ongressional support i s  a  t r u l y  v a l id  concept o f  " b i­
p a r t is a n s h ip "  because th e  P re s id e n t must c o n s ta n tly  ap p ea l to  th e  
p u b lic  to  support him. In  th i s  in s ta n c e  th e  P re s id e n t a p p a ren tly
^Crabb, op. c i t .
% upra. Chapter V III.
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though t i t  was im portan t and he devoted a  g re a t d e a l o f tim e to
g en e ra tin g  p u b lic  su p p o rt. Ih e  H a rr is  P o ll^  in d ic a te s  th a t  th e
P re s id e n t was s u c c e ss fu l in  g en e ra tin g  support b u t what e f f e c t
2
th e  p u b lic  op in ion  had on th e  a c tu a l  v o te  i s  d eb a tab le .
As W altz re p o rte d , th e  P re s id e n t d id  n o t c la im  to o  much 
fo r  th e  t r e a t y .  In  f a c t  i t  seemed th a t  th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  w it­
n esses  emphasized what th e  t r e a ty  would n o t do more th a n  what i t  
would do. Hie t r e a ty  was b u t a  "hopefu l f i r s t  s te p "  tow ard le sse n in g  
o f  te n s io n s  and opened th e  channels o f  diplomacy between th e  S o v ie t 
Union and th e  U nited  S ta te s .
I t  was i n  th e  a re a  o f  "hopefu lness" th a t  P re s id e n t Kennedy 
s t a r t e d  h is  a d m in is tra tio n  and h is  "S tra teg y  fo r  P eace ."  The S tra te g y  
would have f iv e  s te p s ;
1 . A n u c le a r  t e s t  ban agreem ent.
2 . C essa tio n  o f  p ro d u c tio n  o f  n u c le a r  m a te r ia ls  f o r  w ar.
3 . P ro h ib it io n  on th e  t r a n s f e r  o f n u c le a r  weapons to  c o u n tr ie s  
n o t p re s e n tly  p o ssess in g  them.
4 . An East-W est agreem ent t o  ban n u c le a r  weapons in  o u te r  space.
5. H ie d e s tru c tio n  o f  e x isU n g  s to c k p ile s  o f  n u c le a r  weapons
3
and conversion  o f f is s io n a b le  m a te r ia ls  f o r  p e a c e fu l u se s .
^ e e  Appendix "B".
2
Supra, C hapter V III . 
^Supra, C hapter I I .
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The L im ited  T est Ban T rea ty  became a  r e a l i t y  du ring  th e  
a d m in is tra tio n  o f P re s id e n t Kennedy. He vas k i l l e d  in  O ctober 
o f 1963.
During th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f  P re s id e n t K ennedy's su cc e sso r. 
P re s id e n t Lyndon B. Johnson, th e  U nited  S ta te s  and R ussia  concluded 
th e  C onsular Convention. A H uclear N o n -P ro life ra tio n  T rea ty  vas 
n e g o tia te d  during  th e  Johnson a d m in is tra tio n  and r a t i f i e d  under 
th e  Nixon a d m in is tra tio n , in  I969. A lso d.uring th e  John admin­
i s t r a t i o n  th e  t r e a t y  banning th e  u se  o f  n u c le a r  veapons and o u te r  
space vas ach ieved . With th e  ex cep tio n  o f item s tv o  and f iv e  o f 
P re s id e n t K ennedy's "S tra te g y  fo r  Peace" th e  r e s t  have been ach ieved . 
This vou ld  seem to  v e r i f y  th e  s ta tem en t made by h is  a d m in is tra tio n  
th a t  th e  Limted T es t Ban T rea ty  vas b u t a  "h o pefu l f i r s t  s te p "  t o -  
v ard  le s se n in g  o f te n s io n s  -Kith th e  S o v ie t Union.
To ach ieve  t h i s  le s s e n in g  o f  te n s io n s  o r  d e te n te  v i th  th e  
S o v ie t Union, P re s id e n t Kennedy used  s ix  d ev ices commonly a s s o c ia te d  
v i th  th e  concept " b ip a r t is a n s h ip ."
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APPENDIX
TEEATÏ BANDING NUCLEAR NEAPON ÎCESTS IN 
THE atmosphere,  IN OUTER SPACE 
AND UNDER NATIffi
The Governments o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  o f  America, th e  U nited  K ing­
dom o f G reat B r i ta in  and N orthern  I r e la n d , and th e  Union o f S o v ie t 
S o c ia l i s t  R epub lics , h e r e in a f te r  r e f e r r e d  to  as th e  "O rig in a l P a r t i e s , "
Proclaim ing  as t h e i r  p r in c ip a l  aim th e  sp e e d ie s t p o s s ib le  
achievem ent o f  an agreem ent on g e n e ra l and com plete disarmament 
under s t r i c t  in te r n a t io n a l  c o n tro l  in  accordance w ith  th e  o b je c t­
iv e s  o f th e  U nited  N ations which would p u t an end to  th e  armaments 
ra c e  and e lim in a te  th e  in c e n t iv e  t o  th e  p ro d u c tio n  and t e s t i n g  o f 
a l l  k inds o f  weapons, in c lu d in g  n u c le a r  weapons.
Seeking to  ach ieve  th e  d isco n tin u an ce  o f a l l  t e s t  exp losions 
o f  n u c lea r weapons f o r  a l l  tim e , determ ined to  co n tinue  n e g o tia tio n s  
to  t h i s  end, and d e s ir in g  to  p u t an  end to  th e  con tam ination  o f 
m an's environm ent by r a d io a c tiv e  su b stan ces .
Have agreed  as fo llo w s:
A r t ic le  I
1 . Each o f th e  P a r t i e s  to  t h i s  T rea ty  un d ertak es  t o  p ro ­
h i b i t ,  to  p re v e n t, and n o t to  c a r ry  ou t any n u c le a r  weapon t e s t  ex­
p lo s io n , o r any o th e r  n u c le a r  ex p lo sio n , a t  any p la c e  under i t s  
ju r i s d ic t io n  o r  c o n tro l:
( a ) in  th e  atm osphere; beyond i t s  l im i t s ,  in c lu d in g  o u te r  
space; o r underw ater, in c lu d in g  t e r r i t o r i a l  w aters  o r  h ig h  se a s ; o r
(b ) in  any o th e r  environm ent i f  such exp losion  causes 
ra d io a c t iv e .d e b r is  to  be p re s e n t o u ts id e  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  l im i t s  o f 
th e  S ta te  under whose ju r i s d ic t io n  o r c o n tro l  such ex p lo sio n  i s  
conducted. I t  i s  u n derstood  in  t h i s  connection  th a t  th e  p ro v is io n s  
o f  t h i s  subparagraph a re  w ith o u t p re ju d ic e  to  th e  co n c lusion  o f a  
t r e a t y  r e s u l t in g  in  th e  perm anent banning o f a l l  n u c le a r  t e s t  ex­
p lo s io n s , in c lu d in g  a l l  such exp losions underground, th e  co n c lusion  
o f which, as th e  P a r t i e s  have s ta te d  in  th e  Preamble to  t h i s  T rea ty , 
th ey  seek to  ach iev e .
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2 . Each o f  th e  P a r t ie s  to  t h i s  T rea ty  undertakes f u r th e r ­
more to  r e f r a in  from causing , encouraging, o r  in  any way p a r t i c i ­
p a tin g  in ,  th e  c a rry in g  ou t o f  any n u c lea r weapon t e s t  ex p losion , 
o r any o th e r  n u c le a r  ex p lo sio n , anywhere which would ta k e  p la c e  in  
any o f  th e  environm ents d e sc rib ed , o r  have th e  e f f e c t  r e f e r r e d  to ,  
in  paragraph  1 o f  t h i s  a r t i c l e .
A r t ic le  I I
. 1 . Any P a r ty  may propose amendments to  t h i s  T rea ty . The 
t e x t  o f any proposed amendment s h a l l  be subm itted  to  th e  D epositary  
Governments which s h a l l  c i r c u la t e  i t  to  a l l  P a r t i e s  to  th e  T rea ty . 
T h e re a f te r , i f  re q u e s te d  to  do so by o n e - th ird  o r more o f  th e  P a r t i e s ,  
th e  D eposita ry  Governments s h a l l  convene a  con ference , to  which th ey  
s h a l l  in v i t e  a l l  th e  P a r t i e s ,  to  co n sid e r such amendment.
2 . Any amendment to  t h i s  T rea ty  must be approved by a  m a jo rity  
o f  th e  v o te s  o f  a l l  th e  P a r t i e s  to  t h i s  T rea ty , in c lu d in g  th e  v o te s  
of a l l  th e  O rig in a l P a r t i e s .  The amendment s h a l l  e n te r  in to  fo rc e  
fo r  a l l  P a r t i e s  upon th e  d e p o sit o f in s tru m en ts  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  by 
a  m a jo rity  o f  a l l  th e  P a r t i e s ,  in c lu d in g  th e  in s tru m en ts  o f  r a t i f i ­
c a tio n  o f  a l l  th e  O rig in a l P a r t i e s .
A r t ic le  H I
1 . This T rea ty  s h a l l  be open to  a l l  S ta te s  f o r  s ig n a tu re .
Any S ta te  which does n o t s ig n  th i s  T rea ty  b e fo re  i t s  e n try  in to  fo rce  
in  accordance w ith  paragraph  3 o f t h i s  A r t ic le  may accede to  i t  a t  
any tim e .
2 . This T rea ty  s h a l l  be s u b je c t to  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by s ig n a to ry  
S ta te s .  In s tru m en ts  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  and in s tru m en ts  o f  acce ss io n  s h a l l  
be d e p o sited  w ith  th e  Governments o f  th e  O rig in a l P a r t i e s — th e  U nited  
S ta te s  o f  America, th e  U n ited  Kingdom o f G reat B r i ta in  and N orthern  
I r e la n d , and th e  Union o f  S o v ie t S o c ia l i s t  R epub lics—which a re  hereby 
d esig n a ted  as th e  D ep o sita iy  Governments.
3 . This T rea ty  s h a l l  e n te r  in to  fo rc e  a f t e r  i t s  r a t i f i c a t i o n  
by a l l  th e  O rig in a l P a r t i e s  and th e  in s tru m en ts  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n .
4 . For S ta te s  whose in strum en ts  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  o r  acce ss io n  
a re  d e p o sited  subsequent t o  th e  e n try  in to  fo rc e  o f  t h i s  T rea ty , i t  
s h a l l  e n te r  in to  fo rc e  on th e  d a te  o f  th e  d e p o s it o f  t h e i r  in s trum en ts  
o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  o r  a cc e ss io n .
5 - The D epositary  Governments s h a l l  prom ptly inform  a l l  s ig n a ­
to r y  and acceding S ta te s  o f  th e  d a te  o f each s ig n a tu re , th e  d a te  o f  de­
p o s i t  o f  each in stru m en t o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f and access io n  to  th e  T rea ty , 
th e  d a te  o f  i t s  e n try  in to  fo rc e , and th e  d a te  o f  r e c e ip t  o f  any r e ­
q u ests  f o r  conferences o r  o th e r n o t ic e s .
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6 . E l is  T rea ty  s h a l l  he r e g is te r e d  hy th e  D epositary  Govern­
ments p u rsu an t to  A r t ic le  102 o f  th e  C h arte r o f  th e  U n ited  N ations.
A r t ic le  IV
T his T rea ty  s h a l l  be o f  u n lim ite d  d u ra tio n .
Each P a r ty  s h a l l  in  e x e rc is in g  i t s  n a t io n a l i ty  have th e  r ig h t  
to  ivbhdraw from th e  T rea ty  i f  i t  decides th a t  e x tra o rd in a ry  ev en ts , 
r e la te d  to  th e  s u b je c t m a tte r  o f  t h i s  T rea ty , have je o p a rd ized  th e  
supreme i n t e r e s t s  o f i t s  c o u n try . I t  s h a l l  g ive n o tic e  o f such w ith ­
draw al to  a l l  o th e r  P a r t i e s  to  th e  T rea ty  th re e  months in  advance.
A r t ic le  V
T his T rea ty , o f  which th e  E n g lish  and R ussian  te x t s  a re  eq u a lly  
a u th e n t ic ,  s h a l l  be d ep o sited  in  th e  a rch iev es  o f  th e  D epositary  
Governments. Duly c e r t i f i e d  cop ies o f  t h i s  T rea ty  s h a l l  be tra n s m itte d  
by th e  D ep o sita ry  Governments to  th e  Governments o f  th e  s ig n a to ry  
and acced ing  S ta te s .
In  w itn ess  w hereof th e  undersigned , duly a u th o riz e d , have 
sig n ed  t h i s  T re a ty .
Done in  t r i p l i c a t e  a t  th e  c i t y  o f  Moscow, th e  f i f t h  day o f 
A ugust, one thousand n in e  hundred and s ix ty - th r e e .
APPEIIDIX "B"
INTERVIEW WITH FORMER VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHEET 
JAMJAEÏ 8 ,1970, 'mCAIASTER COEnEGE, ST. PADL,MIM.
QUESTION: Mr. V ice P re s id e n t, w i l l  you g ive me your views concerning
th e  T est Ban T rea ty  o f  1963?
ANSWER: The g en es is  o f  th e  T est Ban T rea ty , o f cou rse , goes back to
some o f  A dlai S tevenson’s though ts o f  1956 and to  th e  estab lish m en t 
o f  our s p e c ia l  committee on disarmament in  th e  Senate which was esta b - 
l i s e d  by a  Senate re s o lu t io n  as a  se p a ra te  subcommittee and w ith  le g ­
i s l a t i v e  a u th o r i ty  and no t e s ta b lis h e d  under th e  normal procedures o f  
a  m ajor committee b u t by s p e c ia l  r e s o lu t io n .  I t  was a  jo in t  com m itttt 
f o r  th e  s u b je c t o f  disarmament and arms c o n tro l .  I t  was w ith in  th i s  
committee t h a t  we s ta r te d  to  d iscu ss  th e  n u c lea r t e s t  ban t r e a t y  and 
in  i t s  i n i t i a l  d iscu ss io n  s tag e  in c lu d ed  acro ss  th e  board  l im ita t io n s  
on atm ospheric underw ater and lan d  systems o f t e s t in g .  L a te r  on as 
we came in to  th e  6 0 's ,  we a l te r e d  th a t  because i t  became, q u ite  obvious 
t h a t  a l l  o f t h i s  cou ld  no t be s u c c e s s fu lly  o r w ithou t r i s k  m onitored. 
During th e  Eisenhower a d m in is tra tio n . P ro fe sso r  Berkner came out w ith  
a  re p o r t  to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  we could  m onitor t e s t s  in  th e  a i r ,  in  th e  
atm osphere and on th e  ground by space s a t e l l i t e  as  w e ll as  by o th e r  
e le c tro n ic  and m agnestic d ev ices .
QUESTION: I s  t h i s  our P ro je c t  "VELA" and i s  t h i s  in fo rm atio n  s t i l l
" c la s s i f ie d ? "
ANSWER; I ’m n o t su re , I  wish I  could  go over my re c o rd s , b u t P ro je c t 
VELA was one t h a t  I  pushed f o r  c o n tin u a lly  and was fought by th e  con­
s e rv a tiv e s  v e ry  h ard  f o r  a p p ro p ria tio n s  in  o rd e r th a t  we cou ld  con tinue  
s c i e n t i f i c  experim en tation  th a t  needed to  ta k e  p la ce  to  c a r ry  out th e  
B erkner r e p o r t .  I t  i s  my view f i r s t  o f  a l l  t h a t  P ro je c t VELA made i t  
p o s s ib le  to  s a f e ly  e n te r  in to  a  n u c lea r t e s t  ban t r e a ty  w ith  th e  S o v ie t 
Union and i t  was t h i s  f a c t  th a t  f i n a l ly  convinced— when we were ab le  
t o  dem onstrate t h i s  p r e t ty  s u c c e ss fu lly  to  D irksen, to  Mundt t h a t  thqy 
s t a r t e d  to  r e l e n t— to  g ive up t h e i r  re s is ta n c e  to  a  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .
I  spen t a  good d e a l o f  tim e ta lk in g  to  th e se  men and as  you know th e re  
was q u ite  a  l iy y le  argument about i t .  The Defense Department came 
t h r o u ^  v e ry  w e ll on t h i s ,  as d id  th e  Jo in t.C om m ittee  on Atomic Energy. 
Of course th e re  was T e l le r ,  and o th e rs , th a t  d id n ’t  ag ree  w ith  i t  a t  
a l l .  We had a  number t h a t  wouldn’t  go a long . Hans Bethe was a  very  
pow erfu l in f lu e n c e  and P ro fe sso r York, who was th e  P r e s id e n t’s a d v is e r , 
were b o th  s tro n g  c o n s tru c tiv e  in flu en c es  f o r  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty .
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QtlEBŒION: Mr. Vice P re s id e n t, in  th e  C ongressional Record you made
re fe re n ce s  to  "Strawmen" th a t  S ena to rs  Goldwater and o th e r  co n se rv a tiv e  
S en a to rs  s e t  up and th e n  p u rp o rted  to  knock down in  support o f t h e i r  
arguments a g a in s t  th e  t r e a t y .  Could you t e l l  me something about th i s  
a sp e c t o f th e  Senate debate?
ANS^ER: S en a to r Dodd was th e  most im portan t one in  my mind. Now I
worked w ith  Dodd on th i s  and th i s  was a  coup to  g e t Dodd. A c tu a lly  I  
was going to .in tro d u c e  th a t  re s o lu t io n  b u t we needed a  "hawk," a  s tro n g  
arm t h a t  had been a n t i - t e s t  ban t r e a t y  f o r  a  p e rio d  o f  tim e  to  support 
i t .
QUESTION: How d id  you g e t him to  change h is  mind?
ANSNEE: W ell, j u s t  a  p e rso n a l r e la t io n s h ip  b a s i s .  He had l i s te n e d
to  th e  arguments and a f t e r  a  long  s e r ie s - o f  p e rs o n a l  v i s i t s  he came to  
me one day and s a id , "you know, l" v e  begun to  change my mind about 
th a t  t e s t  ban. Maybe we ought to  do som ething about t h a t . "  And I  s a id , 
"w ell, I  was going to  in tro d u ce  a  re s o lu t io n ,  b u t , why don’t  you i n t r o ­
duce a  r e s o lu t io n  th a t  j u s t  p u ts  us on re c o rd  in  a  g e n e ra l way and 
s p e c i f ic a l ly  ig n o res  o r excludes underground t e s t i n g ."  He asked why I  
d id n 't  because I  was th e  le a d e r , and I  s a id , "no, you do i t  and I ' l l  
jo in  y ou ,"  and th en  we g o t a  number o f  o th e r  S en ato rs  to  jo in  u s . I  
always f e l t  t h a t  th e  b e s t  way to  g e t something th rough  Congress was 
n o t always to  be th e  f r o n t  man y o u rs e lf .  Tom Dodd was on th e  F oreign  
R e la tio n s  Committee w ith  me and we needed someone who w a sn 't ex ac tly  
f r ie n d ly  to  t h i s  concept and t h i s  tim e . He f in a l ly  came a l iv e  a f t e r  
h e a r in g s , t a lk s ,  and a  v e ry  good p e rso n a l r e la t io n s h ip  and hav ing  him 
appear as th e  le a d e r  was v ery  s ig n i f ic a n t  because a t  t h a t  tim e he was 
regarded  as an a l l y  o f H icken looper, Mundt and D irksen on th e se  m a tte rs  
o f disarmament.
QDESHON: What happened a t  th e  b re a k fa s t  w ith  S en a to r D irksen , S e c re ta ry  
M ansfie ld  and y o u rs e lf  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t th a t  le d  S en a to r D irksen to  
come around to  su p p o rtin g  th e  t r e a ty ?
ANSWER: The main reason  f o r  t h a t  w a sn 't  due to  my in f lu e n c e . I t  was
a t  th a t  b re a k fa s t th a t  th e  P re s id e n t, as I  r e c a l l ,  was a b le  to  b rin g  
in  some p r e t ty  s o l id  in fo rm atio n  as to  what P ro je c t  VELA would be l ik e  
and what th e  s e c u r i ty  f a c to r  would b e . This was, a f t e r  a l l  th e  m il i ta r y  
had re-exam ined th e  testim ony  and ny own testim ony  re g a rd in g  th e  p r o je c t .  
You know. S en a to r D irksen s t a r t e d  ou t a g a in s t  us on th e  t e s t  ban and 
C iv il  R igh ts and e v e n tu a lly  came a l l  th e  way around. Y o u 'l l  have to  r e ­
member t h a t  S ena to r D irksen always l ik e d  to  p lay  th e  r o le  o f th e  man 
th a t  f i n a l ly  brought about th e  v ic to ry .  He tras an a c to r  in  a  sense , 
and I  d o n 't  mean t h i s  in  a  deroga to ry  manner. He would r e s i s t  much o f 
th e  tim e because he wanted to  p re s s  you f o r  a  good argum ent. This meant 
t h a t  he could say to  h is  more co n se rv a tiv e  c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  "w ell, you see 
th e  reaso n  I  changed my mind i s  th a t  th e  evidence was j u s t  so over­
whelming th a t  I  had to  do i t . "  E vere t D irksen was never as co n se rv a tiv e  
as h is  u tte ra n c e s  o r h is  e a r l i e r  s ta tem en ts  i n  th e  Record would in d ic a te .
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But in  o rd e r to  su rv iv e  p o l i t i c a l l y  w ith  h is  p o l i t i c a l  h e r i ta g e ,  he 
had to  g ive  th e  appearance o f  being  much more cau tio u s  and co n ser­
v a tiv e  th a n  h is  re co rd  a c tu a l ly  dem onstrated .
QtTESHGlT: How, th e n , d id  he g e t Mundt and H ickenlooper, who a re
very  co n se rv a tiv e , to  support th e  t r e a ty ?
ANSWER: Mundt and H ickenlooper were b o th  on th e  F o re ign  R e la tio n s
Committee and th ey  l i s te n e d  a t  le n g th  to  t h a t  te stim o n y . H ickenlooper 
and Mundt were v ery  adamant a t  f i r s t .  They were w ith  th e  T e l le r  group 
so to  speak. But th e  evidence we had; th e  amazing amount o f  evidence 
we could b r in g  up as to  th e  s a fe ty  in v o lved  in  doing t h i s ;  th e  r e l a t i v e  
s tre n g th  we had from n u c le a r  s id e  as compared to  th e  S o v ie t Union; had 
i t s  im pact upon th e se  men. I n  a d d it io n , we had a  g re a t  d e a l o f p u b lic  
op in ion  on our s id e .
QUESTION: Many S en ato rs  m entioned th e  heavy m ail a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty
w hile  th e  p o l ls  in d ic a te d  s tro n g  p u b lic  su p p o rt. Was t h i s  an o rgan ized  
campaign a g a in s t th e  t r e a ty ?
AÜGWER: Yes, d e f in i te ly .  The L ife -L in e  Program, th e  Hunt b road­
c a s tin g  o u t f i t ,  P au l Harvey, and a  l o t  o f more o r le s s  co n se rv a tiv e  
r e p o r te r s  and commentators r e a l ly  steam ed i t  up . Edward T e l le r  was 
t h e i r  k ind  o f  hero  and h is  o p p o s itio n  to  i t  was always p o in te d  to  as 
support a g a in s t  th e  t r e a ty .
QUESTION: Did Edward T e l le r  have access  to  c u rre n t in te l l ig e n c e
in fo rm atio n  during  t h i s  period?
ANSWER: No, he d id  n o t. But he was s t i l l  such a  s ig n i f ic a n t  f ig u re
in  th e  development o f th e  hydrogen and atom bomb th a t  he was looked 
upon w ith  a  g re a t d e a l o f r e s p e c t ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  in  th e  more conserva­
t i v e  s e c tio n s .
QUESTION: Throughout th e  P reparedness Subcommittee h earin g s  th e
S enato rs  accused G eneral Maxwell T ay lor o f f a i l i n g  to  c o n su lt th e  
o th e r J o in t  C hiefs and in  f a c t  q u estioned  th e  t r u th fu ln e s s  o f h is  
testim o n y . At th e  s t a r t  o f th e  F oreign  R e la tio n s  h e a r in g s . S en a to r 
H ickenlooper asked th a t  each w itn ess  be sworn in .  Was t h i s  to  see  i f  
th ey  were a c tu a l ly  ly ing?
ANSWER: Yes, t h i s  was to  see  w hether o r  n o t th e re  was any evidence o f
p e r ju ry  and o f course  you have go t to  remember th a t  th e se  peop le , 
H ickenlooper and Mundt, were so adam antiy opposed to  any id e a  o f  d i s ­
armament. I  th in k  th a t  i t  i s  f a i r  to  say  th a t  most o f  th e  G enerals 
and Adm irals would ju s t  as soon no t have had a  li .ra ita tio n  on arms, b u t 
we d o n 't  l e t  G enerals and Adm irals ru n  t h i s  coun try  and when we do we 
w i l l  be in  se r io u s  tro u b le  and most o f  them adm it t h i s  a l s o .  The
209
P re s id e n t, a fb e r  l i s t e n in g  to  th e  c iv i l i a n  a d v is e rs ,  th e  te c h n ic a l  
adv ice  o f h is  s c i e n t i s t s ,  and th e  m il i t a r y ,  made th e  d e c is io n  to  go 
ahead w ith  ta lk s  reg a rd in g  disarm am ent. As a  m a tte r  o f  f a c t  th e  b e s t  
argument t h a t  ve had in  fa v o r  o f  th e  t r e a t y  came from th e  Department 
o f  D efense. G enera lly  th e se  people  a re  a u to m a tic a lly  c o n se rv a tiv e , 
th ey  b e lie v e  in  weapons, n o t non-weapons, b u t th e  s c i e n t i f i c  s id e  o f 
th e  Department o f Defense was overwhelming in  i t s  support o f  th e  t r e a ty .  
The Arms C o n tro l and Disarmament Agency was p r im a r i ly  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  
th e  sy n th e s iz in g  o f  to n s  o f in fo rm a tio n  th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  had been 
g a th e rin g  f o r  s ix  o r seven y e a rs  and th e y  deserve  a  g re a t  d e a l o f  c r e d i t  
f o r  th e  t r e a ty .
QUESTION; What was th e  purpose o f  S en a to r Goldwater ' s m ixing o f  th e  
term s "com prehensive" and " lim ited "?  Did he p e rso n a lly  n o t u n d e rs tan d  
th e  d if fe re n c e s  involved?
ANSWER: I  th in k  S en a to r G oldw ater p u rp o se fu lly  t r i e d  to  confuse th e
" lim ite d "  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  w ith  th e  "com prehensive" t r e a t y  because  most 
everybody— th e  v a s t  m a jo rity  o f S e n a to rs—would never had  v o ted  f o r  
a  comprehensive t e s t  ban t r e a t y  because  we ju s t  d id n 't  have e n o u ^  
evidence th a t  we cou ld  f u l l y  and ad eq u a te ly  m onitor what we c a l l  a  
sm all k i lo to n  t e s t  underground and we d id  have evidence t h a t  we could  
s u c c e s s fu lly  and c a r e fu l ly  m onitor t e s t s  in  th e  atm osphere and on th e  
su rfa c e . So I  d o n 't  th in k  t h a t  G oldw ater was be in g  fo o le d . He used  i t  
as an o p p o rtu n ity  to  c loud th e  re c o rd .
QUESTION: Had P re s id e n t Kennedy been a l iv e  in  1964, would S en a to r
Goldwater and h is  f r ie n d s  have used  th e  t r e a ty  in  th e  campaign fo r  
P res id e n t?
ANSWER: Yes, I  th in k  he would have u sed  h is  n e g a tiv e  p o s i t io n  on th e
t e s t  ban t r e a t y  a g a in s t  th e  P re s id e n t .
QUESTION: One p e r s i s te n t  theme o f  th e  S enate  co n se rv a tiv e s  was t h a t
th e re  were s e c re t  s id e  agreem ents made a t  Moscow. S en a to r S a l to n s ta l l  
accompanied th e  " b ip a r t is a n "  group o f  S en a to rs  to  Moscow, b u t he s t i l l  
asked Dean Rusk i f  th e re  were any s id e  agreem ents made. When Dean 
Rusk s a id  no, th e n  S en a to r S a l to n s t a l l  s a id ,  "and you say  t h a t  under 
oa th?"  Can you e la b o ra te  why th e  S en a to r asked th a t  question?
ANSWER: W ell, I  th in k  t h i s  i s  ju s t  a n o th e r o f  S en a to r S a l t o n s t a l l 's
way o f re a s su r in g  th e  c r i t i c s .  He was a  f in e  and w onderful man, and he 
was th e  epitomy o f  i n t e g r i t y .  I  th in k  t h a t  he was obv iously  under severe  
c r i t i c i s m  f o r  be in g  as a c t iv e  as he was in  support o f  th e  t r e a t y .  He 
was never a  fo r c e fu l  man, you know. He was s o r t  of=a k in d ly , honorab le , 
decen t gentlem an and I  have th e  f e e l in g  th a t  t h i s  was j u s t  a n o th e r way 
o f  removing c r i t ic i s m .  When t h i s  happens w ith  o rgan ized  m a il, th e  
S en a to r can quote from th e  Record and say , " I  took  your m a il s e r io u s ly
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and I  know you th in k  th e re  were s igned  agreem ents and so I  asked  th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  w h ile  he was under o a th  and he s a id  'n o , ' and I  
th e re fo re  j u s t  had to  b e lie v e  him ."
QJESHON: Was th e  L im ited  T est Ban. T rea ty  o f  I963 , in  r e t r o s p e c t ,  a
h o p e fu l " f i r s t  s te p "  tow ard d e ten te  w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union?
ANSWER: I  th in k  i t  was a  v e ry  s ig n i f ic a n t  f i r s t  s te p . I t  was th e  f i r s t
m ajor agreement between th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union on m a tte rs  
o f  n a t io n a l ,  and c r i t i c a l  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i ty ,  in  which we were a b le  to  
come to  some u n d e rs tan d in g . I  a lso  th in k  i t  was th e  f i r s t  tim e we were 
a b le  to  in v o lv e  th e  advance technology o f th e  space age in  th e  f i e l d  o f 
arms c o n tro l .  I t  i s  my view th a t  i f  th e  space program had done no th ing  
e ls e  b u t to  p ro v id e  th e  P ro je c t  "VELA i t  would have been w orth  every­
th in g .  The f a c t  th a t  we were a b le  to  f in d  an o p p o rtu n ity  to  t r u s t ,  and 
t h a t  i s  e x a c tly  what we were a b le  to  do in  t h i s  agrrem ent. Through th e  
advance o f  sc ien ce  and technology we were f i n a l l y  ab le  to  combine t h i s  
w ith  a  p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n  to  e n te r  in to  a  n u c le a r  t e s t  ban t r e a t y .
I  f e e l  th a t  t h i s  was a  s ig n if ic a n t  b reak th rough  between o u rse lv es  and 
th e  S o v ie t Union. T his le d  to  th e  n o n -p r o l i f e r a t io n  t r e a ty  and you 
know we made th a t  accomplishment in  a  r e l a t i v e ly  l im ite d  p e r io d  o f  
tim e . And now a f t e r  th e  n u c le a r  n o n p ro li fe r a t io n  t r e a ty  we have moved 
tow ard a  t r e a t y  on p la c in g  weapons on th e  ocean f lo o r .  We were a b le  to  
move on th e  p ro h ib i t io n  o f  th e  deployment o f  weapons o f  mass d e s tru c t io n  
in  o u te r  sp ace . I  th in k  th a t  i t  was th e  t e s t  ban t r e a ty  t h a t  s ta r t e d  
to  v e n t i l a t e  th e  clogged channels o f  diplom acy between th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
and th e  S o v ie t Union. I  d o n 't  th in k  we ought to  o v e restim ate  i t .  
own view i s  t h a t  we have to  n e g o tia te  ev e iy  t r e a t y  w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union 
on a  v e iy  h a rd  b a s is  and we have to  work w ith  p re c a u tio n , b u t th e n  th ey  
to o  have to  work w ith  c a u tio n .
APPENDIX "C"
SENATE INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE REPOET ON THE MHITARÏ IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE PEOPOSED LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
TEST OBJECTIVES
Can Be Done 
Under 
T rea ty
1 . S u rv iv a b i l i ty  and responsiveness o f h ard  ended s i t e  
m is s i le  launch complexes to  h ig h -y ie ld  n u c lea r  weapons. No
2 . Response o f  hardened underground s tru c tu re s  to  b l a s t
and c ra te r in g  from h ig h -y ie ld  su rface  b u r s t  weapons. No
3 . Response o f hardened underground s tru c tu re s  to  ground 
m otion. Yes
4 . D eterm ination  o f m is s i le  warhead and nose cone v u ln e r­
a b i l i t y  to  n u c le a r  exp losions during  atm ospheric r e ­
e n try . No
5. Reduction o f  m is s i le  warhead and nose-cone v u ln e r­
a b i l i t y  to  n u c le a r  ex p lo sio n s . Yes
6 . Study o f atm ospheric  and h igh  a l t i tu d e  ra d a r  b la c k ­
ou t phenomena. No
7. Study o f communications b lack o u t phenomena from 
h ig h -y ie ld  n u c le a r  ex p lo sio n s . No
8 . P u l ls c a le  o p e ra tio n a l t e s t s  o f AMB system s. No
9. Development o f  ABM warhead w ith  maximum l e t h a l i t y
and minimum b lack o u t p ro p e r t ie s .  P a r t i a l l y
10 . Development o f  very  h ig h -y ie ld  warheads equal to  o r 
su rp assin g  S o v ie t achievem ents. No
11 . D eterm ination  o f v ery  h ig h -y ie ld  n u c lea r weapons
e f f e c t s . No
12 . D eterm ination  o f underw ater n u c le a r  weapon e f fe c ts
f o r  improved an tisubm arine  warfare(ASW) system s. No
13. Development o f  weapons re q u ir in g  le s s  f is s io n a b le
m a te r ia l  th an  p re se n t d e sig n s . Yes
14 . Development o f  pure fu s io n  w arheads. Yes
15. Development o f  reduced f a l lo u t  weapons. Yes
16. F u l l s c a le  perform ance and r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  o f M inute-
man and T ita n  m is s i le  system s. No
17 ' Y ie ld  v e r i f i c a t io n  t e s t s  o f s to c k p ile d  weapons up to
a p p ro x in a te ly  one megaton. Yes
18. Y ie ld  v e r i f i c a t io n  t e s t s  o f s to c k p ile d  weapons above
approxim ately  one megaton. No
19 ' Troop and crew t r a in in g  t a c t i c a l  e x e rc ise s  using
n u c lea r weapons. No
211
APPEiroiX "D"
RESERVAaJIOIIS AND JMnMENTS TO
LIMITED TEST BAE' TEEATÏ
Goldw ater; S u b jec t to  th e  re s e rv a tio n , which i s  hereby  made a  p a r t  and 
c o n d itio n  o f th e  in s tru m en t o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  t r e a ty  by th e  U nited  
S ta te s ,  s h a l l  n o t be d ep o sited  as p rov ided  by paragraph  3 o r A r t ic le  I I I  
th e re o f  u n t i l  th e  Union o f S o v ie t S o c ia l i s t  R epublics has removed a l l  
n u c le a r  warheads and a l l  S o v ie t M ili ta ry  and m il i ta r y  te c h n ic a l  p e rso n n el 
from Cuba, and u n t i l  arrangem ents have been made f o r  in sp e c tio n  w ith in  
Cuba by th e  U nited  N ations to  determ ine and confirm  such rem oval, and 
con firm atio n  o f such rem oval has been g iven  by th e  U nited  N a tio n s .
R ejec ted  17- 75- For th e  Amendment:
B ennett Jo rdan , Idaho S ten n is
% rd , V irg in ia  Mechem Talmadge
C u rtis  Mundt Thurmond
Dominick R obertson Tower
E a s tla n d  R u sse ll W illiam s, Delaware
Goldwater Simpson
Tower R eserv a tio n  Number 1 : S ub jec t to  th e  re s e rv a tio n , which i s  h e re ­
by made a  p a r t  and co n d itio n  o f th e  re s o lu t io n  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h a t  
th e  in strum en t o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  t r e a ty  by th e  U nited  S ta te s  s h a l l  
no t be d ep o sited  as p rov ided  by paragraph  3 o r a r t i c l e  I I I  th e re o f  un­
t i l  th e  P re s id e n t s h a l l  have determ ined and c e r t i f i e d  to  th e  Senate 
th a t  a l l  assessm ents f o r  th e  fin an c in g  o f peace and s e c u r i ty  o p e ra tio n s  
o f  th e  U nited  N ations h e re to fo re  made by th e  U nited  N ations upon th e  
Union o f th e  S o v ie t S o c ia l i s t  Republics have been f u l ly  p a id .
R ejec ted  11- 82 . For th e  Amendment:
B ennett Goldwater Simpson
Byrd, V irg in ia  Jo rdan , Idaho Thurmond
C u rtis  Mechem Tower
Dominick R u sse ll
Tower R eserva tion  Number 2 : S ub jec t to  th e  r e s e rv a tio n , which i s  h e re ­
by a  . . . th e  t r e a t y  . . . s h a l l  no t be d ep o sited . . . u n t i l  such t r e a ty  
has been re v is e d  by th e  o r ig in a l  p a r t ie s  so as to  p rov ide  f o r  a  system  
o f o n - s i te  in sp e c tio n s  adequate to  d e te c t  any v io la t io n s  th e re o f ,  and 
adv ice  and consent to  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  t r e a ty  as so re v is e d  has 
been g iven  by th e  S en a te .
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R ejected  iS-'jS.  V oting fo r  th e  R eserva tion :
B ennett Mechem Talmadge
Byrd, V irg in ia  Mundt Thurmond
C u rtis  R obertson Tower
Goldwater R u sse ll  W illiam s, Delaware
Jo rd an , Idaho Simpson
M cClellan S ten n is
Tower on b e h a lf  o f Long o f  Louis ia n a :Sub j  e c t  to  th e  r e s e rv a tio n  th a t  
th e  t r e a ty  does n o t i n h ib i t  th e  use o f n u c le a r  weapons in  armed c o n f l i c t .
H olland amended Long " re se rv a tio n ” to  "understand ing^ ijh ich was accep ted  
by vo ice  v o te .
Motion to  T able by M ansfie ld  accep ted  6l - 33* V oting a g a in s t:
A l lo t t  Goldwater R obertson
B e a ll H ickenlooper R u sse ll
B ennett H i l l  Simpson
%rrd, V irg in ia  H olland Smith
Cannon Jo rd an , Worth C aro lin a  S ten n is
Cotton Jo rd an , Idaho Talmadge
C u rtis  Lausche Thurmond
Dominick M cClellan Tower
E astlan d  Mechem W alters
E llen d e r M ille r  W illiam s, Delaware
E rv in  Mundt Young, Worth Dakota
R u sse ll Amendment: Add to  th e  re s o lu t io n  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  a  pream ble 
s ta t in g  t h a t  amendments to  th e  t r e a ty  would be s u b je c t to  ap p rova l 
by tw o -th ird s  o f  th e  S enato rs  p re se n t and v o tin g .
A ccepted 79“9 * V oting a g a in s t:
Douglas H art J a v i t s
McCarthy McWamara Morse
Moss Weuberger P e l l
APPENDIX "E"
VOTING RECORD OF SENATORS AGAINST THE 
TREATY AND THE AMENDMENTS
Voting A gainst
the  T reaty Goldwater Tower#l Tower#2
B ennett, Utah yes yes yes
*Byrd, V irg in ia yes yes yes
*Byrd, W. V irg in ia no no no
* C u rtis , Nebraska yes yes yes
* E astlan d , M iss is s ip p i yes no no
*Goldwater, A rizona yes yes yes
*Jordan, Idaho yes yes yes
*Lausche, Ohio not v o tin g no no
Long, L ouisiana not v o tin g not v o tin g no t v o tin g
*M cClellan, A rkansas no no yes
*Mechem, N. Mexico yes yes yes
*R obertson, V irg in ia yes no yes
* R u sse ll, Georgia yes yes yes
Simpson, Wyoming yes yes yes
Sm ith, Maine no no no
* S te n n is , M is s is s ip p i yes no no
Talmadge, Georgia yes no yes
*Thurmond, S. C arolina yes yes yes
*Tower, Texas yes yes yes
*Member o f D em ocratic-R epublic " c o n s e rv a tiv e -c o a li t io n "  a s  d e fin ed  by 
the  C ongressional Q u a rte rly , 1963.
APPEiroiX "F" 
HAERIS POLL
Reasons f o r  Favoring  or 
Opposing th e  T est Ban September
U n q u a lified  approval
Cut f a l lo u t 21 12
Must end t e s t s 18 18
End r i s k  o f  atom ic war 15 12
Stop w orld s u ic id e 13 6
S tep  to  w orld peace 9 0
H alt th e  c o s t o f  t e s t in g 5 4
Q u a lif ie d  app roval
I f  R ussia  keeps h e r  word 
Only w ith  in sp e c tio n s  
I f  on our term s
11
8
2
1
29
12
12
5
Opposed
R ussia  w i l l  b reak  i t  
W ill h u r t  U. S . defenses
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k
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